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1CHAPTER 1
1.1 INTRODUCTION
During the past century in Svuth Africa, approximately 52 major
incidents have occur-red resulting from ignitions of methane and
coal dust involving considerable loss of life and damage to
installations. The methane and coal dust explosion which
occurred in 1926 at the No. 2 pit of the Durban Navigation
Collieries. for example. killed 125 persons and the
re-establishment of production at the colliery took 4 months to
achieve. It is the author's view and that of almost every Mi1"'''''~
Engineer in the Republic that, following the example of thl-'.
United Ki.ngdom. the outcome of such serious incidents should be
made known to the Mining Industry in an attempt to prevent such
incident3 occurring again. UnfOrtur.ately this is not the case in
the Republic of South Africa and fr~q\lent requests to the Mines
Inspectorate have met with little success. An analysis of
several Il1£jOl:' ind ..denu conttl..inedin the Mines Inspectorate
offices in Dunde.e. as discuss.1i in the dissertation. reveals some
I,:,;
unique circum.stAhcefi surrounding these disasters of which most
Mining Ensineerc are unaware and hence unable to take future
preventive action in mining operations.
The Northfield Colli.ry disaster in 1943 was pr~ceded by a
succession of events. if one studies the Inquiry evidence. ",hich
can only be described as a recipe for disaster.
As aore and 20~. rel&tively shallow eo.1 reserves are depleted.
80 will the Mintnl Engineer of th. future have to grapple with
the proble .. of working th~ deeper and .ore gassy coal seams,
particularly in tho Tron.va.l. This problem will be aggravated
by the fact that relatively high daily production tempos will be
called for - daily production call. ~f 30 000 to 40 000 tons of
coal will be the ~orm and to achieve these tonnages consistently
and safely will require a high degree of technical knowledge and
2competence. not the least being the aware.ness of the dangets of
methane and coal dust and the methods in dealing with these
occurrences.
The evidence gblen at Inquirles into the 155 :i.nt1idents. including
instantaneous mAthene outhurste. :is available from the Government
Mining Engin€:er's Department. From the incidents. it is possible
to sub divide the causes of the ignl.tions and the format of the
di~serta tion. into the f:>l1owing chapters.
2. Ignitions of Firedamp by frictional heat and apark i.ng,
'3. Tg!1iti?ns of Firedamp by lightning and stray curxent.s,
4, Tgnitiomo; of Firedamp by blasting cper at Lona and mine
eX,!>losive~,;.
o
"
\;
\,
5. Ignitions of Firedamp by fJpon\;\sneous combustion including
\ "heatings in the goa! and mine fiV!8.
''I"
I:
6. Ignitions of Firedamp by electI~:~:f sparking and faulty
electric.l equi}lment. ~\
\~\
\\
\~
7. Ignitions by flaMs. ,0
11 \\
',\,
8. Inctantaneous methane outbuuts. \\\\
'~,
9. Conelwaion.. ''\\
\\
\\
In eacb of tbe Abovementioned chapter.. the author\~ropo... to
deal with the proble •• buildibl into each sub headinal~haPt.r the
eUlIlple.' available froll the Mine. In.pet:tbrat. Inquiri~\ relating
to the variou. incident. and then to orr!". at propo.a~. after
,\
r$s.~reh work. in or.der to prevent further incid.n~~ from
'\oceurrinl in the future b•• ed on the premi•• that fpr.ventf~n is
"
better than cure'.
\'\
"\-,
It is not intended to incorporate a ~eparate chapter on the
conditions for a methane/coal dust explosion to occur. However.
it is the at\tho:.-:I s int€ntion to deal with this aspect in each of
the abovementd.oned chaptiezs ,
1.2 NUMBERAm:. SEVERI'£Y OF METHANEAND COAL DUST EXPLOSIONS
An examination of the available evidence derived from various
source material reveals the following list of explosions which
have oct.:urre~ in South Africa.n collieries over the past 100
years:
Table 1.1
Date Colliery Nature of Explosion Fatalities
Natal
1891 Elanlislaagte Methape 1
(.
1897 Elandslaagte Methane 3
Natal Navigation Methane Nil
1898 Natal Navigation MUhll\ne 2
Campbell Methane Nil
St. George Methane Nil'
1899 St. Georp Meth.\ne 4
South A.frican Metha\'l" 2
South African Mathane Nil
Natal Navigation Methane Nil
1901 New eaapbell Mothafl. 3l
1902 Glanco. Methane Nil
cClenco. M.thane Nil
Crown Mathine Nil
1~O3 St. Geor.e Methane 2
':;)
ltauay M.tltane Nil
South A.frican Meth.ne 2
1904 Ra8l.8ay Methane 1
!landslaalte '~~~.th.ne Nil
'+
Table 1.1 (Contd.)
Date Colliery Nl'lt!E'8 ()r Explosion FatalitieG
Natal
1905 Crown Hethane Nil
Glencoe Methane 1
G1.Gncoe Methane ~~il
Newcastle St€!am Methane Nil
Dundee Goa.l Methane 1
South A~rican Methane Nil
South African Methane 1J.
19015 E1.andslaagte Methane 18
Elandslaagte Methane 1
1907 Ramsay Methane 1
:,-:- Methane/Coal19C18 Glencoe Dust 71
19C18 Cambria#::=; Methane/Coal Dust Nil
Ramsay Methaq,_1! '1..
191 )9 S\')uthAfrican Methane 1
1910 Cambrian Meth;qne Nil
1911 Utrecht Methane Nil
1~'12(' Natal Navigation Methane Nil
1914 S.A. Collieries Methane 1J.
1915 Hlohane Methana 1
Hattingspruit Methane 1
1918 Rlobane Med.ane Nil
!-lort.bfield Methane \} .'Alil
" 1919 Durban Navigation
No. 2 Methane I
Northfield Methane Nil
1921 Northfield Methane 1,',
Hlobane Methane 1
Bannockburn Methane Nil
Burnside Methane 6
1922 Utrecht i'l Methane N' ,1....
Burnside M(!thane 1:0
Natal Nayigation Methane Nil
1923 Hlobane Methane 12
ra:b:t.e 1.1 (Contd.)
Date
Natal
1926
1928
Ii
1930'11
1937':\
1941
Ii!) 1943
194~
1944
1945
1948
1949
1951
1952
1~53
1~54
,cc~j,,-.._' '
i~~_,j.}';ti
195("
196('
I)
1962
Colliery
'Burnside
Durban Navigation
New Tendeg,a
Tshcba
Burnside
Utrecht
Utrecht
Northfield
Tlshoba
Hlobane No. 1
T.hoba
Ca.brian
Utrecht
Durban Navigation
No. 2
Northfield
Rlobf'tneNo. ?
Kloban.- Nc. 1:
Northfield
lfewell8'l;I/1.e- Pta tber'i
Clu'na~'n Anthracite
C6\mbrian
J)u:~banNaviaution '.
Mo. :3
5
Nature of Explosion
:t-!ethane
Metham:/Coal Dust
Methane
Meth::me
Methane
Methane
Methane
Methane/Coal Dust
Methane
Met!lane
Methane
uMethane
Methane
Methane
Methane
Ketha~./Co.l Dust
"MethanfdCual Oust
\
" Methane
Methane
Methane
r..thane
Kethano
Kethane
Natas' Coal b:ploration MethaM ))
!nPlilae
Wortht:'ieU
hyuti
',\
Methane
'Methane
Kethan~
Fatalities
1
125
1
Nil
38';\
I
)1
Nil;,!
lS(!
78
Nil
Nil
Nil
9
3
Nil
1
5
1
1
2
Nfl
Nil
wU
Nil
10
1
Table 1.1 (Contd.)
Date
Natal
1965
1960
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1912
1974
1975
(\ -',
1978
1919
1980
Collie~y
Hlcbane No. 1
Indumel"l.i
Durban Navigation
Ki.Lba'r chan
Newcastle Flatberg
Ki.lbarchan
6
Natur.e of Explosion
Methane/Coal Dust
Methane
Hethan(.
Ms!thane
ME!thane
ME!tha!le
!ndumeni M.~thane
Natal Coal Exploration Mfethane
Indumetli
Endu.nerri.
Kilbatchan
Indutt!,eni
ME\lthane
Methane
Methane
Methane
Natal Goal Explor8.tion Met:hane
Kilbllrc'han
Indullleni
Durban Navigation
EnyaU
Ucre(iht
North field
Durban No.vicgati:pn
P. C.J' • .contracr~tS
Newc"stle Pllltberg
Durb_tn Navigation
Durban NflVi gat Lot,
Durbsn N...·Yigation
Durb@D Navigation
Dllrb,.n H.-rig.tion
:~(!"cact1e P'~.'!ltbe:-g
Nilwcaetle Platberg~
Balgray
Durban •.Nevis.tion
Durban.Navigation
B&1gray
Methane
Methane
Me1.4ihane
Methane
Methane
Mf.!thane
Methan~;
Methatllt
Meth~he
MetMn(il!.
Met't!,r.ne
Methane
Metib.ar.e
Methane
Met:n",ne
Met'hane
Mf!t1'hane
~etihllne
Methane
Methane
FlfJ.talities
Nil
Nil
eu
Nil
Nil
Nil
Nil
Nil
Nil
3
Nil
Nil
Nil
NU,
',B
Niii~
\[
Ni\~
\1,
Nil'
1\
281\
1\
NiV
Nil
Nil);
•.:1
,'M
\\
i Nil
\ .\ N:l..l
INil
\
,Nil
\
II 1
\\~'il
'Nil
Nil
7Ta..,le 1.1 (Co':ltd.)
Date Colliery Nature of Explosion Fatalities
Nat,::,1.
1981 B!llgray Methane Nil
Durban l'!A.vigation Methane Nil
Newcastle Platb",rg Methane 10
Ba l.gr-ay Methane Nil
Newctlstle Platberg MethA.ne Nil
Durban ~lavigatioll Methane r'l1
Balgray Methane Nil
1982 Durban Navigation Methane 1
1984 Durban Navigatinn 11ethane Nil
Durban Navigation He thane Nil
Transvaal and Ot:ange l're~ State
1935 Cor:solidated
:ofarsfield MethanelCo~l Dust 95
1936 South Rand
Exploration Met;han~ Nil
1;;0,41 Consolidated
Collieries Methane Nil
1943 Consolidated
Maflfield Methane NU
1944 Consolidated
Collieries Met1:)ane Nil
1945 Landau/Nllvigat;,o~ Methane 10
1947 Consolidated
(ICollieries M.thane 1
1951 Cornelia Methant; 11
,')
1956 Schoon8e~_;icht Metha~l. 8
1957 S}'r!.ngtielt' Met:hanllll 8
1960 Schoong.zicht :.fethane Nil
1961 Coalbroo'k Methane 7
196~. Sprinsfield Methane 1
,.' 1972 u.;utu Methane Nil
1974 Albion Methane 13
8Table 1.1 (Contu.)
Date Coll~ery Nature of ET.plosion Fatalities
Tz-">nsvaal :."~ndO;:ange Free State
1973 !Tsutu 11ethane
Usutu ~ethane
Ermelo Hines Methane
CO.ll'brook Uct:hant~
Ernie Lo Mines M\~thane
Ermelo Mines Methane
Springfield Methane
B(lsjespru:it Methane
Springfield "{ethane
Ermelo Mines Methane
Springfield Methan'l!
Springf:teld Met.hane
Ermelo Mines Methan~
Errnelo lot!. nes MethanElI
Middelbult Metha.n .. 1Cos. 1 Dust
Springfield MethaM
Springfi.eld Methan.e
Springfield Metha'ile
Errnelo Mines M~ths.ne
Nil
1.
1980
1980
1981
N· ,~~
Nil
Nil
.:
1982 Nil
Nil
(. I)
1983
11
Nil
1
1984
1985 30
2
Nil
Nil
Nil1990
The inddents of tilet;~Hlneoutbursts Ln South Afr'icar. collieries
E:t'e set out in Tab;A! 8.1 in Ch<tpter 8.
While no fa!:.litie<.l have occurred lUI a reault of these outbursts.
it :is evid~Qt. from the project IIIt\,1d.y. that the vast qus.ntiti.!s
of methe,ne and coal dust liber.8,ted. coupled with th. destruction
of tha ventilation appliances. ere·' ~ an unfavourable environtnt!nt
in the working faces. The 155 incidents ql,i.~ted is'1 Table 1.1
resulting in 799 fatalities. justify an elulmination of the
probletl.
Tht! projeet suffered from a limitation in that much emphasis was
pla<:ed on Official M:l.nE's Department Inquirhs and in Ulan~'
instances conflicting evidence and blatant untruths come tu the
9fore. An attempt has been made to highlight and eliminate such
episodes.
With regard to methane ignitions and coal dust explosions, it has
been established tha.t 6 ignition sources have occurred and the
central chapters are davoted to an examination of each of these
sources. namely. spontaneous combustd cn , e:l.ectric sparks. flames.
lightni.ng ant! stray cur rent s , frictional heat Lng and blasting.
10
CHAPTER 2 IGNITIONS OF METHANE BY FUCTIONAL HEAT AND
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2.2.1 Over.sea~
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2.5
2.6
2.6.1
2.6.3
2.6.4
2.7
11
Friction between Steel Tools and Rocks - Laboratory
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Springfield c<'llliery. 28th February 1981. Ignition of
methane in goaf. \\
Ermel~ Mines. 12th Nov••ber 1982. Ignition of .ethan~
in old wot'king •• '.'
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2.1 INTRODUCTION
In 1981 a methane ex~,1osion at 07hOO on a Saturday morni.ng at the
goaf edge of a stooping sect ion in a Transvaal colliery killed 2
men and injured a further eleven sectiun workers. Officials. at
a loss co explain the origin of the explosion. put forward a
theory that the miner had allowe,i uncertiHcated Black workers 'Co
fire charges :in the split or in a fendel: ./hil~h blast had igrLited
the methane. Subsequent investigations revealed that in all
probability the explosi® was 'Caused by frictional heat during a
col;tapse of s t ratia in the goe,f. Such was the lack of knowledge
at operational level in the hdustry at t~ time on th~ dangers
of ignition of firedamp by frictional heat and sparking.
With the increased level of maximl~ extraction techniques
practiced (pillar. and. rib pillar extracticn and longwal1ing) and
the greater use of conti.nuous miners both in development and
retr:eat systems of mining. the hazard of frictionl'c.l heat and
sparking will increase proportionately. FriQtional htHlt arising
from the steel of coal cutter picks and the picks of continuous
mining Qlach;inesstriking quartzitic sandstone has been the cause
many methane ignitions.
t~e £lne froll a blown out shot or a Hre is morl! visible and
sp)ctacular than frictional heat and spe.rking and is viewed al." a
mote efHci.tnt ignition source (oft.en erroneously) in an
explosivQ methane/air mixture. 'It i,. ner:essary therefore to
e~·"mine the ignition temperatures of methane/air mixtures as t.t
point of departure when studying ignitions resulting frQm
fdctio,~a1 heat which i~ gene:rally not that visihle.
Secondly. an examination is Qlade of overseas laboratory
eXl'eriment<l deali.n& with frict;ional heat and sparking between
14
various eLemer.t s and substances. Very littlE', if any, research
has been car r i.ed out :i,nSouth Africa on this subject.
The knowledge gained from overseas research into frictional
Lgn i tLons of methane is applied to conditions which have existed
in South African coilieries. Conclusions have been drawn as to
the possibility of ignitions being caused by this ignition
source.
The known cases which have been reported and ::'n:vc.:;i.igated are
given. several of the more important incidents aze discussed in
detail and finally precautionary measures to prevent such
phenomenon from or.:curringin the future are dealt with in this
Chapter.
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2.2 STATISTICS
2.2.1 Over.se(!;.s
Hartwell (1965 ) states that ignitiot1o caused by frictional
heating can be grouped into those resulting from cutting
operations and a much smaller number resultin.g from other
frictional means such as hand blows from picks. rocks fallil,:;; on
metal work, etc. Table 2.1 compares the number and percentage of
ignitions in the United Kingdom from all frictional causes and
those from cutting only in the successive six year periods of
1952 to 1957 and 1958 to 1963.
Table 2.1 Ignitions caused by frictional heating
No. of Ignitions Other
Frictional Percentage of during Frictional
Year Ignitions Total Ignitions Cutting causes
1952 10 38.5 9 1
1953 14 32.6 12 2
1954 9 33.j 7 2
1955 11 36.7 9 2
1956 16 53.:i 1«; 1
s.':I':'I1 13 23.l_ -~Mean ar....,u.l
68 % 35.8 60 8
1958 8 32.0 8
1959 s 17.2 5
1960 16 16.5 14 2
1961 8 38.1 r 1
19~2 8 42.1 8
196! ..2. 47.4 8 1
Meanannual "54 % 39.7 50 4
16
Figure 1 shews the number and locations of ignitions of firedamp
in British coal mines from january 1958 to December 196'~.
Tab1.e 2.2 shows the cause and location of ignitions and Figure 2
the number of ignitions in ...ioa l mines.
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That the numbers are small mt!st reflect 10'\'1gas emis~ions, since
ill the majority of headings, unlike faces, rock is being
deliberately cut. Although few Ln number. ignitions in drivages
::lre potentially more dangerous because of the generally low
• .c1a 1.r ,_...ows.
During the period 1980-1986 there w~~c 40 ignitions in the
Federa l, German Republic (Marthe, personal communication, 1~187).
'VIithin this total ~ 17 were caused. by shea rers, ll. by boom-type
roadheade rs and 9 by full-'face tunnelling machines a much
'higher proportion in headings than in the UK. In ce Latri.on to the
number of ma.chine type:: in use~ these correspond to ;:oates of
0,020. 0,015 and 0.:S06 i::;nJ.tiOlw per machdne per year. Over the
same period in the liK for roughly similar coal outputs, there
were 75 ignitions. 66 with shE::arersand 4 with boom-type heHding
machines.
Table 2.4 Number of Ignitions by Machine Type
Machine
Shearer
Fixed
Rangtng
In-web
TrE!panner
Trepan-Sh\:p.rer
Plough
Coal Cutter
Total
Period (April ~. March)
1965 1970 1975 1980 1985
to
1910
to
1975
to
1980
to
1985
to
1987 Total
51 40
4 :>
16 17
3 3
1
4 3
79 68
":)
20
19
14
2
26
16
1
2
13
9
113
67
39
41
6
2
8
7
1
1
60 47 22 276
Frictional ignitions caused by th, t:utter picks on llower loaders
and heading machines continue to be a hau.rd. In 1981 they
to~al1ed 24 - equal to the highest ~ecorded total (for 1977).
Figure 6 shows that over the last fiftean years the average
at about 14 incidents perincidence has pers>{sr~ntly 17emained
I f'>,\
year on longwall fac/'ll'aespite a reduction in the number of power
1,<
loaders at ~ork.
TaLle 2.2 Cause and t.ocatlon 0'; Ignitionu
Location
Stables f,) Rudin,_ I of
.",d Gat~ and narro..- No. of total
Paceo fast .ands Rippings Roads workings Shafts Elsewher:a ignitions i;;nitions
Frictional heating dr.ri.ng
cutting 54 .~ 1 \j 58 37\I
Frictional heating:
rock!reetal 1 2 1 4 :3
Shot firing 10 t: 19 10 43 27
'F,lectridtv 11 1 2 1 3 1 19 L
Static eiectricL~ 1 1 1
Lightning discherg,! 1 1 1
Naked lights 2 1 5 8 5
S£i?king -.\ 1 4 2 3 IOk 6
Fa~lty Fla.~\~k.p8 1 1 2 1
Spontaneou. ~b~bu_don 2 :3 5 3 ,_..
F1... cut t ing 4 4 2 '-0
Unknown 1 1/2 . uu: 1 4 2
No. ef iID~.tionll! 82 10.5 26 ~.5 23 6 4 J.59
I of total i&ni.Lons /,) 52 7 16 4 14 3 3 100
j"_'
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Hartwell (1955) further states that in the twe~ve year period 37
percerrt of repor.ted :i.gn;Ltion~ were att:::i.lmted to fried.onal
her-tt1ng and of these ni.ne tenths occur-red dur Lng cutting ('.1
:i.gnitions with conventional cutters and 9 T..,ithtropanne r s and
sheare't:s in che last half (If the period). There W,Hl a 3 to 4
percent rise in tho proportion of frictional ignitiDns in ~he
Lat er 3ix yet.'t period and there has been a noticeable trend ::.n
the Last thrEE) years towards a !d.gher pr-opcrt i.on (1£ ignition::.1
w 'h t reparme xs end 8h(~arer,5; ft"lr instance. of '.:he 8 1.g0:Lt:tons
du: 7ng cut tLng 3.1teady re?orte"~ Ln 1964, two were with cutters,
two in t repanne r pre+cues and four with shearers.
The importance of frictional heating as an igniting source may be
judged from Figure 2 which shows the part pla!ed by a11.
frictional ignitions in the last twelve years.
Fortunately t:lEl lar-slS majority of the mot'e recent ignit10ns ir~
cuts have imrolved relatively small accumulations of fit-edamp
evolved frot!! freshly exposed surfaces of the coal: the
inflallUlaticJns have usually been confined to continued burning of
gas in the cut for periods of up to 30 or 40 minutes in a gassy
seam before oeing extin&ui.h.~. In one such inc~dent in ~
1.7 metre cut at the fac(J of a development heading. flame was
I!lxtinguiah~d 1.;./2 hours after ignition occurred; in another the
violence of the ensuing explosion w.s aufficient to disturb stona
,lun QT. a barrier 120 metres from the face; in others the
develop1l'lent of fire. hall led to the 8ft.ling of districts,
Easingto\" Colliery (1951:\381 killed) experienced a large scale
explodotl which va. initic.ted in. the cut and served to emphasise
the .edous haurd ft'~1D ignitions ofii this pa,t\lrq.
1 '
The•• isnltion. DUly be aore frequent than the above data 8ugint
for it wo",ld be idle not to think that ignition of. 8ma11
quar.titie, of ,as "have occurred. p..~tieularly at t.he bad. of deep
cuts. wirhout being nl)ticed. In general it would appear from
such ,lata 88 are available that ventilation velocities en the
,?-1
face have little or no influlmce on a:..r movemetrt s in the cue and
the only cettain preventive meaHure that can be applied
present is the positive ventilaticn of the cut.
On 24th Fer-nary 1979 an underground coal mine expLcsion in the
No. 26 Co1.1:.ery. Gl~,ce Bay, NO'va Scotia. killed 12 miners. In
its final report on the disaster. issued in April 1980. Canadian
Department of Labou!: investigators attributed the explosion to a
frictional ignition.
Tht!: last mille explosion disaster:in tiie ~Jm.t.ed Stutes in which
fricti::mal ignition was c-ms i.der ed a likely cause occurred on
15th Dceembez- ::'963 at Carbon Fuel Company No, 2 fHne at Helper.
Utah. Investigators of thil:; exph:sion in which nine minf,rs died
found that it. had or.iginated At" thp! f:at:~ wh('re an explosi,ve
mixture of methane. sir and coal d J,.t had heet' i.gnired ei.ther b~
f·ciction.:ll sp3rk& b.·om thE; bits of a (!<l!:tinul)us miner cutting
:..nto tor rcck or by arcs \)r st>ar"lc:.z: fr')m e.lect-t;: cal equipment.
Since. 1970. when a miner was k~;r: y:dclt~d as the result of ,....a
frictioflal ignition. roomine fstaH~i •• ir; the Unih:d States have"
b6en attributed to this ceu.f!. However. frictional ignitions
reported to MSHAhave accounted felr .21 avert Ie of lIlore than th!:'fl61
injuria. a , •• r to conti'ft\10UfJai~er oper.to!'. and thei l' helpers
in the pa.1: 10 ~t'.. 11'•• 0118C..... accordina to en MSHA
Technical Support Industrial Safetr Branch rep~rt (979). lIlethane
f1 .... travelled 15 metrea or more fro. th. point of i&nition at
the facie.
(:0/
II
n•• pit,a.. dOWtl1fard tr.n4 in the- fNque,!'cy" <If '!liD. .zpl(J.~.on
di.. etlltrllin recant de~fS~ ••• tfilt t!req\Wft(:)' of. reported lIethene
j_f,niti~n. j.\\ und.r5ro~d coal dIliJ•• lUi_ b...... ridul" wi t~i the
i. \ •
inCl'.a,si~1u.. of
i~•• ;t..r {pal ......
_, \-..:_> -,
'"'<':0
h••.,. • iniag .li~c:hil'1.8
\1
explorations of
the accC!!II'I.panyinstable (Table 2.3) ''lieu freque'l1<:Y of r0ported
methane ignitions by .ource fro. 197.t t:broulb 1980. By totallingq
Ii
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the figure.3 for consecut ive fJ.ve·"year per i.ods , it can be seen
that thez e were a total of 't80 r~polted frictional ign.itions
during the first half of the decade and 329 ign:i.tions during t:he
Lasr he.l f. of the 'O ..~rioc1.
Espechl1y alarming to MSHAIudus t r LaI Safety Branch Personnel
and to Bur-aau of Mines fil:·e and explosion researchers was the
inc.'cease from 47 ignitions in 1978 to 97 in 1979. Although
fr~ctional ignitions de~raa~ • to 72 in 1980. the decrease ig not
b".ing viewed as a revez-sa.l of the long term tl~'ward trend and
~eseerchers note that the 1980 total is still higher than thBt of
any previous year except 1979.
Most of the ignitions occur:ring f:!l:lchyea.r involve the cutting
bits of mining machi.nes , Acco.tding to an ~:SHAanalysis oE 223
frictional ignitions attributed to continuous ruiners from
,.
1971-1.976. about 64 per-::entwere caused by bits striking roof
rock and 22 p.arcent; were the resu'-t of bits striking includons
ilithin.the coal seam. The remaining 14 percent we::e attributed
to bits s ...dking the mine bottom.
(J
(1981). supecv1isory
"Centre, outl:~ned\1 the
it
v..rious reReareh approaches and ::'ro~J thlilmd01tr'into four ~lroad
flammabl4;, mixtures. preve~~:Ln'
icnition q,uenching and Ilface
.: inertiDI' If. uchine opentor i8 f!utting i.nto hard ... terl~als
where there b. loeal flalJllllltbl. eir/Illethane zone. a m.t~i\.n.
II
i
q
I,
I
In .. recent article. Welby C. Courtnf..Y
Pittaburh Resetl"chran.reh Che.ist at the
araa5, prevent ina fora.tioD of
ignition of flll_.ble !Ilhc:tUrtl8.
i~i don and explosion can occur c~
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Table 2.3 This table shows the annual fre<;,uency of underground
fd.ctional ignitions reporttld in, the U.l.ited States
fer the past 10 yeats. During the past; five years,
such ignitions occurred nearly twi.ce as ofte:-, in
underground coal mines as they did during the earHer
five-year period
1971 19'72 1973 19'14 1~t5 197'6 1977 1978 1989 1980
Con t inuous
Miner 30 20 "? 44 50 57 37 36 74 55...~
Cutting
Machine 3 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1
Roofb('llter 0 1 1 0 3 2 <3 10 5
Roof ~'all 1 2 0 0 1 2 0 0 0 1
Shearer 0 0 0 0 0 4 7 2 13 10
Hand Pick 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0--
Total 34 24 23 45 54 67 46 41 97 72
The annual totals of firedamp :i.gnit.ionp in the United Kingdom
(Browning 1988) cnused by cutting tooh·. since reporting of thebe
was made cOQPulsor~f. i. shown in Fi2.ure 3. The year 1965 covers
\' 0
a 15 month peric>d w~,en the char;Se was ude froll calendar years to
fiscal yean (Apr;.g 'i-Q f<;:.reh). It wa. in 19~5 that the first
ignitions" occurred with power loade::J and it is the incid(lnts
since thp.n that are nllevant to current mining practica.
Ii
In th. 22 year p,rlod to March 1987. there have bflen ::JO~'
19n:l.tioDs reported. ,:i just ~d.r 14 ,an avera"e of per yaa.r.
Co.lf.c. machine. have been r..pondble fer 276 of these. ~ith 25
occurrit'll i.n hftadin,. and 1 involving ro,..fboltina. Despite eOIll.
370 e~l1i..ry clo.ure •• then h'18 only been a .li~t downwud
"
trend :~nnwaber of incidents ensure 4). When the nUllben at:., .
related to output (Figut'4i 5). there ue dgn. that the rate is
increasing. One might have expected the increag. to b. greater
,,_""
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1iliththe introduction of multi-machine faces and larger. more
powerful machines able to cut readily through harder strata.
One clear feature from the figures is that ignitions are more
likely to occu:J:'in the thinner seams; although seams 1,2 m and
undc t" comprise only 25% of the working faces. they are
responsible for some 65% of the ignitions. This is put into
per.spective by the figures for the past 5 years when there was 1
ignition for every 27 faces at 1,2 m seam height and less
compared with 1 ignition for every 88 faces in the thicket seams.
The higher rate in thin seams may in part be due to the machines
used in these conditions.
Statistics relating to coal face machine types are shown in
Table 2.4. 'l'hetable reflects the changes in machine utilisation
over the years. and in general. the. numbers fo1."the different
machines is in proportion to the numbers in use. The exception
is the in-web shearer which does appear to have a much higher
incidence. An analysis of ignitions for the 10 year period
1973-1982 (Slater. unpub Ld.shad data, 1982) showed that ignitions
occurred with in-web shearers at a rate of Ot121 per machine per
y~er" Oth"!,,frf\UIitWf\I!U 0.016 for trepanners. 0,014 for r.anging
dr~ shearers and 0.013 for fixed drum shearers. However. this
doe. not necessarily convey the true picture. since .oms maqpines
lIayonly b. used in conditions wher~ there is no i.gnition riaL
If the rates are estimated on the basis of use on known
friedonal ignition risk sitea, the rates become 0.124 for in-web
shearers, 0.133 for trepanners. 0.030 for ranging drum shearers
and 0.027 for fixed drum shearers. These results clearly
indicate that the in-wftb shearer and the trepanner have
characteristic. which make th.m more prone to ignitions, although
it must be r.membered that both machine. are usually based in
thin .eSIUI.
Of the 302 frictional ign~,tions since 1965. only 25 (8.2%)
occurred in ·drivages. 11 of whi.ch involved continuous miners and
dinth.ader •• 11 booll type ro.dheader •• and 3 other machines.
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temp<:!rature will cause its :i.gnit:i.on. It is therefore nece asacy
to consider not only the ignitibility of mixtures of methane and
air. but vrha t may be termed the "incendi vity-" of various S()~J:rCf':S
of heat with respect to them.
30
The reasons for thia sustained frequency of incidents are complex
and varied and include the ever-increasing power :!.pplied to the
cutting element and the continuing evolution of the shearer and
in particular the in-weh shearer.
2.202 Sc,uth Africa
V:i.ljoon (1988) in dealing ..71th ignitiorw and explosions of
methane, says that an evaLuat Lon of the information ava'i.LabLe for
the p(~riod 1970 to 1986. reveals that the c:r:mGes and or~lg:1.m; can
be clsGsified Q& fol1ow9~
Causes
Neglecting to test :2or:methane
Inadequate ventilation
Sources
Blaiting operatior ..s
Di~ectly by flame or by inher~nt hot gaseb
cElectricity
Dt'.lI1agingor misuse .of electrical equipment
Frii~tion II fY )Irr~·tal t on r:>clt
! j "
()
High speed impact of m~taf on
"U&lltning
Via boretlOles or str.tll
Other
The use of prohibited articles on r{l collapses i~ goaf
·1
areas
Unknown
/1
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A summary of the aforementioned sources which contributed to
exp Lo sz.cns is give':'} below (for the period 1970 to 1986).
Table 2.5
Source
Number of
incidents
Number
injured
Number of
fatalities
------,---
Blasting 10 16
'Electricity 6 9
Friction
Co.alcutters 11 20
Continuous
miners 14 21
Shearers 1 2
Roofbol t~rs 2 3
~ightning 6 9
1Other }
() Naked flame .f 2 3
Roof collapl!l8S 7 11
ankno~l 4 6
------
r~tal 6S j,OC
c
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27 3
164 79
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2.3 IGNITION TEMPERATURES OF METHANE (FIREDA!-~P)
Morris (1984) has done considerable research into early
experiments conducted on ignition temperatures of methane ,
:::.3.1 Def:i.nition
I f a mixture of .1. J.redamp and ~..i!: iE; gt'adt!ally raised in
temperature throughout its extent by some e:.'CternaJ. source 0';:
h~at. the rate of combination between oxygen and 'methane
gradually ~lcreas~s. It rMdily a.t
temperatures of lib out 3{)OoC. The react:i.on betwe=n oxygen and
methane is aceomparri.ed by an flvolution of haat , so that tn~;.'
rro<i-'Ucts of combustion, and any unburnt lnixture with which t}>ey
mingle. are at a higher temperature than that supplied to thet.t by
the external source of Zie!:\t: and as an increase ill temperattire
increases the rate of reaction, there is !t. tenden<:y for this tate
of reaction to go on inc\'el\si!l8 rap~dly until tne whole of l:he
methana. or the 0ltYaen. in the r4ixture is conauaed, If the
init~,d tt!l~e:t".rtfte imparted to the milttute by the e:r:tel"tlal
\.
'(Jurc"c~f heat t.~ 1Iluffic:ient:Ly hi&h~ ,the rate elf reactirm wi1~
(7 > ".
becot:le 110 rapid.,. to~t:.t.~du.l:e "f1 .. 1.... Thus the combi~ltttj an
bet"~~ o:ryi.n and .ethllne, ~~1:!:~Q of proceeding at Ii tt,ruu"
inc1':~uil:j8 IlI})eEld to a conclufllon. ,,'ill be co'apl.ted comparatl1.vi! 1y
" .--.,,. II ...
:ludden1.,. l>1 the 1-'&1186,. of. flame"through the mut:u,e. The !M:Hu1l
I!
frll' th<t i.nidal telllpel'ature imparted to the mixture that ::~1i11
11
just enabl. tlfi. ph.no.enon Illtitaa.:ely to occur is I '.:he
.:
ignition-temperature of tha mixture.
(\
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2.3.2 Early Expe.·::i.men'':s
Coward and 'i'rheeleg (1925) stated that the earliest recorded
obse rvat Lons on the Lgn i.t ion tem':~el'ature of firedamp wer.e made by
Davy :i.n 1816 ·t..no stated that 1I~..el1 burnt;" cha rcoa l., ignited to
the st:rongest r.ed heat. 6id not explode any mixture of air and of
the firedarlp; i.e. cha rcea L that burnt w·:l..thoutflame was blown
up to whi teness by an. (;:{.plosiv~ mixture containing the firedamp.
without producing its LnFl.amms.tLon,
Cowar d (195l,) continued that Mallard and Le Ch::..t(:1ier (1880)
att·.:!mpted t.c make a more p::ecise determination of the minimum
tempe,'ature of ign:i.t:!.oll of methane by heating methane-air in
closed porceLa Ln tubes. Thf:y obtained ignitions in the range of
600°C to 750°C. and :i.n addition discovered the now well-known lag
Ott ignition. which r-eached about 10 seconds at the ignitiOl.
temperature and gradually fell to almost zero as the tube
temperature was increased to lOOOoC" This discovery served to
exp Ladn Davy's difficult:y in igniting f:i.redamp wi.th iron rods.
for convection would rapidly :replace any urdt of the mixture in
contact with a rod.
\ ,~~--"
The fact that the ili)ige {if temperature over which ignitic.n occurs
is lower when the me1Chaneis mixed with oxygen than when it in
mixed with air shows th$.': the ignition temperature is d.ependent
upon the concenc ra t Lcn of the reacting gase.. llent!E! W-! would
'eI' explltct to find that <tiffe rent mixture. of methane and air should
1....:/
have differ~nt ignition ~~e8lperaturell. This hall bee$l found to b.
so by Taffanel Il!ld I.e Uoch (1913) who .aployed a variant of
\.':,:/
Malliard and I.e Chatelier's method of ~xl'eril1.nt. using heated
".acels of diffet'~nt aiz.SI.
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T.\J.bl£ 2.6 Relative Ignition Telrperatures of Mixtures of Methan.e
and Air (Taf1anel and Le Flc,ch)
Methane in aiL
.?ercen''':
6.9 to 7.0
8.2 to 8,3
9,0 to 9,2
10.1 to 10,3
11.9 to 12,0
Relative ignid.on tt?tnperature$
15 cubic cent~metres
Degrees Ce:u;ius
275 cubic cent:!necrcs
Degrees Cel.sius
7'H' 675.J;)
735 680
742 680
755 710
765 no
The imp{lrtant fact demonstrated bv Taffanel and Le Floch 1::; that
the ignition temperatures over the whoie range of ud.xtur~s wer.e
lower when the vessel employed in the experiments was La rge r ,
'Dds is an effect of surface 01: "catalytic" action as affecting
the values obtained for ignition temper.atures by methods of
experiments which involve contact of the mixture with a heated
surface. and was first pointed out by Dixon and Goward (19Q9).
Dixc'l and CO'{.lsrd (1909) devic~d a new method of. e:x:peri.net
whereby the i.l':.flarnma.blegas anI the ait, (or oxygen) cou l.d ht=
heated sepa~4tely. and then lIl110wed to mil1g1e. After successive
t~ials. a t~mperature could be founJ such that when the hot
L"lf1ammable st. and the hot ait' mixed with one another.. flue
appeared. For lIIethan~ the figures given by D1.xon and Coward are;
with air. 65Co6 to 750°C; with oxygen. 556°C to 700oC. Ordinar.y
~ariation. in barometric pressure were fO,""nd to h.~e no
appreeb.ble effect on the ignition temperatuO:liis.
2.3.3 Ianition T•• perature. obcer,ed with Miniai •• d Surfaee
'1ffecu
In order to reduce surface effects on the ignitiun t.lI!peratures
of S88e3. H.B. Dixon in 1914 used tvo mBthod. of eXF8riment.
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In th~\ first methcd , the concent rd.c=tuba method, a jet of gas
(e.g. pute methane) Lssued from a narrow tube into the c~htre of
A. wide vertical tube up which a stream of air was moving; the
gas and air were thus prebeat ed to the common temperature of the
two tubes, and mixtures of all compositions between pure methane
and pure ~dr would be formed around the jet. With flow:tng gases
and a slclwly rising temperature, ignition of methane occurred
within the range of about 540°C to 750°C. according to the
va rLouu rat es 0 f fhlW in the tests (Dixon and Coward 1909). A
small alteration 'was later made in the p't:ocedure; at a chosen
methane
ignited
temperature and with a steady stream of air. a supply of
was suddenly started ane' the interval of time before it
waS m~asllred; the rate of flow of methane was increased in
uuccess Ive series of expe:dments until almost identical results
were obtained wh':h further increases; (Coward 1934):
Table 2.7
Tima interyal before ~.gnition Ignitiun Temperature
Seconds 0,,,v
0.5 722
0,6 718
1 701
2 684
3 674
5 663
In the secl,nd of Dixon's methods (Dixon snd R,;o;rwcod. 1935)
r.on8l.deratil)n is giveil to a methfJd of experiment sUl&gested by
N.rn8t which. as elabo\~.t.d by Dixon (1914). pr.obAbly l.'e<:ords
with conl!lidlu.·.bleaccuracy the true ignition temperatures of
II
various mix1;ures - at high presaures. In this method the mixture
of known c<)mpositi.on. is co.pre.sed adiabatically ih& thoreby )
rapidly h..a1:ed throughout itl extent. The liegro. of cOllprenion
required to cau.e ignition of the Ilixture b det;ermined by
su~ceasive tri&l. (with fresh char,~. of the mixture) ~nd the
36
temper.atm~·e corresponding with that compression can be calculated
from the fOt"r.lul.a:
T2 '= ( v: )=r (V2)
-1.
in which T1 and TZ ar the temperatures cf the mixture befot;'f' ;;1.1d
af~er ccmpcass i.on (~~xprc:'ned in degrees abxo l: \~e;) VI and V2 the
initial and fLnaL v'llume!'>; and is the ratic.' between the mean
spC:f~ific heats of the mi~turo of gases at constant ,\roltL1!e and at
'I'h.ere are. unfortunately. 1. Hable deter.minations available of
the ignition tel'lparatnres of tlLi.r.turl-~sof methane and a:i.r by th:LS
method. The Hgl.lreg:i.vun by F:':Ilk. (1907) who was the fil"l:lt to
use the method. in 650°C for a mixture cont adnd.ng 10 percent of
l'lethane; but Dixon has shown uhat. his expe r imenticl, Clrrangemenl:s
were defective and Hable to give too high results. Probably
between 600uC and 625°C Ls rt~'llr"'r the truth, and such a fig:Jre
represents the Lgni.t Lon t.en' ,r.e t.lt the pr.essur.e employed co
produce it, namely. b,~tween _ .:.nd 1..0 atmospheres.
A correlation bet'k'e;en the conr:ent(·lc tube and tht' adiabatic
f!ompression result:" tl')t' the: ignition temperature of methane in
air:is sho~ in Figure) (Di.xon and Harwood ..935) • The two
curv.aII relate to different canses of pr.ltluure. for the concentric:
(,I
(;) c:»
tublt ex-peraent. were liluited to a 1I1aximwa of about 1 atmosphere.
pres,ure; whet'aa~ the adiabatic c9'~prea.ion experiments "{I.1:(.th
/ (
mixture. at various irdt:id tE!mpf!i.tu~e. and pressures) W\lre
limited to "lI.iol,JpllD'l '~f ,.bQ;)t 19 atllt1.pheres. attainet} 3& a
reIJult"of. the sudden ccmpn,as:i\'On. HC)v~v.r. thl!! result. of the
tvo ..erioa are nearly in li\le and auu.at tbat tbe oba.arvatiotls
Ln buth were l8r~ely independent of pOoldble ~atalytic efflllct61 by
soliel lSu~f",c.s in contact w;'th the gas •••
(1927) Wfrre
concluded by Jones "\:",..n;lnk}'~ 810na procedure. similar to that
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developed by Tatfanel and Le Floch (1913' and Mason and 'W1v='!elet
(1924) •
A cy l.Lndr-i.ca l quartz vessel of 108 cubic centimetres capacd.ty was
haat.ed in an elecr:ric furnace to a pretietermine·1 temperature"
eWH:u,.ted. and the required gas mixt'.ll"e int:rodllced. TIle lowest
temperature to which vessel had to ba heated to obtain ignition
of tne mix.tut'e was obse rved , Ignition occurred after a time
:i.n,terval (lag) of sovez'a L se conds , during ,...hich the mixture
self-·r.eated as a +esu lt of i.ts slow combus tLon ,
!t:;n:b:Ion temperatures obsez OI'ed ir. this way have n') abso lut;e
va lue I fa!' they vary with the size and shape of the vessel use~
and I':.l'parently witl'. some other facto:r. For these reasons 8UC~
ohservai:iofls have not been regarded as other than relative.
:b'igur,e 8 showq the results obt.ained for methane, ethane. and a
nI~ttlral ~ac ~f the app:roxiu:ate compl)sition CH4, 88,7; C2H6• 7,4;
C3HS' .1.4; C4H:\O.1,0;, and ~'2' 1.5 -percent. The ig.niti('ln
t()lli~e:iAclJre of cho nat!.1l:"a.l gas was 1m.'er than that of methane
thro\.!S!lf)!.lt whole series inflU!Jllable mixtures.
15°C to
,
d:,fferal'lce irA t:heu\ c~yCWlt8tabc.s" ranged, frOM about
for mizl:lJr.. ot tlqu~\l content »f inUuuaable 888.
~at. th()" ~,ilbe4:' hydrocarbons hava a greate:;,
in'!tUfOnce on the 1.p'h:f..on tetaperature when the total inflUllllable
&1lS \i.~ pn.ent in ~:::.t,ateraaounu. I:
\ 11\
'\ n \
l(r,\)"llaldlt., of -the ti..e la, in ignition i8 lap~ t.ant in comparins
\ I
t1ut ir1nUt.~bi!hy of ,...... for" in '!lactie~ 1 o~ration. the
'd~gerou. 18(41.ia:ture 1M,. b. !onatantly flov:~n,' ,p~n the high
tellper.atu:r •• euree of i~,nitioll and th.rdor~ .,~ have a pedo,", of
~ont.et whichb len tban the 1.,. ' \~'
\\
\'!'hill tiN 1&, of ipitil':n will "be dis<.:u.... d in 'Mora detail in
n
It ~~=~.ar
~/
proportionate
'~
CMpt.~ ,~ C'&tplodona eaus.d by explolhes).
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2.3.4 Effect .. of Small Quantities of E'oreign Substances
Coward (1965) stated that several substances, accelerators and
inhibitors. have proved to have a considerable effect on the
ignition temperature of methane. Dixon found that the presence
. of traces of nitrogen peroxide in the atmosphere of the
concant rdc-cube apparatus reduced the ignition temperature of
metbane; the efiel!t reached a maximum of 122°C i:l the presence
of 0,7 pe+cen t of N02• This discover,. which led to important
results in the chemistry of chain reactions. suggested also the
possibi.!ity of discovering a t(~chnically l1seful inhibitor and
Dixon found that the presence of smal:!. fractions of one percent
of iodiile and several compounds containing iodine ,n: bromine
oraised the ignition temperature of methane by 80 C and more.
Both carbon dioxide and nitrogen r~dse the ignitior. temperature
of methanli'! in air. in the concentric-tube: appe ra tus , but 0uly by
a few degrees for each percentage of the added gaC! (Coward.
1934).
The presence of a little ammonium nitrate dust Ot finely divided
solid explosive reduced the ignition temperatui::e of a puff of
o '"methane and air blowncinto a heated tube. from 7(10C down to
330°C in an e:lttrellle ca... Other combustible substances ht.d a
much smaller ~ffect so it i. pc sible that the action of the
explosive waa 1.rgj~ly ~e to nitrogen parox:ide produced by
"
thermal dec(.)1llposit~pn (S.H.R.B. Annual Reports for 1942. 1943 and
1944).
P:rom this short sUli1lSUlry of the att".pts that have been ru.de to
f.)determine the ignition te.peratures of ,a••ous mixtures it will
doubtless be realised that. de.pite its value •• • measure of the
absolute ignitibility of a given mixture, the ignition
te.perature does not t,.ll .. "«ining !naineer all th:\t he n... d. to
know regarding the pOI~dbility of that mixture being i..,.ita-i.
'l11e fact that a mixturu ha. an ignition te.peratur.. of 8ey 6COoC
does not neceasarily In.~.n th4.t any source of heat at that
o
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2.4 IGNITION SOURCES
2.4.1 General Account
'namsElY(I965} stated that the ignition of gas by mechand.ca'l
action occurs in cirdtffistanCe$, common enough in a heavy
:indtli3try. in which motion takes place against ftictional
resis~tance. Very little haat is taken to ignite gas and the
e,bsoq:.\ti.t;>nof ene rgy by tn,~ process is of negHgible irupo1:tance
t~ the motion of the bodie$! concerned. Hence a.lthQugh there is a
vague conr.~ct:ioJ in that th.\! gre~ter the powers involved the more
fa~rourabl\! can be the Chf;"C~\S of an ignition. the connection is
\Te::y loos~ and ~rtainly th6\re is nothing like a quantifiG.ble
relationship ~
The phencmenon divid~ )l.ll'lII1ddiately into two:
(i) Frictional. ignitions in which the energi.es are derived
purely ft.·ommechan;.c..l sources , exau,lple rock on rock.
Ii
\,'
(ii) Frictional ignitions in which the proce~e is l~itiateci
by a mechanical source but iJ.t'ought to fruition by
light alloy
a
,rhemical evolution of heat. ~1'Ul11p1e
\\
~~~l'Ity steel.
\
The nature of friction has been made m~ch cleare~ DY the ~esearoh
on
of Bowd.n (1958) and his cotle.suGle. By:ieflYo"sotid. hodie:i make
contact throi1sh n:, more than a few'pctr.ts. their nU1'!lr'~l"SlId area
being decided by the total load. I t th~ load iJ {ncrf>!ilu~.~the
pointe yi~ld. progressively bringing o,th~r surfaces intI) contact.
~J
Ths P1:'ot'3 continues 'lntil stability is a.gain re8ched wt,en the
new load io equal to t::he produc t o~ a n6W surf~' ~ area :nu'1tiplied
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by the stress at which contact surfaces are operating. When such
surfaces are dragged across one another, the local ,issipations
are gru:.l.t. the contiact; poLnt;s are soon brought to softening
tempe rattrres and t:he load spreads to an increased aeaa with the
temperature at which the load carrying surfaces are operating
being the softening point of the more easily ao f tene d body.
Impact is somewhat different of course I but a l.t hcugh impact may
take place with neither surface loaded beyond the e1asti.c limits.
the more common situation is likely to be onf: in which plastic
deformation occurs together with the associateu evolution of
heat.
It is important to note that the temperatures reached in
frictional ignitions of dle first kind (chemically inert) are
normally much less than those reached in frictional ignit{on of
the second kind, or by explosives or by electric arcs. The
latter group involve temperatures ranging up to 2 500°C or more
whereas pure frictional ignition (chemically inert) is not likely
to exceed 1 200°C.
2.4.2 Ignition of Firedamp by Frictional Heat and Spa~king
Frictional heat and the spar.king often associated with it have
b~en regaroed as more less proven causeS 'Of explosions in coal
minea. The emphasis (2nded to be laid, for a while, on the
l.~cendivity of the sparks: possibly beceuse of their more
obvious l!ppeal to th~ eye of an obseever. LaUr. the surface
from .which glowing particles had been torn seemed to be the more
dangerous becau.e a simple frictio~ spark (that is. one that is
unaided by hurning) could not be hotter thar: the surface from
which it l..dbeen erodea and would in f.ct;,lle cooling froll the
moment 01 its creation; beaides .. the hot surface reme.ina in
relatively leng ccncac t with the neighbouring part of the
firedamp-.ir mixture whereas the flying spark is consta','ltly
moving into fresh mixture. Sti.l1 later. and <[uite recently.
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attention has been directed mainly to the danger of those hot
particles of matter which may maintain and €Nen increase their
temperature by burning. such as the sparks from aluminium and its
alloys and even ferrous
the burning of readily
variously estimated as
which temperatures magnesium and aluminium are so
metals. ThE~ temperatures attainable in
combustible metal particles have been
some 27000C to 37000C (Rae. 1961), at
quickly
vaporised that they burn a~ flames rather than as glowing
I,articles. At such temperatures the leg on ignition of methane
must be very short so that it is not surprising that light-metal
sparks are incendive~
2.4.3 Fd.ctional Heat and Sparking in Coal Mines
Sparking is no more than an extreme fOl~ of fricti~nal heating in
which particles of the bodies concerned are torn off and ejected
glowing visibl)" Concern with sparking was first expressed in
connection with th~ the Spedding Mill. Volta (1777) questioned
the safety of Spedd:i.ng's invention following experiments in which
a hydrogen/air mixture was ignited. It is unlikely ~hat. he
ignited methane/air in the same way but hif:jviews on the HUl
appear to have bet:tl ficcepted. Be that as it may, from Volt.a's
time onward. mechanica.~. ignition has, time and ng8.in9 bElen
reported as the source of mine explosiqns.
IConsidepable laboratory experiments have been undertaken ov~rseas
rf'sard~;hgthe ign~~ion sources of .aethane in the sphere of
fricttbna1 heat and sparking. In ad )itit>n. teports of actual
expe.1iences in.mines are invalua'"le .s will be shown later in
thij ::.:hapter.
Coward and Ramsay (1965) reported that falls of rQof. especially
,.
where a hard rock is involved, ~~ve given rise to frictional
effects that have caused ignition of firedamp_
Tney continued that the report of the Prussian Firedamp
Commission (1886) described a series of observations in German
mines thus: "gradual bending in of the roof. accompanied by
cmlnous crack1.:i.ng; and then suddenly. with a crash like thunder.
the maases (,f rock fall in. and the place is lighted up for.
several seconds by flaring streams of sparks which together form
a veritable 'sea of lurid fire I '.
Ignitions of gas by hard rock falling ante iron or other bard
rock have bept1 reported (Gray, 1908; Redmayne at a1. 1914;
Rogers. 1950). More serious in their results was an explosion at
Lewis Merthyr, South 'Hales, in 1956. ascribed to the impact of
rock falling onto a steel arch (Jones. 1957).
Well authenticated reports of ignitions caused by impact between
tools and various hard rocks were summarised by Burgess and
Wheeler (1929).
Sparki~."" by the picks of coal cutters has been frequently
report: , (Roberts. 1952) and thel't.was at that time a general
c\
impression amongst mining people that it Wt:l.S n.otdangerou:::. "But
an analys:i.s of all
Britain) f·.rom1,937
repor~ed cases of igni.tions of firedamp (in
to 1951 has shoYn that. excluding ignitions
from naked lights. coal cutter picks are second only to
explosives as an igniting medium; 91 ignitions werQ caused by
coaleutter picks and 100 by exploa{vt's" (Roberts. 19521.
2.4.~ Ezperirlental Work on lrictional Ignitions of 'firedamp
//
~rictiGln.l ,parks may be incandescent particles of rock or
certain matais. \',);t' burning particle. of matter prodw::ed as a
result of frictional contact between rubbing surface ••
Experime::.ttsware carried out at the Exp~rimental rUne Barbara in
Poland when high speed film was taken of sparking prodfled by
, '/
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contact of a metaL disl.:!and cutter head against sandstone. These
f:ilms showed that the source of ignition of a methane/air mixture
was ,'1 concentration of incandescent aands cone particles attached
to the rubbing surfaces (Loge jko , 1977). Experiments at the same
location showed that in the case of frictional contact of steel
on stef:l. a dense stream of sparks is produced which l.n
responsible for ignition of the gas mixture. When atr.. ,JJ:
sandstone is in frictional contact with pyrite. the pydte
undergoes burning and a stream of burning particles is produced.
Somesparks are passivp. in relation to oxygen. while others are
active. Typical e~~mples of passive sparks are those produced
from contact with sandstone or sandy shale. Such particles do
not enter into a chemical reaction with oxygen~ since they are
th'2:mse1.vesoxides. S);Iarks produced by the abrasion of sandscone
or sandy shale are Hmited by the plHsticisation tet!iperaturE~.
which is about 1 200°C. Th<'!ignition capacity of these par tLcLes
depends on the temperature and size of the ex!?o~ed rock surface
and on the particle concentration on the acne (If r.ubbing.
Active sparks are those which, en~.~r intn reaction with oxygen;
the reaction is exotherm S..' that the iijQi,~:i(~nalenergy inot'eases
both temperature and :i.gnit::'ol1capacity. The temperature of such
sparks depends mainly on thp quantity of he!1t produced by their
co~bustion in unit tilDe. Some of th~se sparks pos~ess a low
lev~l of chemi',:U activity. such as steel or pyrite. Particles
of steel burning in air or in an explosive aclii08l)~,~re. may attain
a te!il\perEtUre of the order of 1 7000C while tho!!e of pyrite may
reach a temperatuce in excess of 1 7booc. Spar}.;,;posseesing a
high level of chemical activity are typicaUy light &;11oys of
heats
magnesium. especially when ~n
of comb1.\stiol'.of, alUminium
contact with rust.aluminium or
respectively 30,1 MJ/kg and 27.8 MJ/kg.
for pyrite (L~~ejko. 1977).
and magnesium ar~
compa=ed with ;1 MJ/kg
Burning particles of light alloys of aluminium and magnesium have
been shown to have attained temperatures afthe order of :3 700°C
(Rae , 1961).
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(a) Friction betwee',lrocks
r1ayer (1886) ignited fir~damp readily by th~ friction between a
:?ieceof compact sands t one and a revo Ivd.ngdisk of the same rock ,
in the course of some 10 or 15 seconds; a piece of 3ha1e held
against a sandstone did" became incandescent at the points of
friction. and ignited illuminating gas but not firedamp.
Burgess and Wheeler (1928) readily ignited firedamp with various
types of sanc.stone; the !!l.0re quartzitic sandstones seemed to be
the more dangerous. The heated area of contact at the edge of
the stationary rock whe,re it met the rotating whee l, appeared to
be the source of ignition. bU1::.twas found possible to ignite
firedamp by
thrown off
the particles of fused rQck that were sometimes
from the heated area. An estimatl:i of the minimum
energy required
suggested that a
and falling for
eo produce experiments
piece of sandstone weighil1g 'lbout 50 kilograms
a few metres onto the sharp edge of a similar
rCC~tcould produce ignition in a mine. Nagy and Kawensk. 0.960)
in an apparatus similar to that of Bur~ess and Wheeler, obtained
ignition of natur.al gas (90 percent methane) with a peripheral
speed of the sandstone wheel. rotating against saudstone rock.
equivalent to a free fall of 0.67 metres. A shale rock held
against a sandstone wheel also gave ignitions. but less easily.
In all these exper~.ments. howevt~r, the distance for ",hich rock
was rubb&d on rock in order to obtain ignition was greater than
the distance of fall required to gain the rubbing velocity.
Ra~say (1965) states that the temperature reached in frictional
contact is limited to that at which the rock softens. Of the
rocks Net with in coal .il1in8. only the <J.uartziticrocks "produce
ig1'!.itiona. In experiments in which rock sliders are held in
contact with rotating rock wheels. ignitions are not produced
exc.eptwith these rocks with powers in excetls of about 0.746 KW
or when the contact persists i~i exceaa of 0.746 KW, or when the
contact persists for distances ranging from 20 cm up to 5 metres
depending on the conditions of the experiment.
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(b) Friction between Steel 'i';,ols and Rocks
Steel rubbing on sandstone in the way just described produces
ignitions readily enough and with ~1imilar va Lae s of load and
rubbing distances. although tathe:r greater values of the latter
tend to be required. Tungsten carbide on sandstone behaves
similarly. Ignitions can be obtained also with other metals. for
example. nickel (melting point 1 420oe). nickel-copper alloys and
copper (melting point 1 0800e).
Ignitions are readily obtained by the impact of tools on
quartzitic rocks; readily with steel tools but alSO with bronze
picks and even with brass. It is likely that the ignitions w~th
bronze and brass occur only after the tv')l has picked up rock
fragments so that it is more a case of rock on rock.
Ignitions occur when iron pyrites is struck by a steei tool but
the mechanism is not understood. It is suspect~d that the
ignitions are brought about not by any combustion of the pyrites
but by thin shavings of steel. cut from the teol by the pyzLtes ,
oxidizing so repidly that they reach temperatures high enough to
cause ignition. Bands of pyrites (iron disulphide) have been
shown to be capable of producing ignition when cut into by a
blunt tool: fine pyrites powder is produced which ignite3 at low
temperatures and burns ~ith a sulphur f.lame.
Generally sreaking, the bright sparks encountered when grinding
steel ldth other abrading materials. such as sandstone or
carborundum are also thought to be burning flakes of steel.
Burgess an''! Wheelet· (1929. 1930, 1931) IUd. an extensive series
of experiments on the ignition of firedamp by the frictie-n
i)el:waen steel and rocks. In the) first of these reports.
experIments which ultimately led to the delilonstration of
ignitions of firedamp 'With a chain (!oalcutter c11tting through
hard rock were described: "Ignitions were J)btaine(t with a
cutting speed between 18.mm and 450 IDlIl pet' minute. with picks of
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carbon steel and tungsten steel. The depth of cut was 75 mm to
125 mmand along most of its length only the three lower rows of
picks cut into the rock, the centre ones gr zLng over it and the
top three rows being free of it".
Another report described further experiments 'I1Hh coaLcucter
picks and hard sandstone rocks, which gave "a localised form of
sparking. which is capable of igniting firecJ.mp under condidcns
likely to arise under mining conditions".
(c) Mecranism of Ignition
Blickensderfer et a1 (1972) and Burgess and 'Wheeler (1929) found
ill the labor.atory that it is very difficult to ignite mixture'1 of
methane and air by the m?chanism of spark ing , Methane has a high
ignition temperature (6~boc)~and sparks do not usually possess
an adeqaate combination' of life time. temperature. and surface
area for ignition. Gases with a lower ignition t'.:'!mperature. su;;:h
as hydrogen. are ignited fairly 2::1si1y hy sparks from machine
tools.
• ~ ,; j
As ,tltrly as 1929, Burgess and 'Wheeler referred to a stationary
spa;~? at the contact bp.tween the pick and" the rock; which can be
equatcc. to a hot spot. This hot l.p\'lt ii, composed of a surface
layer of ait~er molten rock or mt',t!ll. and is caused by frictional
slidl.ng. The layer norlU'.l.!,yconsists of the mat'!rial with the
lowest melting point. and the malrau?Jl temperature does not
nonu!ll1y exceed this value. It is sugg.&tctd that the area and
the tempcarature of tn@ hot:. spot, together lfHh the methane
concentration. determine wheeZ.er ianit1:on can OCC1!t:.
In rocks cO~lt.ining iron py,dte. the aeehani.aa of ignition il1l
tnout-ht tc) he the burning cf finely grouad pyrite. rather than a
hot ape-,t on the rock. Frictional .:H,ding between the uchine
tool and the rock is responsible for the initial heating.
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Blickensderfer (1975) no ted that the maximum temperature of a hot
spot is the melting point 1ther the to')1 material or the
rock. The maximum 'Y1idthof the hot spot is the width of the
tool. The length of the hot spot above a certain temperature
varies with the speed of the tool and the cooling r.~teof the
molten rock or metal.
It is implied in the literature that. as the temperature of the
hot spot caused bv frictional impact increases. t:hearea needed
to cause an ignition of methane decreases. However. the possible
effect of the thermal. conductivity of the rock and the thickn~ss
of the het spot upon the area required for ignition have not been
investigated. The maximum temperature of the area heated by
frictional impact depends upon the melting point of the tool and
the rock , The area of the hot spot depends upon the width of the
tool and the speed of cutting. 'I
(d) Rocks likely to cause Ignitions
An attempt is lII.adeto identify the ignition haaard associated
wh h ~. particular rock. The mechanism of ignition when ~h¢.:;.:.=-=
rock. are impaoted by u.chine picks is important in this resper.t
and two general categories of rocks can be identified:
a
(i) Those where a hot spot develops on the surface when
impacted. and
(ii) Those that are liable to $,elf heat on impact owing to
th~ presence of pyrite.
Burge.. and Wheeler (1929) noted that rocks with a higb quart:t
content are an ignition hazard when impacted. Rae et a1 (1964)
concluded that only rocks with.a high srelting point. Euch as
D
those containing appreciable quantities of quartz. are likely to
cause ignitions by the mer.hanism involving a hot spot.
Blickensderfer et al (1974) suggest that the quartz content and
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particle size are
potential.
important parameters affecting
Powell et al (1975) conclude that the following general
characteristics of rocks are most likely to cause ignitions from
a hot spot developing on the surface:
(. ,1, A quartz content greater than 30 percent,
(ii) A particle size greater than 10 m and usually greater
than 70 m. and
(iii) the rock remaining 'strong' at tcmpel'atures of at least
l250oC.
Other factors were also thought to be important. In particular.
the thermal conductivity of the rock was considered to have a
substantial influence. Wynn (1952) noted that the quartz had a
low thermal conductivity, and it was thought that.this could be
one of t'!1ereasons why rocks (:on':ainingappreciable quantities of
this minet'lllhave a high ignitio) ~otential whell impacted.
The rocks that are most likely to cause ignitions when impacted
by machine p1.cks as a result·of the formation of a hot spot are
thos!!having both a relatively large quartz COl:1tentand particle
size. The strength of tbe rock at a temperature of 12500C also
appeArs to be important. Nodules of iron pyrite are an ignition
::-i.kowing to th~ self-heating of dQst ,.nerated frolll:'an i1Bpal;t.
'.(t c ,
It ill nol.:c1••r. however. whether iron pyrite dia.e.inated within
:;:;:;'
a rock increases tbe risk of aliignition of methep.. SOllie
author. consider that the thermal conductivity of a rock h.. a
substantial inHuence upon the i1.ncendivity.althoulh this has not
~en ••tablished through .xpuimentati,?n.
lor practical mining purpos.. rockS catt be con8:1.de'tedin term. of
their potential for frictional ignition of a methanelair mixture.
Th~ following classification has been u~ed (NCB. 1971).
\~
,\
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1. Avera~e ignition potential:
~andstone with 20 to 50% quartz
Pyrite-ironstone.
2,. High ignition pc-ential:
Sandstone with 50 to 70% quartz
Pyrite sandstone
Pyrite siltstone
Pyrite fireclay.
3. Very high ignition potentia.l:
Pyrite quartz.
2.4.5 General Information available from Overseas on the
Ignition Potential of Sandstones
McVey. building on the knowledge gained [rom overseas research
and strength tests conducted by himself at the Chamber of Mines
Research Organisation. reports that ther~ are two groups of
information available from overseas coal mining countries
regarding ignitions in the goaf. ".I.'hefirst groul\lincludes the
findings of investigations into methane ignitions in collieries.
These inHcate that there have been many events over the years
tha.t apPlro:a:imateto:> the event under' d~scussion at ~rmelo Mines
Limited. For ex..ple, th(lre are 11 ignitions due to falls of
"ground Tc,.;?ot;!tJ!d by thftU.S. Bureau of Mines for the period 1959
,'::'--.,'.-' ~/;
to 1980. More detailed reports of .i.ilar events are described
by Coward and Rams.y (1965) in which it .ppears that the fallit"4
of rock in the loaf i. acco.panied by frictional heating whic;~.
results in ianitio:ls of ••thalle. Prall the fonJoing the
nec••saL7 criteria for the friction ignition to occur are the
relative .ave.ent of rock. that the roek i. hard and has a quartz
content abo,'. a ce?ftain ainimwa criticltl value~ ,
\ _I
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The second group of information results from laboratory
experiments which have been conducted to qu.ancify the :i.gnition
potel'ltial of a number of materials in various relative
configuJ:'tltions.It is thit.>second group of information ",1-).ich is
most instruct~.ve in assessing the probable cause of ignition
during roof falls and goafing. There are certain findings on
methane ignitions whi~h are generally accepted as being correct.
T..ose that are relevant to this report are discussed here.
(a) PhysicalConditions required to cause a Frictional
Ignition
Of overriding significance is the finding that methane-air
mixtures can be ignited by the friction/imp.llctof rock on rock.
This has been shown by Rae (1964) when he conducted two series of
experiments where sandstone sliders were pressed against a
rotating aands cone wheel. He was cons:tstently able to cause
ignitions of a surrounding atmosphere of methane/air when certain
speed and contact pressure criteria were met. His findings were
~ot unique as others had previously ~rtcwn the same effect but in
a less precise manner. Because of the quality of the qata
present1.!dby Rae. it is used in th:i.sreport to create an exampl0
sbO\.Jingthe in,~endivity of rock-on-rock sliding.
JI
d
Ra'~ sho'K'$d q1,~&r1y two effects. the first being the relati'~1e
;,llcendivityof various materials rubbing on each othar , These
inclu.ded H.meIJtone. sandstone. steel. tungsteti carbf.de and
II vad,ot11ilother lIleta1 alloys. In theee experiments, the mos~
inQendive materials in eny rubbing configuration of 3peed contact
and pres£ure were sandst':lne rubbing on sandstone. The second
effect was thatu rubbing tue to ignition WilS shown to decrease
with increase of both .peed of rubbina and contact pressure.
In 'theErme!? Mines Limited ca.8 (MeVey, 1986) only the a&ndstone
rubbing on eandstone i. dealt with and thus an inapection of
Rae's results using thi. material is appropriate. At the maximum
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load that his rig was capab~e of applying, this being 400 kg to a
2S!!1!!lsquare slider. :l.gnit a.on occurred after an average of
0.5 seconds of sliding con~act at a speed of 4.6 metres per
second. This situation could OCCU1~ if a piece of sandst one of
similar. composLt Lon were to break away from the goaf , slide for
more than half a second at 5 metres tier sl:::'!ondor faster. and be
Laz-ge enough to apply a. cent act precsure of over 65 HPa. If the
coefficient of friction of sandstone em sandstone is assumed to
be 0.5 then thl:! minimum s'1.c'pe angle that the piece of sandstone
will maIntain a constant E1p€:ledor accelerate on is :;6°. The mass
of the rock necessary to (l,Pillya force of I~OO kg normal to the
plane of contact is thus
400~ = 445 kg
Cos 260
The height that the piece of rock would have to faH vertically
to attain an initial apeeci of 4.6 metres per second is 1~08 m and
tbe total distance covered <luring sliding contact. would be 2.3 m.
(McVey. 1986). This is sheen diagratnma:tically in Figure 9.
On assessing the applicability of i:he above to the typical
goafing or c~.vlng situation. it iii reaclily seen that ;;he
conditions described could occur underground. The many millions
of tons of sgndstone that are displaced by the extraction of coal
~very week dictate that the probability that the required minimum
size, of 'rock will fall and slide for the requir~d minimum
distance is high. Certainly •..it is possible that the described
u
(-- frj.ctional;sliding conditions "ill be met some of the time
underground (see Springfield CollieIY example).
There ~re two further condi~ion. which MUst be met before an
ignition will oc(.'~"1 An explosive aixture of methane lIlUllt exillt
at the area of ~t...d~ng c<)ntac.t of the. rocks. and the rocks in"
question mus~ have similar incendiviti •• to those used by Rae in
hi. experiments. Th. faet that an i&nition occurred at ErIIl610
Mines Limitod adlilquately covers the first condition. The eecond
r•
Intact over!yir~gstrata
Caved rock
fM~9
CotFlGlR;\ TION Of f If - >~ ROCK IN GOAF WHCH COO'_D CAUSE
A fRtCllONAl. IGNItION Of A UE:THANE/A~ MIXTURE.
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mdition. which is basically the comparison of the Ermelo Mines
Limited sandstone and the' sandstone used by Rae and other
researchers in sim.ilar test,:? is covered in the following section.
(b) The Influence of Rock Composition on Incendivity
The term sands tone covers a wide range of ;nineral con fd.gur at Lons,
A sandstone is a poly-mineral material. made up of grains of
quartz cemented t02ethar into a solid mass by a matrix of another
mineral which can be a fe1.dspar. a carbonate. or one or more 0."
se'Ter::\l other minerals. The gra Ln size distribution of the
quartz is va r iabj.e , as is the t'<'!.t:io of quartz greLns to b:i.nder
matrix material. Porosity is also variable. 'rhe stt'ength of
sandstone varies WJ.th th-e quartz gra.i_n size. the matrix mineral,
the rstj-p of the two foregoing. and porosity.
,< ~.:
<:«
The incendivity of sandstone 'also vades with differences of
composition. To understand the eHect of this variation in
ncendivity. a brief lleRcriptionof the mechanis1Xlof ign:i.tion by
frictional heating is t·equired •.. When
Iilost at dip.
t.wo bodies rub on ene
another. A.n~rgy
d.fo·.mation of fac~ 8speritl.l.h.
.?~~ints of conz.ac t due
This is . lij~.n~)t.nh"!d by
tois
an
increase in temp~ratnre where thL defo~':lu~t'~'olh:,~lilk.'t:;'!,i,,1_;,ce. The
temp4r3tur~ reached by the two surfaces willl'hit' he nisher than
t~Q melting point of that !Ilaterial with ~be :Lowel'iIIelting point.
At 'this tem\)e1:ature. the lO·.o1er mel~ing .point material becomes
molten. the coefrieier,t of frietiot1 drops to • very low ...·due and
the ability to gen!!"!'"stp. further. ttiction'.l he('!.t by rubbing is
lost. Thitr ill the ease for undstone rubbillg, 0\\ sandliltone; the
.alting point of thE; lI£triXe, .inera! of .andstone determines the
Mleinl point of &andst"'n" and in a .trong coarse-grad.ned
sandstone thiIR ir. .~out 1 250°C. Co~~ddMtal1y. the ~inimUll1
\\
t....peratul'o C'f n hot IJu::,t'aea lIlolllentAdly axpolJed to a methane/air
mixtur. r.quired to cause ignition is 1 2000C. A further.
factor iu this process is the time wbleh the hi':!t t:urfac~ produced
by friction will ren.in hot. At 1 2500~ the ~onuct t:!."l8
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between the gas/nh mixture and the hot su-rf'ace to C8'!lSe an
:igniti.onis in the region of 15 to 30 as. The heat of
crystallization of the molten mineral combined with the lew
thermal conductivity of sandstone create conditions where the hot
spot remains hot for long enough to ~ause an i.gnition. The
foregoing cha.tl.cteristics of high melting points. high mechanicr;!l
strengths up to the melting point and low the' ',(13 conductivities
are not present irL cea l+esooc Lat.ed rocks otlle.: cuaa sandat cnas ,
'l'he only other coal-associated rock known to be i~.:"'<mdive is iron
pyrit(~. 1~hich. if heated by friction. can burn Ln air in a povde,
fo rm and thus cause igniti.on.
The iactc)rs in the composition of sandstone which affect
incendivity have beer. studied by 'Rae (1964) and by PoweU and
Bil1inge (1975). Rae studied various rock types in the
laboratory, whil~t Powell and Billinge studied the type of ro~k
which was being cut by rcadheading machines in Britain. the
celJults of the,se incependent stt-dies occur in the following:
(i) The incendivity of a sandstone increases with
increasing quartz grain .,be.
(H) inH:-eaaes withThe ineendivity a .andsto\\teof
increasiul quart.: content.
'\
Expandina on the •• statemenu it can be 84id that aandetorul with
a doainant particle .ize of greater than 100 microns and qUArtz
contnt of MOt'e than 50 percent is hu:endivo. A sHtstone of
doaiuut particle "b.e between 10 and 100 .ic;:rons and & quaru
cC<ntnt of 110M thall SO,.rent is ine.nd!ve but 1... .,0. "hilst
.hal'S oic'rk b.... 40Iainut pardcle ~be In. thaD 10 .ieron. are
.I.i~,le.8 inc.~div ••
'~
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Comparison of Sandstone Sample from a Colliery with
Sandstone used by other Researchers
The sample supplied by a colliery to the Chamber of Mines
R,~sear.chOrganisation was analysed and the results are discusned
here. The r~ason for analysing this sandstone sample was 1.:0
ascertain whether it fu1fi.l1s the conditions for incendivity.
(n) Strength
Uniaxial compressive 'trengths were d.etermined for five 76.2 rom x
25,4 romcores. The strength of the rock was found to be 50.0 MPa
.::.6,5 at
shQ')m in
I'
95 percent confidence HIII.itso Full test results are
Table 8. This compares closely with the
ha<i a uniaxial
sandstone
1.'!'ompres;.dvesant~les used by Rae (1964). t;hich
strength of between 43 and 64 MPa.
Table ,,8 Uniaxicl coapreuive strength ,test results for sample.
of sand.ton.. fro. two South African collieries
The following are the results of tests carried out a.tthe Chl!litber
of Mine. Re.earch Organisation's testing facility. All teats
have been carried oat in accordance with the standard procedure
described by the Internation.l Roek Mechanic" Saeiet::r.
Ut&iuial cOIIpr••• i". str.ultb
Material 'I'eat (Mr.)
SaD4MtoM (A) 1 74
2. 72.
;;? 3 77
';, 4 11a..
S.ul4.to~ (I) 1 48
2 56
~ 58
4, 55
S 51
.eaan E
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(b) Mineralogical Description
From a thin section, the composition of the sample was determined
to be 73 percent quartz. these being the grains, held in a
matrix: of 12 percen~ feldspar, 5 percent mica and 10
percent accessory minerals.
The desc:r:1.ptionof th"! sandstone used by Rae (1964) indicates
that it consisted mainly of quartz and.feldspar. with a smell
a;nountof mica.
(c) Grain Size
The mean grain size of the sample as determined from the thin
section was 530 microns. From all the foregoing, the sample has
been classed as a coarse-grained arkosic quartz at'€:nite.
A sandstone witll this dominant grain size fulfills the condition
for incendivity laid down by Powell and Bil1inge (1975) who
c·
stated that a sandstone with a dominant grain size of greater
than 100 microns ~ill be incendive.
2.4.7 rriction o.tween St•• l Tool. and Rock. - Laboratory
T... te
Kelly ~nd Forkner (1976) have conducted e:tenaive res.arch using
an abraaiv.-iapact incendivity apparatus to simulate abrasive
apacU between st.el snd llinerUe that miaht b. present during
the pnewutic transport of cod. The experu..ente highliaht
several iaportant a.pect. of fricti08al heat and .parkins which
could b. uaed to draw conclusions in etudyinS ~hi. phenomenon in
South Afriean Colliari •••
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(a) A,bstract
Laboratory equipment.
steel and minerals
which s;~mulates abrasive impacts between
transport of coal.
that m.ight be
was used by
present during
the Bureau of
pneumatic
Mines to
characterize the potential explosion hazard of such collisions in
an atmosphere of fine coal dust. air and methane. A variety of
coal mine rock materials. including sandstone. limestone and
py:d.te~bearing limestone. were impacted with specimens of
pipeline steel. Tests were conducted in atmospheres containing
zero to 6.4 vol··\>ctmethane mixed with zero to 300 mg!l of coal
dust.
Coal dust in air alone was not ignited by abrasive impacts but
addidons of as little as 1 vol'"'pct:methane to the coal dust and
air mixture resulted in ignitions. Steel impacting against
sancstone caused ignitions in mixtures of coal.dust~ air and
methane snd the pr.obability for ignitions increased with an
increase in methane. No ignitions occurred with impacts of steel
on limestone or pyrite-bearing H!ll~stone. even when large showers
of .palka were produced.
Ignitions in coal-air-methane mixtures were fcund to be caused by
CJ a hot frict·ion-induced •••• r on the impacted rock at: the impact
osite rather than by spark.s. High spe.d photography was used to
verify this obBervation.
CQ) lntroduetion
Ilnit.bi. aixtures of methane ~nd coal dust could exist in the
.!I
pipeline or in auxiliary' equi\1•• nt during haulaa. op.rations.
Such mixture. could be ignit.d by sparka or frictional h.etina
generated during coel tranSfer by collisioua of tr..p ....t.rials
againat each other or with th. pip.lin. wall,. Hard tramp
material such as pyrite-b••ring limestone (commonly k.no~ as
"sulfur balh; "f). limestone. sl{~le.sandston.. iron and steel
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could LnadverterrtLy enter the pipeline. where they would be
likely to collide with the innel' walls of the pipe.
Experiments by Hartmann. Nagy. McGibbeny and ChJ:'istofel ('195'2)
showed that a low percentage of natural gas in the atmosphere
enhances the ignitability of coal dust by permissible e~pJ.osives.
NO~lhe!"ein the literature have there been reports of ignition
studies in coal-air~methane mixtures by abrasive-impact heating.
Suzuki. Takaoka a.f'-l Fujii (1965) report that coal dust dispersed
in a.ir can be ig:. ted both by frictional sparks and by a hot
surface under $ome heavy-contacting conditions between D high
speed rotating st",el wheel and a steel slider.
(c) Experimental Equipment and Procedure
Abt'asive Imp.~~t Incendivity Test Equipment
Impacts between low carbon steel speclmens. representing pipeline
materials and mineral specimens were produced in an
abrasivf1o-:-illlpaetincendi vity apparatus. shown in Fj.gure 10. The
test apparatus consists of a massive rotating wheel that carries
••tal iapact specimens; the metal specimens make low angle
apr.sive upacts aa.inst wineral specim.ens inside an explosion
chaaber. A rock vice holding the mineral block is advanced
tow",~d th~ rotating metal specimen by a flow regulated hydraulic
cylinder who •• advance rate can be varied from zero to 0.018 inch
(0.046 em) per revolution. A fan mixes the flammable bas and air
prior to a teet. Natural "a8 containing 92 vol-pet m.ethane was
u•• d. R.oult. of an Analysis of the 1118 "ere as foll0'tf8~ in
vot-pet: 2.5 C2H6• 9,2 02~ 92.1 CH4" 1.7 N2• 0.1 C' .ilDd 0.9
e3BS' CO2 and H2 Nere not detected.
!l.ctronic tachometry i8 used to monitor and record impact energy
«
and the revolutions per minute of the flywheel. The kinetic
energy rele ••• d in the collision of the steel and rock salllplesis
1.1
Venf----
Flywheel. E,mmm diOO'l.
260,82kv·
HydnlUlic cylinder.
152mm bore.
Coal dust cup
-Time delay switch
,
110 vac
"-)_':r(l:l
Ii if' Ft~e 10
II
ABRASIVE~ACT lK'..EtIlIVlTY APPARATUS
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calculated from the change in angular velocity measured just
before and after impact, with appropriate corrections !Jr
friction losses of the moving
are vented to the outside of
consisting of a polyethylene
parts. Explosions in the chamber
the building through a weak wall
diaphragm 0.004 inch (0.010 em)
thick and 16 inches (40.6 cm) in diameter.
(d) Test Procedure
Multiple-Impact Mode
'l'he majority of the abrasive-impact incendivity tests w'are
conducted in a mUltiple-impact mt)de. The metal impact specimen
mount-ed on the fl~rwheel was rotated at; a tangential velocity of
900 fpm {4.S7 m/sec} while a rock specimen was advanced
hydraulically into the impact zone. Repeated impacts were made
until either an ignition was produced or the metal sped.men cut
about 5/16 inch (0.8 tum) into the rock, causing conract of the
flywheel anfi rock ,
The rock specimen advance was interrupted periodically as the
impacts occurred to allow a mnx:tw.llmdevelopment of the frictional
hot spot on the rock surface. The coal dust was dispersed into
the pre-mixed air-methane atmosphere only when a sizeable hot
spot had developed. The tillle delay between the Lns cant; of
dispersion and ignition was measured with a stop~atchJ and the
coal dust cloud density at the instant of ignition w~,s ;',ereby
deduced frvlllthe 081 ibration curve in ~'igure 11 relat:;.ng density
to settling time. Initial coal dust cloud density for all test3
was 300 mg/l. which resulted from a coal charge of 36.6 g l.n, the
dust cups. Time delays of 2 to 4 sec were noted between the
),
instant of cosl dust dispersion ana ignition. resulting in dust
cloud ~ensitie8 of 300 to 190 mg/I.
I
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(e) Results and Discus~ions
Multiple-Impact Mode. Effect of Coal-Methane Composition
Frictional impact of low carbon steel (pipe ue grade) at 900 fpm
(L~.5"l metres per second) ag.ai.nst quartzitic sandstone caused
ignitions in mixtures containing 200 to 300 mg/1 coal dust and
methane contents of .5 voL-pct down to as l.ji'J as 1 ·lol-pet. Goal
dust clouds of up to 300 mg/l. density were not ignited by the
same frici::ional heating conddtLons, Methane-air mixtures
containing 5.0 and 6.l~ vol-pet methane ~vere ignited 60%and 100%
of the t:i.me respecd.vE!ly. Ign:td(''i1 data for the above tests are
shown in Table 9. Visual ODS. Jation.:l of frictional impact
ignitions of coal-air-methane '!:.ixtures irjdic.ste that ;E hot smear
(If metal on the sandstone is '~he ignition source. No igrdtions
t(ere observed from sparks ejecl:I,\d from th(~ impact site.
T.rtble 9. Abrasi ..c-impact ignitions of coa:t-air-methanE mixtures
using C-1020 steel aga:i.nst quartzitic sandstone at
900 fpm (4.57 Ill/sec!)
Coal dust c l.oud
density rants
M(.,~il.ne dur.1ng teat NUIIlber of ignitions Pi' reef: t 'lg. of
vol-pet mg/l .tn 5 test. ignitiorul
0 300 0 ..,
"0.5 1300-0 0 o1.0 300 1 :W
2.0 1300 1 ZC
3.0 ;300-190' 2 40
4.0 300-190 3 60
5.0 300 3 60
5.0 0 :3 60
6.4 0 5 100
12 One ignition at 300 mg/l Nal dust.
3 Tvo ignitions at 190 m~!l coal dust.
One ignition at 300 mg!l coal 'uat and two ilJnitions at
190 mg/l coal dust.
No ignitions were pr iuced Ln a .dxture of 4 vol-pet metrJlne with
300 mg/l coal dust f~olll Erictiondl impacts of low carbo~ steel an
liu..estone. No hot snears were nbs€' \led and only a fraction of
the sparkir,g that 0(' 'rs in steel on sandstone impa_ts was noted.
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The limestone is too 80f-:= and non-abrasive to produce a highly
incendive conditl'n such as that occurring on sandstone.
IMpacts of low carbon steel on "sulfur ba Ll.s" p rc duced trt>:l'lendou(1
zilower.sof sparks. but no ignitions of coal-air-methane or
mgthane-air. No hot smears were t" ,3rved to form on the impact
surface. €!VI'!n though much sparkd.ng was evd.derrt , I.ik~l the
surface. M:~xtures in air included 2
31)0mg/l \~.oal dust ~ 4 "'oi-pet methane plus
and 6 .1. ',()l~'pct metha.ne. In each tel~t J
limestone, ":sulfur balls" are soft enough to he easily worn or
fra.ct"ured away, and very little metal ''Nas smesred on the Lnpacr
vol-pet methan~ plus
300 rug/I coa~ ~ust.
the coal J.ust was
dispersed only after a copious shove r of sparks was obtained.
Effect of Tani~ercia1. Impact Velocity
,I
A study V..lS m.:lde to dE'!t~lrminewhat effect t3J:1g~i1tial veludty or
'I
steel opecimens ililpactit1g sandstone has on' ignition pr-obabClhy
in a coal-air"'methunn atmosphere. SpecimenS' of low carbon st~:el
were ililpacted !8gain:::t quart;,;2:i1;ic sandston~. at velocities of 450.
,'I ,
600, 750 and 900 fpm (2.29. 3.(15. 3.81 and 4.57 ttJ/sl~e
rt~specti1fely) ,wit'h a steady rock feed rate of 0.006 in\!h
(0.015 _) pero!impact. An atmospb.er~ tif 4 vol-p"t methane and
30() m,/l cO.~":'1 dust W8S used. five duplicate tests at each
ri velocity relul1ted in the following:
II
i
1
450 fJIII (2,29 1k.ec) - m,9.nydull red .parks' ejected with a dull
\1 smear ¢n the rock, no ignition.
i\
'I
'il
600 fptll (3.05 I;V.ec) - s" '!e u foregoing_
\jI,
"
I
900 fp. (4.57 alYS'lc) - " few red .parks .n<l very bright n.shing
il'\ Slletua on roek w~.th each iapact. resulting
I!
in three ignitions in fivt! te8ts.
Initial oba:ervadons of these teats indica.ted tha.t t'he ignidons
occurred only 'Wh~n the bright hot spot. or slIea.r d.evt~l(\pedon the
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rock at tile impact cite, and this condition deve Loped very f'~asily
w:i.t:ha tangential specimen vcloc:tty of 900 fpm (4.57 m/sel:).
Single Impact Mode
Single lew angLE' impacts of quar.tzit:i.csandstone. quartz (agate).
"sn lfur ball" material. coba Lt+bonde d tungsten carb i.de , type /\-36
steel. C··4130steel. and altaninium were made against A·-36 ~:tee1.
Tan~er.tial velocities of 900 and 1100 fpm (if.57 and 5.59 m/sec
respec t+ve l.y ) were used in tW(' types 0;: explosive atraosphe res .
No ignitions resulted in atmospheres of .dth~r aiT and methane or
flowing acetylene. '!'he follofJ1'ing specific resT;:lts wer.e noted:
1. Q~art%itic sandstone on A-36 oteel. The sandstone specimens
fractured ea"h time. 'No hOI: s~p.ars were seen, a Lrbough an
cceaaLone I tiny ':llark Vg.u ejectet!~
2. Quartz (agate) ~.. Thr,: a8ate chipped. but ~.id not fracture as
readily as .the sandat one , Some sI1Ia11sparks 'and small hot
'.I
smears on "he ateel WI£!re observed.
3. No sparks or hot spots were observed.
S.vere fracturing of tht" ~l).d:illenJl occur red,
4. Cobalt bonded tung.tun carbide. CI"IIDJII.4trcialco cutter pi.ck
tipo war.. btp.ac'i::ed nlsin.t A-3E, n..d with no resulting
i&'::titions. No .parke C'I hot smears v4ire ~1)II.rved.
5. A-% flte,.1 an4 .C-4130 steel. No hot •• ~ai'. vere: observeci
but .om4 4Pl1 sparks WOre produced.
6. Alurninilm. Impact ap.cir".n. of alUllliniulD.vere struck
alainst both clean and ru~ty A-36 et.ttcl •. and alllo alainllt a
steel plat ..$: w;,th a heavy rust layer, A few very frlall
sparl<s were 'lbserved. bu,t no avid.ncli!: of! a th~t1IIite ~eaction
V61& noted. Apparent 1y fhe tan&~nt ial VEt 1Qcity ':lets too 10':1
to cause in!tiatiort of a thermite reaction.
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Due to the nega.tive results in air-methane and
air-acetylene from single impacts. the tests were not conducted
in mixtures of coal dust. air and mezhone,
Failure to produce a SUfficiently large frictional hot spot to
ignite methane in air from impact of sandstone on steel appears
to be a :t'esult of the fraccuri 19 of the sandstone. Apparently.
the impaet energy is absorbed in creating new surface in the rock
specimen rather than in pz-oduc ing heat by frict;:i.on.
Ignition Source
Visual o!>servatlons of of air-methane and
c,oal-a.ir·-methane mixturl:.s frett', £1':; ctional impacts of steel on
sandstone inf..icat~dthat the ii~.ij:ion SOUrce was a hot smear on
the rock rather rhan ejected sparks on a heated :i.1ll.pact specimen.
VerificatilJn of '~hJ$ observation was made with the aid Qf
highspeed cinematclI,:r.ep;'lY. An ;_gnition ':>£
consisting of 300 mgll coal dust and 4
photographed, at 2 000 fralllt\sper second. The ignition was caused
an explosive mix'Cu~e
vol-pet methane was
by frictional impact of low carbon steel rotating against
quartzitic sandstone at 900 fpm (4.57 m!aec). The ignition and
flame front cap be seen to ~r.isinate at the hot smear at about t1
f#/sec aft!!t' 'impact. as shown i11 Figure 12.
Since not enoush energy to c(eat. an incandive condition could be
concontrated by a single low angle imp.ct. single impacts of
sandstone. "sulfur hall_". limestone. quartz. tungsten carbide.
suet and alwdniWll or. pipeline steel failed 1:0 l.gnite
.ir-aethane or air-acetylen~ mix... Multiple impacts of lo~
carbon ..teel on "sulfur balh" and limestono abo failed to
generate Irufficient it'icdonal heating to ignite air-me.thane or
coal-air-methane ~ixtur.s.
The oTlly incendive te8ults were obtained 1!I.ithmultiple frictional
impacts of low carbon steel on quartzitic sal:dstone. which shows
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FJgure 12
HGH SPEErJ Fl.,. STRP SHOWWG IGNTION OF
COAL-AR-MEfHANE ORIGIN.., tJ«; AT FRICTIONAL HOT SPOT.
nne Is shown at tap .f eocn 5.... (in mi8sec'"
i
','
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that a m.ixture of air and 6.4 vol-pet methane 1.$ more easily
igni.tedthan coal dust alone ox r,,:oal-air-methanemixtures. All.
of the test~ on air and G.4 v~l-pct methane resulted in
ignitions. whereas no coal dust clouds up to 300 mg/l density
werE'ignited. A mixture of 1 to 2 vol-pet methane in air -with
300 mg/l coal dust ignited in one ont of five tests. 3 vol-pet
methane in ::oa1 dust ignited in two of the tests and 4 to 5
vol-pet mexhana in coal dust ignited 1.nthree of five te~;ts. A
mixture of 5 vol-pet methane in air (lower explosive limit) also
ignited ::'nthree of five tests. These results indicate that the
probabi.lity of coal dust ignition increases as methane :i.s added.
The effect of tangential velocity of a steel spec imen impacting a
quartzitic sandstone target is a strong factor in determining
whether or not a mixture of cOli\l dust ,::drand methane will
ignite. Ignitions failed to result below the tangential velocity
of 900 fpm (4.57 m/sec). The ignition source for multiple
impa~~tsof steel on quartzitic sandstone in coal-air-methane was
shown in high speed cinematography to be a heated smear on the
sandstone rathe't"than sparks"
Based on the results of the multiple-impact tests with steel on
quartt.:iticsandst;()ne. an explosion hazard exists in cOlll ..lust
where 1 vol-pet or more methane is present. However. restd.'tsof
single-impact tests indicate that ignition of sueh a mi~ture. or
of air and methane. is very unlikely from the type of' low angle.
glancing iDl,Y'''':7)1 that tramp rock or metal would ~ke in a coal.
carrying 'pip.ii·ina. j!
//
(I
J
1/
'I
'(II}n.aC:riptioD of Roek.
1. Quartdtic .andatoni. A _di_ to con.e ara{iled. bu:ff to
red brown Sand8tone con.bting a1ll08:=.ntir.ly of anaular to
aubround.d quartz grain •• with sor... econdary ov.rlrovth of
quart!,_" Trace o.f 1Il0ntaorill.,nit.. (Geographic ..ouree
unknown) •
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2. Sulfur balls. A partially metallic brown to black
carbonate-sulfide l(Ck. consisting essentially of siderit:e
and calcite,. and very fine grained pyrite. with some coaly
material and limonite. The pyrite content varies through
the rock from 0 to 100 pet. with a spot average of 60 to 70
pet. Some 5mal1 veins of t'elat1.vely coarse . ~gra1neu
secondary pyrite penetrate all of the at ructures, Small
nodules of lighter caroured calc:i.te were random l.y scattr:red
throughout the rocks. Additionally. veins. clots, stringers
and disseminations of carbonaceous (coaly) material occur
randomly in the rock. From Humphrey No. 7 coaL Mine
(Consolidation Coal Co.). Monongalia County, W. Va.
3. Limestone. A very fine grained. gray, fossiliferous
limestone. From nlaney-Bowser. Kittanning. Pa.
An important aspect is that if methane and coal dust are present
in the air simultaneously. the lower limit of explof:ibility of
each is lowered depending on the:i.rrelative concentration in the
mixture. As shown in Figure 13 for minus 200 mesh Pittsburgh
coal dust, the nust concentration decreasd from 60 grams per
cubic metre at 0% methane to 0 grams per cubic metre at 5%
methane in air (Kawenski et a1. 1979).
2.4.8 The Cuttinl Tool
Kelly and Forkner's laboratory -e~p.rimentll with ngu.:\ to
abrad.,. i.pacts of hard rllinerala with pnewaatic pipeline steel
are 8upport.e-:t by Horda (1984) who d.al. with the: ignition
potential of the cuttin, tool. Morris' findio,. are crucial to
this aspcsct of frietional heat aince. in laaay of th.. incUents
quoted, the explosIons h..... their ianiti.01l source in .I!oalcut:ter
and continuous lIin~~ picks impacti", ~>/quartdtic: Ji!ildstone
.)
either in the .aam or as a roof in the roadway••
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Several parameters regarding the ignition potential of the
c1.7"tin.gtool have been investigated. these being pick material.
wear, heating. g,,",om~tryand rotation. Studies are continuing in
some of these areas at the present time.
Laboratory studies en the ignition potential of cutter picks show
a wide variation of pot.ent.La'l, suggesting that testing conddtLons
have a strong influence on the vaLue of the results. With
variables such as gas concentration. velocity. energy, bearing
pressure and humidity, this is not surp:d.sing.
For practical applications there are two basic types of cut'..:!!,
picks. The plumb-bob shaped pick with a cylindrical shank is
typical of the first type. while the flat cutter pick is typical
of the second type. The former type is designed for point attack
and is free to rotate in the yid. holder. This ability to rotate
is designed for prolonging pick life but is d.ecidedly
disadvantageous in relation to heat diesipation. The relatively
loose fit of the pick in the box minimisea the effective transfer
of heat genersted. through the body of the pick to the pick box.
fbis condition forces the pi~k to operate at a much higher
temperature and fa~i1itates fr~etiona: i~nition. Flat cutter.
/j 0
pick. are rigidly fa8t6ned in the pick box and as a consequence
there is a •.;:>r. etfectivliIheat transfer t(., the pif~k holder. so
that the pick operat •• at a lower temperature.
A flat eutter pick t••t.d on Ruhr 8and~tOD •• which contained 14
I..'
pe!"c.~.llt quart. bee... red hot after cuttina a fe... Ilett: ••
(Selu:iev*r and Manc. 1980). Tetlpotrature,. up to asooc have been
recorded tor uncooled point attack bit.. Methane h.. beeu
ianite~by .~ •• tal bar coated with pyritic d~.t at a ..t••parature
-; i, 0
u low as 644 C ~1iebnad8rf.r fAt al. 19~4).
Ii
jI
j
The phys:ieal .t:-aftsth of st •• l an& hard carbide pi.e~l lins.rta
e II
dtl\.re:..... rapidly at te.p.ratuJ:G8 above 500 C and tha /foaponaut
li", ia .ub.tanti&1ly reduced. Reduction of t_per~tur(. "ould
\'
'\
(j)
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reduce the probability of a. frictional ignition and
simultaneously increasE:l the bit life by a factor of up to 10.
(a) Material of Pick Tool.
Early 'Work suggested that the material of the cutting tool.
contributed little to the cause of ignitions I)f methane+ad r
mixtures. More recent work st~ltes that the material of the pick
tool dot;!shave an influence upon the probability of ignitions.
Burgess and i<J!leeler(1929) carried out experiments in which
various steels were held with a.n edge in contact with a rotating
wheel of quartzitic sandstone in an. explosion chamber. Ignitions
were obtained from all the steels, and there wa~ no significant
d~fference between them. In tests on machine picks made from
\ <
both carbon and tungsten steel~. there were no appreciabii!
differences in the time taken to ignite methane betweer{ the two
pick materials.
All.ap IlndWheeler (939) carried out experiments in which blunt
pickll()~d. from carbon steel and tung.ten ateel impacted iron
pyrite. 'l'heu appeared to be no differenee in the incendiv:i.ty of
the two steet..
Rae (19f.4)noted that, loft metals •• uch as copper and br .... that
h.~~ ~ .0lting point lower than the ianition t$mperature of
_than. can c.aus. ianitioft. aa Q re.ult of r. h"t spot mechani.lII.
when impacted on quatt: rocks. Particle. of t )ck e.bedded in the
lIt.talawere ob"t'VIQd. 1'b~ hot spots produced ....1'. molten rock.
rather than molten .. tala and w.r. thoupt tc have been due to
the friction of roek on roek. No t.•• t. vere carried out on the
relative inc.ndivity of the••• oft .. tala. .teel. and tuna_ten
Ii
carbide.
~
Blieken.derfe:r.t al (1972) t~n.d a.veral lIetals and II. metal
alloys for ignition potential. They ~onclud.d that tun&stGn
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ca:rbiC,l.;;:was considerably 1e~s ince:ndive than I::.ommer~.i.al carbon
steels of the types that are used for pd.ck shanks.
It was therefore concluded that the steel shanks of cutting
tools, rather than the tungsten carbide tip. were primarily
responsible for face ignitiolls. Stainless steel was found to be
less :tncendive than commercial carbon steels. hut more prone to
ignitions than tungsten carbide.
'l"he mechand.sm of ignition in thes~ tests. however» wac stated to
be that of sparking. It was not ed that methane mixll. (o1ith air
was ver:r dHficult to ignite by sparking and a hydrogen-air
mixture. whi~h ignited easily. was used.
In further tests, Blickensderfer et a1 (1974) noted the
applicability of the results obt aLned with the hyd't'ogen-air
In;,
mixture to ignitions c.aused by hot spots in methane-air mixtur~s*
In addition, a hard matal alloy. TiB,,-CuNi. was found to have a..
lower ignit.ion potential than tungsten carbide. No reasons were
i:
given for the differences" in ignition potential between the
various metals or metal alloys.
(J
Blickensderfer (1975). in a theoretical approach, developed 'l{(
energy-balaflce equation for the machanbat of i81lition by hot\
spots on rock. The fO~":nu1aimplied th&t the !lelting point of the
tool had an effect upon ignitions. The lower thtl lI'IeltirigpoLut;
of the tool, the les8 energy would be required tv lQt"IIla metal
..ear on the rock. Por a given energy input, thorefore, the
eadar it would be to for. this molten layer which is a Ia8jor
contdbutor to iani.tions aa dialCQ8 •• d previously. 'Conversely,
the lower the lIleltintpo:i.nt of the utal. 1:h. l.nter would b. the
te..peratllrQ of the hot spot. !tl the taats dtIacrihed above. nonl!
of the author;:' atteapt to explain tha differenc .. I r~n incendivity.
or othervi.e. between different pick material. by eo..p&ring their
re.p.cdve lIIeltina point s ,
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On the basis of tests ~"ith pf.ck+body !)t<.:el and tungsten carb Lde,
Roepke and Eanson (1983) suggested that the ignition potential
c1.:pendsupon the back clearance of the toc.l., t'p" ....!t' than on th,3
material. w1.on the back cLeazance ang1.e was posLtLve, neither of
th~ ,a:'!ter:ials :i.gnited i".J. methane+ad r mixture. v7ith a negad.ve
bad. el.earance <Ingle. igrd.tion::: rea-iily occur red with both
materials. The authors did not attempt to give an expLanat z.cn
for these effects.
It can be seen that there are ccnnradf.cr Lons in the literature
surveyed. The very early work indica.tes that the pick material
.'oes not influence the likelihood ()f igciti:!1g methane-air
mixtures. The later literature implies th9.t tungsten carbide
tips ace considerably less incendive than the body stet!l ,)f a
pick. It is also su~g~sted t~at~ if the material of a pick is
chaaged , for example to a tip at i:1~ hard-motal alloy TiB2-CuNi
and a body of stainless steel. a tool could be dp.sigt'ted that
would be less li.kely '1"0 produce ignitions. Very recent work
'lll!plif;." that the eff~ct of the blick-clearance angle. rather than
thp.material f~om which a machine tool iR made. influences itg
inc,"ndivity. Th.;: no !'lIIaJ for~es acti~lg on l"icks inCrei.lSe
drsmatical1y as the back-elee.l.ance angle is reduced to llilss tnan
about 5 degrees _ wh:i.~h hal!' an effect on the ra.te! of. heating lit
t:. rock-pick interface. HOtIever no author. have attelnfted to
r"\luate their experimental rettults with a •• chanisa of ignit'bn.
It is clest". therflfor(!. that the effect of the material of a
cutting tool upon the risk of ignitions hal" not b~~...n researchlitd
adequately. Reference should bo"ever be made to t~Ae wor.k don. by
I,
l('.. l1y and Forkner which haa been duct'ib.d in this chlJ.pter.
!)
(i
CD) Pick 'Wear
Many authors agree that worn pick. ftre considerably .ora
incendive than 8ha~p ones. Some a.p~ct. of the effects of wear
on the ignition potential of. machine piek. have been ir:',estigated
only very recently. Ii /.
II
T·'nwe:J.l e t al (1975) and 131it~kensderfo1:' (1.9"5: COll!:l'.l<Ie that
ignitions tvil1 not OCC'.lt' while picks rcma:L;.. E:t18.rl'. DU?:I.ng
ignition t(wt:~:.Pow0.11et 3.1 not(!G that the d'.l:~d-::iorl of ~'uttin8
for a 50 percent probability of. :.~nition ;.'81.: (':Nls.:id(~t'ably !lWl:O
Shell~ e'· ;11 (l98:; whel1 di.e
shali,k. T'lle reason for this
wear ~lat extendad to the steel
was t.hought; to be t1tE'! t",:e~t(";
ir.c(fudivhy of (~omtler.cial csrbon stee.l relative to tungsten
carbide.
Roepke and Hansl..I!l (1983) concluded that the :nech,m:i.sms {)f
ignitions caused by frictional illipact appeal' ':n b::: largelY
controlled by thf' back-c lear ance angle; of the pick. I'he back
clearance can. of cours~. be influenced by tt,e weet' of th~ cuttet
tool.
The lit~"Hure implies that worn picks 8.r~: conoi.dezabLy more
LncendIve than sharp ones. p.!l',t,ticu1a.rly if I:he body steel COUle'l
into contact with the rock bel!ing impacted. REcer,t ':,nvestig,l,ti,')ns
suggest t:h8tt the 1"t'''''ndl'lity i\)f a coa1f ..~tin:~ tool may be gn~stly
increased if wear occurs 30 t~'U,.t thE' back cLaarance angle beccmes
i'
I
negat Lve , 1\
\.1
(-:: ) Pid; He.tinl
I
I
Exp-.riJl1e\lt.ltiol'l. ha. beerl !~&r~,I'ied out recently i'tto the
upon the poten'~ial t\) l.gni!!te ~i.thane from. pick thM was
before cutting" An earUillr ]i'theoretical approach implied
theTa itt: an hdtial pick te.ptl1rature effect. l.aU-lll et a1
\\
preh~kte'I!\"orn pick. to a telll~.ratuu of beUrtlen 12~>oCand
effect
heated
that
(1983 )
150°C
tt) simulntf> n Dl,ltch:i.ne tool ttiat he.. been h.at~d a8 a result of
cutting 4:(',18'1.anI! compared the~,r ignition pote~tbl with that of
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coo). picks having the SIl!M., degree of ~·lcar. No _jm;t:if:i.cation. was
given for th~:' range c f te!llperature to which t.he tools were
pre~heated. ::.t was fotmd that, ;:!t pi(:k speeds of O~96 and 1.9
i[H~tres lKl?' second, the ign:i,tion pouerrt i.al for thp. h()t: pl.cks was
eond.derably- n:o'r(~ than for the (:00: cnec ,
B1.iekensdel'fer
(1975) ~ an 1.d.t:ial Gool-temretEI'ture effect i.::; impEed. It ·t '"....... _1
implicit from the equati on that the higher the in 1.t :i.a.L
tempera tC:"'I~ of the pick. t:he le~,sener-gy 1,0 requir.ed to form the
m(~t"::' smear ,)H the ~,,:\)c1;:• For a given in!)ttt of energy. therefore.
the ea:si~r 1.t: will b(~ to fOr1.\l this molten layer. which 1.13 B. major
c;;nt;l'ib'!;(c'i';.;)r t':> :i.gnlt::lons or methane-air: mixtures.
Compar:h:,g pre"heat:0d wczn picks with cool ones at a r:peeCi of
2.86 !ll(~t>:,et;per second. Lar-son et a1. (1983) deauced tha.t their
incp.ndivities 'Were essentially the same. The reason for this was
thought to be cooling of the pi.ck by 81..1:.
It is suggested in the literature that. as machine tools bp-come
hot. their potential to ig:lite methane-a.il:' mixtui=,es increases.
However. at ':)ick speeds of m()r~ than aItprox':"mately 2.83 metres
per second. i:he indications are that the~e is little difference
in incendivity between hot
explanation for the higher
ai~ cooling of the picks
successive impac~a.
and cool cutting tools. A possible
speed effect was thought to be that
reduced their tempet'atute betw~-en
The work relining to pick geoDIQtry has tended to concentrate upon
rhe tip i,rea and diameter ~Rf the shank. rhis is because previous
experimentl1tic'n «;oncludeJ)t~at the tunga:tlfn carbide tip wal,~ l.ass
incendive than the body steel. end that wider picks i.ncrellsed the
area of the hot Sp'~t"
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Lar scn et a l (1983) compared (\ commerc Lal, tool of. plumb-bob shape
wit.h a bullet-shaped pick of smaller diameter. The angles of the
cnrbide insert and body cone in both tools were .~ssential1y the
~j8:ne. It 'ilaS i:mmd that. as tte pick diameter increased. so did
the :i.gtd t Lon fr:equency. Hansen (1987) in comparing plumb-bob
with r)€!ncil-type pid·.s. reached d.milar. ccncIus aons , Itt
ad(.Htiot~. he noted that , if the diameter of the tungsten carbide
tip and the immediatt! shank we.1:! sma.ller. the ignition potential
was reduce-J.
Thr.ee types of conical picks were compared fm: ignition potentb.l
by Roepke and Hanson (1983). All these cutting tools had a tip
angle of 90 degrees. but the size of the tungsten car.bide tips in
relation to the end of the shank ~as different in all t~clses. A
widely used commercial pick .. which was used as a reference. had
the smallest tip which did not cover the end (If the shank , The
tip of the second pick ccve red the end of tbe shank, '!'he tbird
tool 'Jas a non-comme:Ccl,al typP.. which was termed the
Imu~hrQolII.-tippick'. in which the tungsten carbide tip had a
greater diameter than tue .f!ndof the shank.
:It was found that the refe.rEmce pick was considerably mare
incendive than the other picks. The mushroom-tip pick had the
next gt'aatest ign::l.tion poteutia,l. The authors did not expect the
latter t'.8ult. because they !;hough1~ that the larger tip. by
tJrotectin& the steel shank. wt)uld prove to be 1es8 incendbre.
They therefor. carried out additional test ... on tungsten carbide
and coalclltting steel to mon:.tor the effect :>f back clearance
angle. since this factor was thought to be responsible for the
anomaloue l"tlsults.
'No nd:i,al-type pieks "ere ~lbo tested. one
th.t va. 1ara.r than normal. Buth these
'W.ith '" cutting tip·
tools had the same
ignition potential a8 the least ilic6ndive conic:al pic1f. tested.
For the conical picks. it was foun~~ th&t shanks of larger
diameter increased the ignition pot.tntl~al of t'he tool. The
cut t ing tip of this cype of pick a'l so appears to be important.
If the tungsten carbide covers the tip of the shank, this has an
adverse influence on the incendivity ()f the machIne tool. The
geometry of the pick can influence the wear, '..lri.ch in turn may
have an effect on the back-c Iearanee angle. It is sugge at ed by
the lite:ra.ttn:e that the back+c Le.az-ance angLe hac a marked
LnfIuence upon the igniti.on potential of machine tools. It
appear-s front tht~ few tests 7.hathave been carried.out that radial
picks have a relatively low incend:i.vity.
(e) Pick Rotat:i.on
In testing conical-type picks for the effect of rota~ion within
the pick block. Larson at al (1933) noted ttB' nc ignitions
occurred when the tool rotated. but the inc1.·j~nce "'£IS h"Sh when
the pick was lc,cke(~, The a'lthor~ !'ltatf'd that thi,; type e>£ tool
will rotate "hEm un~)I'J.an..~ed side '.oaGing ove rc omes the u.~istance
friction betwef~n thtJ s1.i:.nk anc the block, and ·;..ey ChEn:efore
'"1
I
recommended atl angle (If Hkew to induce rotati:.1. The authors did
not "ive any rea80n8 why rotation should influence t:lt~ ianition
potential of • tool.
":::')Ha'Qson'(1983) a180 earried out experi.ental studies in this area
~I
but concluded that conical pick. that rotate can produce
ignitions. However. the rotating cutting tools could be
subjected to c<)neiderably lIore wear before becolling
It is Slls&e8t:ed. therefo::e. that pick rotat:i.on
incendivity and th.st incendivity 5.s l:elated to wear.
. ~.l.ru::etl .. 1ve.
influl:!nces
It i. clear that. if conical picke- i'-otau within tbe bIcck, the
I"',
i8nitio~ potential of the
b blA'-d .s: 1pro. Y' ue to geW!lE!tr1ca
'.1
picks tend to be $u(C'iected to. '. \~
tools will be
considerations;
',I
unbiased we('/~
\..i-:.
iJ
This is
by rotating. the
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(f) Cutting Parameters
Several aspec t s have been investigated that xeLat.e machine
cutting parameters to the risk of ignition of methane-air.
maxtur es , These are the speed of cutting. the rate of advance of
the machi.ne tool. the depth of cut. and the cuz tLng forcel~.
(g) Speed of Cutting
The effect that the speed of the pick has upon the igrdtion
potential of the tool has been invti:stigated by several autho rs ,
The i1'l.fluence of this parameter on sharp. blunt. and pre-heated
picks has also been. investigated.
Whenconsidering sharp picks. Blickensderfrer (1975) cone luded
that. by increasing the cutter'-to()l speed. a greater area of the
hot spot. which is capab Iu of :tgniting methane. is p'roduce d on
the r ock, Atl example Ls used ttl illustrate this point. The hot
spot is considered to be a molten sttlear Qf carbon steel at ;:.n
initial temperatura of 145CoC. The smear will cool with time.
At a pick speed of 1.5 metrel'J per second. ;)art of the smear would
have cooled to balow a temperature <:)f 12C'OoCat a distl'lnce of
about 0.7 ~m behind the pick. If th. sp~ed were increased to
4.5 metres per second. however. the pick wi~uld have travelled a
proportionately longer
1200oC'or leu, this
distance before tht~ hot spot cooled to
length bdng approll:l,ml1tely 1,,6 ca , The
length of the hot spot at or abcve a temperature thl!tt will ignite
mettiane tharefore ir.'::T:'eu11Is a,lI the speelt of the pick" ts
increasGd. The area of the hot sp(lIt. which 'has 8 mar.ked effect
'.\ /:/
upon iA\nitioti.. will alse be gras,tar. sin\~e the width is a
\'con'stsr.t./'
,y
Powell and Bill:inge (1915) and Larson tilt .1. (1983) concluded t.hat
the probability of igniting methane with sharp picke increases
with speed. Larson et 8l nota" that the ignitior. potential of
worn picks we;:!greater when t:he .·peed of cut::ing i\lcn~ased. The
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(11fference in the igni.tion potential between the speed increments
was not. howeve r, as great with worn picks as it was with charp
plcks.
Larson et al :in<.:est:son WQ:.:n picks that had been pre-heated,
found that the probability of ignition was reduced when the speed
of cutt:tng was increaoed which was the opp"'site effect t"l that
found for cool p:i.cks. The authors thought ..nat this was probably
due to air-cooling vf the machine tool.
It can be concluded that. when picks are not pre--heated. the
effect of increasing the speed is to produce a greater length •
and therefore area of hot spot on the rock. '!'hisin tu"C'n Leads
to an increased probability of igniti.on. For pre·-heated machine
tools. the opposi.te effect can be expected. 'The picks become
less incendive as the speed is increased which ~ay be due to air
cooling.
(h) 'Rate of Advance
Blidc.enaderfet at a1 (1975) noted that the advar,ce tate of a ~,ick
into rock h~d little or no effec~ upon the ignition potential.'..' ()
Larson' et &1 (1983) cl.ncluded that as the advance rate during a
cutting ••~u.nc. incre••~d. the number of cuts to ignition
decreased. ~lh.Qnthe advance per cut was plott~"d agt'inst t!ie cut
depth. however. it vas found that the de~th of cut at ignition
was the same for 1111advance rate!'!.
The implications sre that the rate of advance I)f a machine tool
into rock has no direet inflU4!lnce on the probability of ignition.
It ia suggested that the governing factor- is the depth of the cut
rather than the rate of advance.
'1II "
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(i) Depth of Cut
Several authors have paid attention to the depth of cut, but only
Powell et a1 (1975 ) and Larson et a1 (1983 ) have carried out
experiments to evaluate the effects of this parameter. They
noted that, as the depth of cut increases. so do the forces and
rate of heating of the rock and tool. Both these factors can
Lncrease the probability of ignition.
The literatur~! suggests that the depth o f cut has a great ~ffect
upon the ignition potential of machi.ne cutting picks. The
i.mplications are that this parameter has an obvious and central
role. in ignitions. As indicated tater. depth of cut is
interrelated with cutting forces.
(j) Cutting Forces
Powell and BiUinge (1975) concluded that rhe re is no di1:ect
i~e1ationship between th~ probability of ignition and the cutting
iiforces. It was found that ignitions were not associated with the
sudden force of an impact. Tbese auth~rs appear to regard the
~fepthof C',lt.t'ather than the cutting forces. as thr: controlling
parametar in ignitions.
There ia an obv:i.ousinterrelationship between the depth of cut
and the cutting forces. In order to cut deeper. larget' forces
are required both in the direction of cutting and normal to the
pick.. Althl)ugh the literature empha8~zes the deptr.:of cut. from.
a mechanistic point of view. t'he cutting forees. particularly the
nOr1llalforce. appear to be more important. With increasi~~~
normal foret'• the friction between tool and rock incre!:ues.
Authors conn Lder that. thi.s friction causes the hot spot \.:0 form
on hard rocks and is responsible for the self-heat'ing of pyrite.
It seems logical to assume. therefore. that the cutting forces.
rather tl".an th(! depth of cut as implied in the literature. i$ the
major factor affectiflS ignitions. T'heeffect on ig~itions of a
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reduction in the back-clearance angle of picks is also p..:obably
due to an increase in norma l f'orcos ,
(k) The Effect of Water
Cooling of a point attack pick is more dHficult than for a f'Lat
cutter pick owing to the loose fit of the former and the nead to
pr.ovide a ~.;aterjet external to the body (If the pick. A water
pressure of about lS MPa and a flow of 4 I/minute per pick can be
necessary to ensure good extinguishing effects with a point
attack pick. However, a channel can be provided in thE::body of a
flat cutter pick to cool it and to direct the water flow ~nto any
stream of incandescent particles. A flow pressure of only 600 to
800 MFa can achieve this ;,lith such a pick.
Powell et al (1975) and Powell and Billinge (1975) noted that
water could b~ effective in reducing ignitions. but that th~
di~-(:t".:,l\ of application is im.portant. Water can be used best
';:" "
when ~,ected onto the freshly cut rack behind the pick. parallel
to the ~st.mt.tleoua cutting direction. If supplied normal to
the rock b_hind the pick. ignitions would be decreased but not as
.ff~~tiv.ly. .Wh.~water va. directed in front of the pic~. which
is equivalent to pick flu.hing. no noti~.able reduction ~n
i.gnition potential was apparent. Spray. r&ther than jet'S vere
found to b~ the ..ost effective form of applying thl' water.
Wilson (1984) d.. c r Ibed ignition t~sts carried Ol.!t by the USBMon
a modified coalcutting pick for t:.l.leon 10n&WM11 shearers that
al1ow.,,~water to £lov through a en.hnel in the tool. The wa!:er
was di.rected to a point ."here the pi.,~k struck the reck or tOl'J ~
that is. l.DUllediately behind thE' eutth,s tip. With th~ correct
water press!")'-. It~ was t-0s..,ibleto .upp."ess ignitiQns co.mpletely
even in· the lDoet adverm'l cir.cum.stances.
It is evident that the applicA.tiorlof water can red~ce or even
eliminate ignitions of moethane--air mixtures. The most effective
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way in which water can be 'Used is in a spray direct,.'!donto the
ro(!k immediately behind the pick. The implication ::.s. therefore.
that the water must be directed onto the hot spot as :i.t is formed
which has ..he effect of either cooling the hot spot to below the
ignition temperature of methane-ail: mixtures or cf prevent:i..ng t.he
formation of the hot spot.
2.4.9 Fricti~n between Metal and Metal
There have been a number of expe;iments conducted by various
inve8tigat~l.'s to simulate sOllie of the conditions that occur in
of
al
be
considered in relation to the method of contact. This is divided
coal mines under regimes of frictional ignitio,,_ A summary
I,,'"'i
the results i~~oted by Deay et a1 (1975 ) and Kravchenko at
(1976 ) is given in Table 10. Frictional ignition can
into three rubbingn... 1,. single impact. andaroupc.
interaitt.nt impact.
The enerl,. involved in fricti.onal ip.ition is IIlOre than two
')rden of ugnitude greater than the .inimwn required to ignite a
..thane/air mixture.
The con4itioaa under which ..thane/ait· aiztur.. can be ianited
haw been atudied b,. a nu.1Nr of inve8tilatolt8.
't';t • .s.au. platinum sphere movina at a velocity of 4 rals. a
ote..p~rature of abo'!,lt 1 200 e "u nece.sary to secure,ignit:i.on at
an 8 percent ... thane/air tllixture (Si1v~r. 1937).
II
An all.aina Burface of 400 _2 in area vall placed in the wall of
an explosion chambeL and requirad heating to over 1 l(}Ooe in
order to ignite a 1 percent methane/air rai%ture. ~nd this
temperatUre increased ~o 1 &Daoe wh.n the area waa reduced to
2 \.
6.25 lllIIl (Rae et a I , 1964).
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T.able 10 Frictional ignition of methane/air mixtures (Kravchenko
et a'l , 1976)
Type of
Contact Experiment Comments
Single
impact
Steel on steel
Steel on Al alloys
Steel on Mg alloys
Probability of ignition
diractly proportional
to impact ene cgy
Maximl.l!ll;.gnition at angle
50°
Rubbing Al and Mg alloys
on rusty steel
at relative
velocities of 2-3 mls
Incendivity of sparking
increa~es up to a sliding
velocity of 100 mls
Inter-
mittent
Combination of
above
Surfece of bodies in
contact greatly heated impact
and may occur over large
area
r: (a) c Yrietion involvina H.avy Metal.
Methane can be. ignited by rubbina .teel on,lJteel but ignitions
are not readily obtained and then only at high loads and with
considerable lal. in ilnition. Rec~nt .xperisents at S.H.R.E.
shov.d that. a 25 ... quare mild ste.l bar pre••ed alainst a mild
.t.el wh•• l with a peripheral speed of about 4.57() lIetres/second
gave ianition. at loads down to about 250 kg. and with times to
i8niti~n of about 100 second.: by the tiMe ignition occurred the
bar v*. red hot and white hot flake8 of steel w~re b~ing torn
frca it. l!J:puiment' with ae"..r. impact bet1oll!en really hard
ateels have prod.1tCed ignit.ion. of Il:ethane-uir dth much 1e8s
total eneray diSillipation. non.thele ... It;ecl.on ste.l iI one of
the l ••• t incendive cOtllbinationa met 'With in coal minin:J.
(b) ri1ietionsl Ipition8 of the Second Cla .. ftbo ••
involving liaht •• tal~)
It so happens that all the metals which combin. exceptional
lightness and strength have a hilh heat I'>f oxidation and, in a
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finely divided\~tate. burn furiously. Furthermor(~.if the metal
is in intimate. contact with an oxide. for. example. rust.
combustion i~ teadiJ.y initiated; this is the well-known
thermite-type reaction. The smears of aluminium. for example.
left t'.'fl a rusted steel surface after an aluminium bar has rubbed
against it can edsily be provoked into giving off brilliantly
incandescent sources that ignite gas instantly; all that is
required j.s a light glancing blow from a hammer weighing a few
gram::.:.
By al10ytng them with other metals. their :i.ncendivitycan be
reduced but. unfortuna.tely.not to an acceptable level until the
.t~es1l1tingalloy is no longer 1~ght. Eo far no one has found an
I~ffect:i.ve way of overcoming this disadv:mtage.
(c) Results of Research by Kell,.and Forkner
RelJ.y and Forkner conducted laboratory tests with a single impact
lI!.odewith cnbl1lt bonded tungsten c.,.rbide.type A·36 steel, C4130
steel and aluminium against A-36 steel. Tangential velocities of
if.57 and 5.59 metres per second were used in two types of
oxplosiv~ atmospheres. No ignitions
,.ithar air and methane or flowing
results are r6corded:
r68ulted in atmospheres of
acetylene. The following
Cobalt-bonded tungstl~n carbide. Commer<~ialcOlllcutter pick tips
were illlpactetia~ain£.t A-36 steel with no resulting ignitions. No
"l'arks or hot smears were observed.
il
A-36 steel and C4130 steel. No hot S~t~ar8 were cbse rvad, but
.[
some dull sparkp ';)Iere produced.
I'
d'
Aluminium. Impact specimens of alum;~~',iumwere struck against
both <:lean and rusty A-36 steel. and Il~".oag~dnst a steel plate
with a heavy rust layer. A few very 8IIuJ.i~1 sparks were observad,
but no evidenco ot a thermite reaction w~s n.ot!d. Apparently the
II
1/
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tangential velocity was too low tf.J cause initiation of a thermite
reaetion.
(d) Experiments on Metal on Metal
Coward and Ramsay (1965) stated th< ignition of f:iredam" by the
frictiottal eff~cts of metal rubb.;_ on metal ha~ been most
difficult to obtain experimentally except when the a.braded
par.ticles produce much extra heat by <...·eir own oxidation, as
oc~urs with the sparKs from a "lighter". The difficulty in
general is probahly mainly because the thermal conductivity of a
metal is greater than that of a rock but in some case!q oxidation
of metal may make ignition more difficult by reducing the oxygen
content of the contiguous atmosphere.
(e) Spark6 fro~ a Cigarette "Lighter" or Flamelam~
ReL:.ghter
The Miners' Lamp Committee. in discussinf!; the proposed use cf a
pyropiloric cerium- iron alloy it. a re lighter for f1eme lamps.
wrote that they wou1.d 11(.eed to! peC! assured by exh~ustive
experiments of. the unreality of tbe ...;""itger that is presUlIled to be
!
,)
create~ b~t~Jifprt'!sence within the lamp of unconsuaed particles
of cer.:.um \:~oy be f'ore we could recommend the adoption of tl1e
I( , ,
'pyrophor' ignite~".
('
Quantitative information about tho i.ncen<livity of particles fr:>m
authorised relighter alloys bas been given by Rae (1956). Such
particle .. ignite spontan~ously when heated in air to about
o180-200 C. a temperature ~o~only reached by the gauzes of a
flame safety lamp.
Particles of the pyrophor alloy which are milch larger thon those
that lre igniu.:~ by the action of 4 rftlight£r ml'ty break away
without being ignited. and may be large enough to infl~~ w~Lhane
89
when t':ley are ignited by the gauze. yet small enough to pas s
through th~.gauze of a lamp. The methane-air mixture ruost t!asily
r')
ignitable by this means was dOGe to the lower limit of
inflammability of methane (5.3 percent).
(f) Friction of Steel on Steel
Burgess and Wheeler (1929) caused a '.00 mm diameter st~e 1
lo;\omotive wheel to revolve in contact with a steel girder. With
a load of 1 ton and ~ wheel sp~ed of 1120 r.?m •• with frequent
sanddng which produced brilliant sparks. an B.1 percent
methane-air mixture was not i6n3;..ed during C, trial last mg 20
minutes. When a shie Id was used to concentrate the sparks ,
several ignitions wer~ obtained with the same wheel speed and
half the load. one ignition occurring in 1..3./2 l11inutes, before
the ra:i.lhad becvme r~d hM E.ndmuch before the rail war. hot
enough ill itself to ignit'e firedamp_ S1j?p~.ementarytests ....ith a
different apparatus failed to give any ignition unde~ various
conditio, '-:'. including the title of vadous steels that gave variot:b
types of sparks. Later experimettts (Safety in lIin~s Re'search
Board. Annual Reports, 1942. 1943), gave ignitions of
firedamp-air with a high-carbon steel wheel revolving with a
peripheral speed of 9,2 metres per second and cutting into mild
steel; "this spepd is much higher than any ret'ched by coalcutter
picks in ordinary use. but highspeed cinephotogu.phs showed that
a hand pick may reach this speed before striking. A wheeJ of a
,
tun-away tub l1l8y skid along thE! ratl at a higher speed still".
Schultze-Rhonhof and 'Weich.le1 (1951) nbtained ignition of
firedallp by pr.essing spring :;teel against a steel disk. revohdng
with a peripheral speed of ahout e.,) n/sec (H' 000 .fthrdn).
Schultze-Rhonhof (1956) 9~oted exper; ~nts by Vereinigten
T..aic:htlletallwerken. in ihich a piece of very hard steel falling
onto a plate of hard steel gave ignitions when the impact energy
was 40 kilograJDlle-lietrea. which i8 equal to 392 (i)oule., and ale'-'
-, ! )
I
quoted sla:ih:r experiments at the Technhche .Hochschule in \
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st ruck a ~n:eel roof girder. The casing of the drill war; an alloy
containing about 94 percent of magnesium; and ignitions of
firedamp 'i1erc. readily obts Lned by dropping a piece of the alloy
onto a tU3ty steel plate. under a variety of conditions
r·.)present~ltive of pi t usage. The! second :invesd.gation (Titman.
1954) ext~mded the work to the whole range of magnes:i.um-aluminiu.m
al.l.oys 3!1C showed that the danger of :ignition. de'~t'ea.sed with a
decreased proportion of magnes i.um but was not altogether
~liminated if pure cast aluminium was used. Inciuentally. the
most easily igl'ited mix.ture of methane and air contained 6.4
percent c·f methl::.ne. an observation sUPJiut'ting the geuc.ra.I
exper1encE~ that mixtures a little above the hlwer limit of
inflammab:.lity are thE most easily ignited by friction sparks ,
Titman an,i Wynn (1954) '3howed that the sparks produced by the
impact of steel or zinc on rusty steel were much l~ss incendive
than the sparks it'om ligh\: all~ IS on rusty steil:, They also
\\
quoted IUtpetilllents by Bowden ap,.dLewis (1958) on ~e minimum
\\
weights of ignited single par~icle8 required to i&nite firedamp
whicb ir..dieated the following crder of decreasing incendivity:
magnesium and aluminium. titantiu~. zirconitUD. "pyrophor" (cerium
alloy) cerium. thorium. Rae (195~) &lgo found that tho mini~tUD
weight for titaniWi\~1iI ~tw ... n tho,e Jor magnesium and pyrop'hor
found earlier (Rae, 1916). Row.v.t:r. t~ order of incendi'Tity"J
11)(
not .' measure of the hl1r'8rd ofliven by th •• ~ experiment. is
ignition by abrasive friction. "for the bri t t i4:ness and the
mechanical properties of the Bolid. ate IJf: primary importance
lilinca this determines whether particles \ will be detached or not
and influenc •• their size" (Bowdenand Le~i•• 1958).
!:a:perimental support was found by Fet~ (1959.1960) for the
hypothed8 that. briefly. the friction bp.tveen IJght alloy and
I. rusty steel initiates Il thermite-like rE'!ac.tionwhich sete fir~ to
particle. of the smeared metal that are proj$cted into. ~urn in
and inf1amlt·. the neighbouring gas.
Smears of light alloy on r~~ty steel can be produced by imps~~ or
friction insuffici:ontly vigorous to ptoduce i.,nitil."ln at the time
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2.5 NUMBER AI'::1 DATES OF INCIDENTS
The recorded incidents of ignitions of methane by fr·;.ctional heat
and sparking in South Africa are set out below~
(a) Consolidated Collieries Limited. May 194;'.
methane explosions in stooping section possibly :'rl'!11 an
LncendLary spark , 1 killed. 1 injured.
(b) Schoon&~licht Colliery_ 1956. Ignition of lIIt'!ths'1e due
to faulty f.an (frictional ignition). 19 killed.
!)
Durban Navigation Cc..l,lieriesLimited. Sept~1Aber. 1968.
Ignition of methane in cut. No casualties.
(d) Dur-ban Navigation
Methane ignitil)n due
Colli.ria. Lieited. April. 1975.
to friction between drill steel
and Ih\nd8tone. No casualtiea.
Usutu Kool.yne Beperk. October 1977• Isnition of
.. thana while cutUna with c.oalcutter. Nil c~[lu.1tiel.
(f) Uautuol(oollriyne Beperk. February 1980. Explosion of
lH'thane in continuou •• iner .6ction. 1 injured.
JI(,> !rmell) Mines. Nove.ber 1980. Methane exploded at a
continuous miner. 1 injured.
!h) !r.aelo Mines. Janua ry 1981 •
contl)nuou. miner •• ction. 2 injured.
(i) !naelo Min••• April 1981. Met.hane ignition due to
continuous miner picks causing 8p.t'i~c,",~ injur.ed.
08
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(,~ology
Figure 16 depicts the geological formati{m in the vicinity of
sec t i.on B302. The in:illlediate!:Qof of the seam consists of a
competent medium grained quartzitic sand-tone which tends to
fracture in large blocks some blocks measuring 1 to 2 metres in
thickness and 6 ro 8 met·.t:es wide and 10 metres in length. The
roof does nc t I goaf" ea,sily but 'hangs up I forming a cantilever
type beam over the goa f 1i11e thereby placing high abutment leads
on the fe ..ders ,
The ~:ncident;
1~e Section Manager reported as follows:
On 28 February 1981 it was reported that a llIethane explosion had
occurred in Section B3Q2. Viai shaft. at about 07h20 on that day.
I subsequently established ~;,ttt: the ceven Blackl;; were reportably
injured in the accident. l:ighteen other W('tKers sustained
superficial injuries.
On 2 and 3 March 1981, at:compan:i.edby the Inspector of tUnes I,
v1sited the scene of the accident and noted. d8taila which have
been embodied un a detailed 1:500 scale. Figure 17. and 1:5000
regional plan. Figur, lZ.0
!i .~
1\
Section B302 ic a 7 \\'~OliV! I':~ction which is being stooped on the
middle 5 road. \\ling the pocket and fender ;,nethod. The pillar
cantua are 25 III with. bord width of 5,5 lil. The working bee is
on a 450 line retreating back t~~ the main development.
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Stuttgart giving ign:i.tions with an impact energy of 200
kilogramme-!nettes. Recently ScilJlz and n:ttmar (1963) have
obtained ignitions of methane-air mIxtures by impact of hard
steel on a hard steel plate w{tb impact energies as low ~s 25
dlog!amm~-·metres. The type and speed of impact is 11 very
important factor.
(g) Aluminium-painted Rusty T.rlln
FoUowhlg a. 1:'~PQrt' r~cel.ved by S.M.R.B. fz om H.M. Factory
Inspectorate. of violent flashes, more like minute explosions
than «parks , obse rved when alum:i.nium-pu;.nt.ed rusty iron was
lightly struck by a tool. Thomas (lS41) ,::;howed that firedarniJ
could reacH] !be ignited by such means. The sparks were. ascribed
to 8 thermite··Hke reaction between mdde of iron and 81;.tminium
an.d were obtained from var Icus aluminiu'll paints pro ....ided the
painted surface nac at some tim.e previously been heated to some
200°<; to 300°C .. Ringman and othe:rs (1952) extended the
obse rvar Lonr, and (!-dce (19')2) summarised the details as follows;
'''l~.e available experimental evidence frOID all source-s endorses
th", opinion th£it el'.ll'liniUIIl and Lron oxide in intimate contact.
when raised in toempeu.1:urllt by a "harp blow, may give _park-a or
ni;'<3hes that will read:-Uy ~Q;nite certain in flamtrable g,~,s or
vapour-air mixtures."
, ill "
W~.lld
/ ~rovide the(/UlD to
sp/lrks. but in practice meat
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paint films may also enhance the conditions for the production of
incendive sparks. In any ,=,'!.'entthe pre-heating tempe~'atures are
such that no steel structure painted with aluminium paint w(lu:iq
be Lmnune from tpe risk of being raised to such tentper"\cures __L
1.!.ttoducI".C into a coal mine.
T':,e main c r i.t Lc-ism that must be levelle.i at a.ll the experIment aL
v1Crk so far put1 bbed is thE' leek :,1' quantitative assessment: of
the hazard and. the determinatil",1 of the energy dissipated at the
moment of contact. In thir latter conrection it must be pointed
out that in all the exp~riments discu~sed the energy used was of
a relatively low order.
The suggestion has been made that: the e~tperimental evidence does
not iridicate a gn.<:ltha%ard attached to the use of e.luminium.
'Ibis is sur.sly the wrong approach. It is known that under
"cer:tain condit:lo,s. much 1Il0re severe than those described in the
papers ment~oned}ut w~11within the range of frequent occurrence,
irt a mine. fr~ctil)n between steel surfaces wi1.l produce incencflve
spa",k.a. Typical of such occur rencea an the full 8wing of a pi:::k
t'l.cddentBilly!ihitdng a prop .or girder. "'"hecollisiQn of a loacled
;(
tub with an arch or,. rOAdway. or the grinding ilIlp1ict of lItoving
machihary. Whllt.,hali now been establ.:!sheC\ is that the prefumce of
'..al~!<-i\Ull paint greatly increase. thb d.k~ for .pan from all
.".\--/tber cons.ideut. ions. ,the energy dissipated in the illl.pacts liklrly
\l to occur 1., a mine would itself be lIuft;fe:l.ent tc. l're-heat ))he
p,int well above the temperatures used experimentaHy. \\
o h
(1\) Sparking tiro. Light: Metal, and their A11o,..
i )
Much of the he )' work of coal mining would be eaB~)dby the use
\ of li.~ht metsla. f"r exalllple. in prop" and bars a~~ arches for
roof\\ ,Iupports. Re.earch ha. been nee .... llry to alises. the
incend.id.ty of spark. due to friction and impact with such
\l.\aud.att..
;J .',' ,-'
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Firedamp was ignited when a piece of an 011101. part a
fan+bLade of an eLect r i.ca l dr i.Ll , was held against a hard steel
wheel rotating ::I.t a. high s?ef~d. 'fhe alloy was at first said to
be "aluminiul'~·1 (S.M.R.B. Annual Report. 1943j. but later this
description was cor recoed tc "magnes Ium" (Margerson et a l., 1953).
Aluminium friction plates of steel props were discovered in
Holland to be capable of giving inc:endhe sparks under
condLtLons , when the props were either und'~r load
certain
or being
Thereleay~d from load (Schultze-Rhonht.f and Weichsel.1951).
danger , they concluded. would be reduced, if not eliminated, by
usa.ng an aluminium-col'per-magnesium 611oy. with as little silicon
contF.!n~ as possible, an.d by improving the de!>ign of the preps;
moreover. props made of the same alloy did not give sparks when
.....rubbed against the ate!!!1 .s;lamp of the props.
:' : __ 1
'~Y Schultze-Rhonha! (1956) discussed
A subsequent paper
i!everal ignitions
uri\~.rlround and described eJCperiment~l work orr. t'!-,e sub jac tz it,.
corlelude:d with the su:Celilent (translat:ed): "Chen the right
" .~~
choie. and Cloaposition of the aluminium slloys and the correct
designing of props and,baJ;'s of thb material. tIll! inherent risks'
of fit.to.p ilnition frolll aluminium sparkihg can be kept within
such limits tbat the continued ulle of support co.ponellts in,
al~iniua .. hevinl re8ard ,to their other advantages r appflan
reason.blew• Brenner and Everahet. (1958) collected the resulta
of test. mad.. 1n several German laboratorhe and concluded that.
f h\.· 1) f 1 11 i 1 fe t e pra-etl..Ce..1 use u a oya. carta. n a 10YIII 0
,.
alU11iniua-masu ... !'lm-I'I i1icon and a1uminiuJIl-. inc-magnes ium
pref'.nt'~d th~ Ieaat danger. pArticularly if they contained traces
of be~lli~; but they concluded with lit cautioMry note about
1
tbll! ~pplic2bility of laboratory taau to ali the
condit'..,ns of a Il';ne.
variou"l
S.H.R.I. b..
inaugurated by
light alloys.
I'
i8rdtion of firedamp in t\ C,\nnock Chase colliery. obser.ved when
an electric dr.i!1 (not pcwered 8~ the time) fell. and prob8~ly
made a •• ri •• of detailed invest i,.<t ions ,
(1952).
(\
Wyrm on the incendivity of Of.parking" by
II.The first (Mag_non et al, 1953) arosl!! frl:lm ilJl
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and such smears can give :rise to incendive flashes if
sub sequent Iy struck by a light gl anc ing blo'., with a light object.
For example. a hammer blow on the steel wedge of a~ aluminium
linked bar roof support system can produce sparking; a light
hammer moving at c1I1y ai..lo;;.t3 metres per second can st::-ikesparks
hom rusty steel ~I!teared with aluniniuLl and tbil:' can ignite
methane. Also. ignitions can OCCUt' from the flash p:t:uduced whe.n
aluminium foil wrappings of the tY'~e used fot' confectionery and
I0nerally krlown as "silw:~:t: paper" :r.e:':ting on rusty steel are
at ruck a :Light glancing blow C't(.pr,enson. 1962). The author ha~~
witnessed these elqler:i.ments at the S.M.R.E. at Buxton, and
conf Lrsis the 'explosions' produce d by striking foil a gl.ancLug
blow with a steel hal'llllel'.
The function of the rust. which makes incE:ndive sparking so ea;y
f'!: che impact (If 1inht &11(>Y8 with steel. is ~l,n~ral1y accepted
0::(("" thtt provilo!ion of oxygen for s .thet'1l1ite-1i~. reaction. An
II
\\ incidental observation, fo't: vh:i(!h no expianlltion was offered. Vias
"lIl1d. by Weich•• 1 (195S): b~ found that a s!IUlll amount of
lIOisture ,.•• nec.sGary for the pecduct.Lon of incendi.ve sparkll in
a drcpping-vei,ht QPpat'~tt:' l~ke tnat of Titlll&n (1954).
\~
(/
!Sofar, :Hah't ... tal dloya thst are incapable of aivins inc.ndive
spark. haft proVfld to be unauiUt.;le in their ...chanical
pr~perti.. fOTV us. .. .. t.t'ial~, for a:;\lIt minioe equipaent. A
puptn by R,Qeand !'field (1960) c:onc:iu&,d that "the IIl08t d.si::able
propertb. of 'tn ••• :'{experilll4!ntal} ,,1'10y. fro. an engine.rin&
roint of vie•• hardne •• and ductility. are those proper~ies which
,'I
to,etber gr the lreatest ineendivity' for a given a,.1lid.niWII
¢.ontent". \180 "in general tenia all aluainiull·'based alloYI must.
be C(Jnllider~d capable of siVinl incendiv. Ipadting". Only when
the altainiUlll content has been"r@duc.d to one .toa in thrEe. can
"the ianition hazard be regc.rded •• ie"uced to .. toluabl. level.
but such alloy. no lonler po... sa the al1v4l.rtaae of lightness."
( i
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(1) Balgray Colliery. May 1981. Ignition of methane while
cutting - picks came into contact with dyke. Nil
casualtiey; •
(k) Belgray Col ery. July 1'181. Ignition of meth:';, c.
while cutting Nil casualties.
(1) Bosjespruit CoIl ry. 1982.March Explosion
methane in continuous Minar section. 6 injured.
(.) Sptingfield Col1i~,ry. May 1982. Ignition of methane
while cutting fsce\ " continuous miner. 1 injured.
(n) November 1982.Krautlo Mines. Methane explosion -
c po.aible CGuse frictional sparking. 11 killed.
(0) Springfield Col~ier.y. August 1983. Ignition
_tllane in cOlltinuv~~ ll1:l."er.ection. 1 injured.
of
(p) SpriOlfield ColH.r~ -;..<>velllbel!'1983. Methane ignidon
while ,\pttinl a h,ce. 2 injured.
',,1c-:
(q) Sprift8fi.ld Colliery. February 1985. Methane
explollion in 10*f due to frictional sparking.
killed. 11 injured.
2
(r) Sprinafi.ld Colliery. June 1985. Ignition vf methane
in goaf. Nil cuuelth ••
()
I\)
\1
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2.6 DETAl.I.S or INCIDENT::;/PHENOME'NON
From all the known incidents recorded in South Africa. 4
incidents have been chosen to illustra.te the phenomenon.
2.6.1 Springfield ColHery. 'February 1981. Ignition of
Methane in Goaf
On the, 28th Februa.ry 1981 (a Saturday) at 07h20 two methane
e~!>los;.ons occurred in aec t Lon B302 killing two men and injuring
i: 'I
a Irurtl\E!r 11. The sact Lon was a 7-road pillal: extraction secz i.on
\i \
elll\~loyfl,,~g the pocket; and fender lIIethod ':If extraction and
1\ \uthl.Si~{gconventional cyclic coal mining and leading equipment
(loaders, shutc1ecars and coalcutters with handheld electric
drill.). Thf! gOllf line was kept at: !~5° to the lIIain axis of the
section.
\
Poc:1t.,~ .ft~ rend ..r "tethod of Pi1.lat. !xtrllct:t..l'tl Figun 14 refers.
Ir. this meth~d of extraction the goaf ed,,. lupport consists of a
I
thin pillariof coni equal in width t6 the height of 'the workings.
This is ref";rred to as tbe fender.
I
" / .~c,h lift 'hOl.'\ the fender is then cut through in appro9ri.te
ph,.; •• into tlle goail; thellle holing. arc refer.red to as pockets.
I
Th\~\! small pill\~rs left in the fender are known as snooks ,
Reference to Fi;~un 15 will show the sequence in which pillars
are removed.
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The section is ventilated by the main body of air which is drawn
through the intake roads numbered 2 to 6 and r2turned via No. 7
road. Th~ air in No.1 road is stagnant.
Auxiliary fans are :inst.qlled for providing air along the face
line and particularly for ventilating the deveLopment;during the
initial cutting through of pillars~ but also for any other area
where ventilation is r€.quired.
The average production in Sectiot'. B302 amounts to 400 tonG!shift
which would require a volume of 10 m3/sec of air i.n order to
comply with che requ:i.rements of the regl11ations.
The latest ventilation survey which was cartled out in Section
B302 on 17 February 1981 indicated that che face area INas
ventilated by means of ~wo fans situated in No.4 cnd 6 roads and
the tots.1 intake volUlllewas 20 m3/sec.
A further t more detailed ventilation survey card.ed out after
this accident on 2 March 1981 indicated thfit there were·' no
(j auxiliary fans in Section B302 and that the resp'.:!ctive volumes of
air flowing through the individual roadways we'.:e zero in roadways
1 and '2 atld gud:ually increasing to 13.5 m3hec in roadway No. 6
.' 3
~ith a total vol~e cf 21,4 m !sec returning through roadway No.
7 (arrows thus 0:1 plan 17).
I have no knowl'.ldge of
Section B302. I visited
recall seeing the fan
whether the fan in roadway No.6 was there or not. The flow of
vantilation th~o't:gh the section, however. appeared to be in
order.
the removal of the auxiliary fans in
this section on 25 February 1981 and can
in roadway 'No. 4. but: did not notice
FroU!observations made lit the Bcene of the ac(.;ident it appeared
that timbers and other combustible obj_cts had been exposed to
varying degrees of heat in the are. /'"aul1el to the goaf line
between roadways 2 and 5 and between i~\its q and E.
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The heat appaarad tc be most :intenseat a point in the vicin:i.ty
of roadway 2. splLt; C. and diminished in a northerl.y direction.
This was also substantiated by the severity of burns of the
persons employed in this area.
A detailed inspection of the area. h"\,,,,:\,·r..did not reveal the
cause of the ignition.
To my knowledge no methane has ever ;)(en .ec ted in this
section.
1,t. is quite possible f01: methane to be released when goafing
ta.ke:s place arid for the methane to be present in the gcaf area
without its presence being detected by normal. routine methane
tests.
After rescue operations had been compleLed and on arrival of the
mine prot~ team. gas samples were taken at regular intervals at
the regulator in the return airway. These samples indicated
initial concent rarLcn= of 3% CR4 and 50(1 PPMof CO respectively
st llhS6. These concenr ratLone g);adually diminished until l5h45
when the air was clear (dee Table 1).
Table 1 Gas Re.dinss at Regulator. 28th February 1981.
Tille eR.% co PPM
11hS6 3% 500
12h32 2.5% 60
13h08 Nil 60
13h43 Nil 30
14hl0 Nil 20
14h43 Nil 10-15
15h14 Nil 10
l5h45 Nil S
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In c rde r to prevent a similar oceur rence Section B302 has been
t~mp(,,:arily stopped and th~ 'I ;)f air to the section has beenvo iuae
increased 3 into 32 m Isec 'in effort to clear any methane which
may stUl be prl2sent in the goaf area. All tests for methane
since 1 March 1981 have. however. been negative. Endeavours are
also being made in future planning to provide bleeder roads
adjacent to stQoping sections so that the return. air will flow
d:trectly from the goaf area into the return airway in a direction
away from the working area.
It would be possible t o ventilate the face of Section B302
witho'l't the use of auxiliary fans, but" then a line of brattices
wotl1d have to be installed roughly parallel to the face in order
to course the air towards roadway No.1 and thus sweep the face.
I did not authorise the removal of ei ther of the fans in
Section B302.
!did not notice any brattices in Section B302 after this
accident.
Without the use of auxiliar-y fans or brattices the ventilation
at
be
s~en
from the ventilation survey conducted on 3 March 1981. the
readings of which are indicated by arrows thus
would tend to be more concentrated towards the return airway
roadway No. 7 and the left hand roadways ill the panel would
starved of air. 'l11is ie. in fact. what happened as CAn be
During the investigation o.f the accident I questioned all the
available witness... 4nd a8 far a. I cocld a$certain no
electrical machin&1:1 wa. being u.ed and no blasting had taken
plac.e at the time ocf the accident.
The explosive. used in thi. .ection coapt-he 200 gil Ajax (7-00 IIln
J: 29 _) caftddge. and electric detonatorsi; varyinl from
milli.econd delaya.
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The (~lief:nginee~ of the colliery inspected the section after
the explosion to exauine all electrical appliances with the
objective of ascertaining whether
initia.ted by an electrical flash.
evidence was that:
the explosion had been
After the examination his
"After I had been informed of this accident I visited Section
13302 for the purpose of de,termiuiLlg wheth€.r there were any
defects to the electrical t';quipmentin the section and whether
any of the equipment could have been the cause of a methane
:gnition. I conducted these inspections on 1 and 2 March 1981
and again on 3 March 1981 in the presence of the Inspector of
Machiner.y.
/i
My inspections covereo all the electrical equi\~ment and the
cables feeding them including the flamedeen banks, ~i2 l!''I;1utt1ecars.
2 loaders. a c~alcutter. a rocfbolt machine. a pump and an
electric drill.
I made a thorough search of the flameproof boxes of the equipment
for signs of flashinr. but all the equipment and cables were in
order and no signs of flashing were evident.
The electric drill. the eabie serving it and a faulty cable
serving onl!of the shuttlecars were t'!l1ovedfor a 1Il0re detailed
exuin:ltion on sl1rfac.~but this too dB n.)t t:eve.lany signs of
flashing or any other defects which could i;"lvecaused a methane
:i.gnition.Tho shuttlecl'l'['cable was not connecte!\ at the time oi
the accident."
Based on the Engineer's evidence it i. ?ossible to rule out ~n
el~ctric flash as th& initiator of th .. (,!xplosion.
'.'
Central to the inves~\ilation at thb 8tage waa, the ventilat10n of
the section. the position of two auxiliary fana priQT. to the
explodon on the 16th Febl'uary 1981 and the dr quantities in the
section.
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Two weeks prior to the accident. the mine Ventilation Officer
3reported that 20 m l eea .;'c '-' intak:Lng into the section with
19 m3/sec:m the return airway. Two fans shown on the plan
3Figure 17 were delivering 5,1 m /sec to roadway No. 2 and
34.5 m /sec to roadway No.4. Each fan deliverad ad.r through a
flexible ducting and an air curtain (as shown en Figure 17) to
prevent recirculation of air. No recirculation was taking place
according to his tests. A ruethanometer was u:::ed to test f')r
methane and the goaf line and return airway (No. 7 road) were
found to be free of gas.
Another interesting aspect of the ventilation was that no
brattice cloth had been erected in the intake roadways to course
or dilTert the intake vendlat'lon to the left hand side of the
section (No. 1 road) and then alon~ the goaf line to the return
airway in No. 7 road. T'~e responsib1.1!Official relied on ,he two
auxiliary fans to ventHate the sod line.
On the ll)th Fi:!'brue.ry1981 the Mine 0';er88er &ave 'instructions for
the fan in No. 6 road to be removed to ~nother section "because
there 'l'I"S an adequate volume of air flowing along that part of
the flet':tion and it (thfi fan) was not serving any purpose!f.
Sever~l days later the fan in No. 4 road lras also t'emoved to
another seetion without the Mine O'llersear's approval; neither of
these acts were recorded~" the Shiftbosses' log book tht'!reby
endorsing these changes. Subsequent to the rem('Jvalof the fans
th. Mine Overseer report~d that:
"I cheeked the flow of ventilation in that part of the section
after the fan had been removed and found it adequate. The miner
confirmed that blasting fumes were being effect~vely eleared."
\ I_I
, \
\
The mine's standard procedures dictated that all auxiliary fan
installations" in sections were to b. 3it.d 1:y the Mine I)verseer
(following an exploBi:.'n in 1962 caused by an incorre~tly sited
fan which va. reci~culetin, air over the fan aotor). The Mine
Overse~r in evidence after the explosion stated that:
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lilt is standard procedure t.o move fans fOl.'ward as th€: section
advances and , not personally select the site as there would
only be one Si ,\.6.~lesite where the fan could possiJ:.ly be moved
to and that is the position where the fan would automatically be
installed. II
Both fans w€t'e installed in t~tis section in January 1981. Aoart
frO!;l the fact chat; a fan was required in another section. the
ShHtboss had established that the fan in No. 4 road was not:
neCiessary. He stated that:
"On 2 January 1981. while I was in Section 302. I noticed tbat
the blasting fumes die!not withdraw from the section on the left
hand side. r then determined that the fan iu No. 4 read was
recirculating and aft~r I stopped the fan. foun1 that the
bla.ting fume, were leaving. Because we still required a fan in
1\
another Bection. I deeic1ed'" the fan there. I didto move not
obtain pet1Rission fol.'"th is. but it was my inte.~tion to inform the
Mine Captain the following day and to obtain hi. appro~al.
On the 27th January 1981 I did an eerly shift with the miner and
we te.ted for ~thanti along the faee ana the breaker line with a
flame safety laap. All the teats were ne.ativ'e. The flame
safety l..p va. not fitted with. test tub~ (probe).
! did not think about erec::tingbrattice. to p\."eventthe fan from
recirculatinl'
When I arriv.d at work on February 16 1981. the othQr Shiftb08B
.entioned to 1M that tbe fan tn No. 6 road had bee.l removed
beeau•• a fan .a. required f?r .ection 30. He also mentioned
that this had been done .ith the approval of the Mine Captain."
There vere no other f.n. available underground to install in the
other ••'Ztion.,;
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It is not clear how:
L the removal 0 f this fan in No. 4 road improved the
ventilat.ion in the section (the blasting f1lmes dissipated);
ii. the Shiftboss could have taken such a decision. without
thinking of Jhe consequences of having the fan removed.
On the 28th February 1981 at 20hOO (13 hours after the explosion)
it was discovered that one of the two main fans on surface had
tripped out on overload at the main substation without giving a
warnin~ alarm.
The fan in question ,was equipped with an automatic alarm system
which is operated from the same power source which feeds the fa.n
motor with, the result th3t when the current tripped out at the
sub station there was no current to set off the alarm system.
Since the accident. the alarm system has been improved by
i.nstell:inga back-up alarm system in the sub station. thus it the
fan Motor Bhoulft trip out on overheating, for instance, the alarm
"system at th0 fan chamber will be activated and should the trip
out occur at the .,jubstation the alarm synte1llthere will be
activated.
The evidence of the Proto Team Captain. who entered Section B302
two hours after the explosion was as follows:
"As we w.lk.e4 Lnt;o the section in question, I took. carbon
lIl!:'noxid.Buple. in the;, air and found, that the carbon .onoxid.
\ ~--:
aradually inctea.ed. t i!nmediately suspected tbat there was
insufficient air to ventilate the .ection.8 the air was dens'!.
yet it wa. then al ready 09h30 while I WIIS advised about the
explo!'::onat 07b30.
I then !;ook a reading at the regulator in the return airway and
determined that a ~olume of 10 .3!s~cflowed through the 'section.
I then increa.ed the air regulator. following which another
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3~eading indicated that the air increased to 16,6 m Isec. T... took
CH4 and CO readings at regular intervals, the results of which
are indicated on Table 1.
When I first entered the section there was virtually no movement;
of air. However, aftet :r inC'reased the size of the aa r
regu1ator. there was noticeable air movement; but 1 took no air
velocity measurements."
It follows fr.oM the g~>I percent agas and ventilation volumes
measured two weeks bp.fore the incident and after the incident
that the one main fan could have tripped prior to the explosion.
thereby reducing the quant Lt.y of air into this section from
20 m3/sec to 10 m3/sec.
At 07h30 on the 28th February 1981 a ehain of events had led to
an explosive methane build up in and at the goaf ed~e.
Two fans were reinatal1ed in the section by the 3rd March 1981
.nd they are shOWn in pos:i.tion on Figure 17 (toget~ler with the
air reading,. at that time)•
Th. Ip:f.tiou SOt.trc.
if
The miner had drill~~I~ ~~,.ed and blasted thl! tW(I back to back:
sp.H.ta in road r between No.. 6 And 7 'roada and 'Was preparing to
blast the snook. between No•• 5 and 6 roads and splits G and H.
He was standing in split D in No. 6 road. A beavy goaf occurred
and after 80lle 5 .econds fl.... we:\.'eseen in ..".~ goaf .ritll
followed by an .~lo"ion. He uintai,n8 that prior .",! bluting he
had e1~ined the loaf .dle and found it to be free of methane.
The Kin.r's Bo: Attendant who wa. d.liverinl explosive. to the
f.ceI! of No. 6 r04d 8tat:et':.
\ )
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"I was an eye witnes<; to the accid.ent in which several workers
were injured in a methane explo*,ion in ou.rsection on 28 February
1981.
At the tiroeof the accident I was deliverLtg a box of explosives
to the face in the tra~tor road (no. 6 road). I was about 10 m
(indicated) fr.om the breaker line when a heavy fall of roof
occurred beyond the breaker line. I looked up in that direction
and saw white sX!lokeissuing from below a slab of shale measuring
about 0,4 m th:i.ck and 4.0 m long (indicated) which had fallen.
At first there was only a little bit of smoke but it then
increao.s2d:involume and after a while I saw flames coming out
from undar the slab of rock. The flames suddenly grew much
larger and reached towards the roof. I then turned around and
ran away. As I reached the second split I looked around and
I>
the tip on all fours. The fla~e. and Qust withdrew almost
noticed that the flaJ;lleswere burrri.ngf:i,ercelynear the hanging.
I ran into the second ,splitand as I rounded the corner a loud
explosion took plac~ behind me. I was thrown to the ground by
the air blast and U$ I was getting up a s~cond explosion occurred
and immediately ~fterwardo the whole area was en~eloF~d in heavy'
coal dt'stand fla!ll.eswhich appe8r~d to come fr~m a:i:ldirections;
\I was knocked to the ground again efter which I cra~led towards
"i.lIItIledf.ately.fteT the second explosion.
",
tfttr r had initia!1y noticed the smoke under th~!rock 1 pointed
it out to !IIyco'"'vorkerand when the flame•• tart\~d rising I ran,
away ahead of hi~. When I ran into the split he was still in the
roadway .and took the full foree of th. exploeion frOll t~~
direction of the fire.
I have no idea of what caused the fire under the slab of rock.
I waa at th. waiting place whe~ the Kiner eZMlI.inedthe section at
the b.linni~a of the shift. '
(j
:.13
We w'· r~,' prer~ring to bla.st the pillars t(lWCUGS t'hla left of the
breaker," J ';":e wher. the accident happened. ;.1", ·b;..as·\;ing was done at
the timl~. He had bLaat-sd the faces fu:';'t:l"l':;1;"bad. (in Split E
betwe6:n r.oaJr (, and 7 indicated) earlier dur:ir.g the shift.n
This evidence is cO:ll'~b(.;..'!;{itedby three other wirness"s who say
-,..<-
~!hat they Stow smoke (white', black. grey and green in colour)
issuing from betwp.en lalge sandstone slabs which were sliding on
top of each other. The possibility that thes~ four witnesi;es
concocted a story to conceal illegal activities possibl~)
blasting op'l!rations - which they could have been busy with at the
time of thE~ll~cicdent cannot lfu ruled out. All four are adaaant ,
how~ver. t~::iit ~he explosion followed a hcsvy god which in t)1rn
.'led to frictl::.;·'1al heat. A,f~'~ple of the sandstone present in the
\:... __. ..:.r--r
roof of this \,ii,rea hase the follo"inl I!ha:racteristics as shown in
Table 2:
'l'abl. 2 o Analysis of qbartz Content of Ro~f Sandstone
I'.
I~
82.2% by,volume
80 ..0 by mass
('
The e"iden~e,.th119 J.ie. more heavily 1fei,hte~ towards frictional
h;at .s the c:auae of the ipitiotl. In furt~er e;upport of this
hypoth~sis is the evidence (;f~. Section lfana,et who stated
'0
that:
"1 cannot recollect what the face outline wac in the area. between
No. 1 a1'1,dNo.2 roads. ! can remeaber se'ling that the roof had
partially goafed in the crea ahead of roadway Nv" 4 and that the
roofbolts in that are, had either .heared or the lliashen had been
v "
stripped off over the end of the bol~9.
Af.'.'i,:, I the .ecident I found· thit
and 2 had loafed 6.8 indicated
the area bet"en roadw.ya'No. 1
on P'i8ure 17. The area had no"t
go&f.d .oli~ and there waa an open apace above the btoket"1 rock.
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There is a very slight dip from North to Sout';!in the coal seam
at the pODition where this accident happened.'
'1'h6section. by all accounts. was '0\'«;11 ston.:dusted.
In evidence. witnesses stated that the c010ur 02 the flames of
the explosion in the goaf was yellow; blue and green. The
Inspector of Mines rejected this evidence as being false
(explosion flames cannot be green they maintained). In the coal
dust explosion at the Hlobane No. 2 pit in April 1956 witnesses
gave evidence th~t the flames Wet'E. b l.ue , yellow and green in
coleur. One can (mly conclude that Blacks interpret a certain
colour which arises in the flame of an explosion as green.
2.6.2 Ermel0 Mines Limited. November 1982. Ignition of
Methane :'.nOld Wotking
Ermelo Mine .. is situaLed 25 kms west of the town of Erme1o. The
mine works the main seam (C Lower) which is 1.6 metres thick and
lies at a depth of 120 metres be1cw surface. Bord and pillar
woriting is practiced with 6 metre wide bords and 18 metre pillar
cantrE>s. A t~,ica1 seam section is shown in Figure 19. The
i1l1ll1ediateroof layer~ consillit A 0.6 metres of shale. and 0,75
met"es of laminated micaceous sariJ..tone. Roof support in the
roadways conaisted of 1.5 metr<: long roofbolts. 1.5 metres apart
in eiJ;her d:b:ection. A fu!~"her seam exists 2 metres above the
.;tinedSeam. Methane pressure fr"m. the u~per seam has been known
to ex(:rt pressure on the roc ~ of workings in the main seam
particularly en interse,ftions. In order to reduc~ this pre snure ,
boreholes on each int.,fsection were drilled to the upper seam to
drain off =ethane. Ol\ce the methane has drained off then the
\flow <.!.,;:ase..This poliC1, wall extensively practiced in Indumeni
I
Colliery to drain the metha~ from the top seall. The mine is
l
regarded as being extremely ~gassy and .ev.aral ignitions have been
recorded in continuous miner sections when picks strike the
8findstone roc f.
115
100 130
0,2 COlI
2,0 ISSe4Im
120 O,9CI..,s..... 180
1,8 CLower s.1II'I'i
3.0 .. ,.... (,I
140 0,5 DS4awi1 110
I ,8 Oilada s.wn
ERMELO AREA
Depth{m) Thicknes$(m)
20
60
110 ..",.........01 f.2 E ....
~._.. 0,8 ColI
GLEM=lLLAN AREA
Depth(m)
~o
ThicklMlSs (m)
70
Reference
1::.._1-
..)He 19
STRA 11GRAPtICAl. SUCCESSION OF 11£
EASTERN TRANSVAAL COAlFEl.o
116
Explosion
On the 12th November 1982 a methane! explosion occurred in. panel
No.6 at lOh30 killing 11 persons and injuring a further 10
persons. Of the 11 persons fatally injured 10 were overcome by
asphyxiation and one died of a fra,::turedskull as a result of
being struck by a brick from one of the brick stopping~! blown out
dur-ing the explosion.
Figure 20 is a locality plan of the area where the explosion
occurred and Figure 21 is a detailed plan of Section No. 6
showing the "bad roof" area. the vel'ltilationst opp Lngs , directit'ln
of air How and position of coal winning aach Lnes , This plan
also al,owsthe stoppings blown out by the explosion. the debris
from disintegrated stoppings and packs blown up in the expLosLcn ,
Mini.ng Po1iey
The section co:nmenced development in a southerly direction as a
to-road pallel. However due to poor roof and floor conditions on
the West side of the belt road (bad r.oof) it was reduced to a 6
road soctiot". In order. to protect the workings hom the "bad
r~ofl'/area. brick stoppings were erected between the 1st and 2nd
right ~~nd coapanions. However. the last split to the right (M)
cuthye 6f the fault was ~ealed off using a plastic brattice the
day befo~e the explosion. Roadway C was open to the return
airway., Air was thus bletlding through the "bai ground" area. In
') .... ~ '·1.\
addition a 60 IIIIIl diameter boreho' .• int:o the "bad ground" area was
downcaatins·
On the day before the explosion (11th November 1982) the p1s.stic
brattictl cloth in the last right split (M on t:"leplan Figure 21)
va. replaced by • brickwall thus i.olatina the "bad ground" area
frOfll the workiug) aectic:',n. 12.4 .'3/8ec was lllealsured in the three
intakes on the 7th October 1989. The quanti1:y of air leaking
through the unplastered brick stoppings itlto the "bad ground"
area WQS not measured but evidence was that therlb!would be some
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leakage through the 12 brick stoppings thereby preventing a build
up 0f methane in this area. The last stopping at split N was
erected on the Mine Overseer's instructions. the objective being
to seal off this old worked out are8. from cur-rent;workings, This
was standard practice at the colliery (evi.dencegiven at the
Inquiry by the Mine Manager). No sampling pipes were installed
through stoppings into the "bad ground" area. neither we::-e air
samples taken from this area to determine the methane ccntent of
the air :1.nsidethe sealed district.
From evidence. the explosion originated in the sealed off "bad
roof" area shown on plan Figure 21.
All the brick stopoings between the belt road and the "bad
roof" area were ~~stroyed and the debris blown in an
easterly direction across the belt ~oa.d. 10 kg pieces of
bri~k stoppings were blown SO metres east of.the travelling
road.
The conveyor belt was seriously dam&gad.
1\
-II All elect.ric ~abl~8 were seriously ~imaged.
The extent of the debris is shown on the plan of the section
(Figure 21). iJ
Plastic warning signs showe.d indications of burning as shown
on the plan Figure 21 at positions X. Y a~d Z.
No signs of burnl.1'lgor an exploeion were evident anywhere in
the Aeetion south of the 1.5 metre downthrow faulto
No ",:fgnsof scorching of timbe'tIiI in the 'brushed area of the
h~ulag. and travelling war was evident.
Both air cros£ings were deQtroyed.
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The major force of the explosion blast occurred at position
A-B on. the plan Figure 21.
Unfortunately all. eye witnesses to the explosion were killed and
this made invesdg:9.tions difficult. Some wit!1esses who could
have provided additional insight on the explosion had red.gned or
deserted. Carbon monoxide po i.sondng was the major cause of
fatalities.
Environmental condition in the section after the explosion
The only air samples: taken after the explosion (hy t't~ Proto Team
Captain) are given in Table 3 below:
Table:3 Air Sample Measurements after Explosion
Time Gas Concentrations
D8h1S Methane - 5%
12h45 Carbon monoxide - 1000 p.p.lII.
Carbon ~ioxide - 0.02%
Methane - 1.0%
14hO(l Carbon monoxide - 300 p.p.m.
IShOO Carbon monoxide - 100 p.p.ttl.
These samples were taken two pillars back from the working faces
(at the switch ban~i and fan in the travelling way).
r.~
The Cau.e of the Expl.osion
The epi-centre of the explosion originated in the sealed off "bad
roof" arp.a. A difference in pressure would have existed between
the intake airway and the ~bad roof" area across all the brick
stoppings since the "bad roof" area was still connected to the
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main ret1.lt'n ai.rway at point C on the plan F'igUl:.?21. Hence it
would be 'J.lnlikely for methau,", to enter the belt road frou the
sealed of·,~ areas. No rcal change in the ba r omet r i.c pr0ssure
occurred <i~ring the day of the explosion.
"
\iThe first i,question th~refore to be answered is hr' could an
,I
expl.os i.ve mlxture of methane have bui!.t: up in such a relatively
short time ~\pan in the sealed off area? The gas build up did not
result from ':11sudden release of-methane inside the sealed area
\\
because it i~ appa~ent that th~ whole area was not fil1e1 with
methane. An \~xa:nination of the ~Iection plan ....ould indicate that
before the la\t stopping was erected at point M in the section.
II..,hatair entetd the "bad roof" Iu:ell would have followed a direct
route to point \~ thus 1•• vi.. l.rge areas adjacent tot his ro"". ,
unventilated. \Further. since roof fs11s had occurred in this
area. it foll~~ that the roof wher~ falls occurred would have
been ~i8h.r th\n the roof in roadways where falls had not
occurred. Since~meth~ne is tighter than air (specific gravity
(
0.553) it is PO~\6:ible that. in the roadways ....est of road C •
• ethane h,d <;Qlle~ted in t1:teroof cavities, caused by falls of
ground. in large '\ quantiti...tuJ bef'Ore the ignit:io.n on the 12th
IINovelllber1982. \"
v
\
During the 15 hour ~friOd following
i_ possible that a t\rgue (tongues)
had en~~loped th~ n\rmal roof and that sOlllewhere a meth~ne
thl, sealing of roadway M it
of lI~ethane frolllthe cavities \
'\
concentration had reached the explosive limits betw~en 7.5% and
\
1St.
The I.aidon Sourc!it
No contraband wa~ found on persons or in the affftcted area.
Neither persons nor equipment .,ere found in the saa).ed off
area.
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All flar..e safety lamps and other lamps were .roundto be in
order.
No blasting operations had taken place a.t the time of the
1 •exp ~O S aon , The Miner's blasting battery and cable were
found in an unconnec ted state and hang ing against the
d.bside.
No thunderstorms. no veld .,.•.l.res nor other fires. were
recorded near the 60 rnm dV' 'ter borehole which was
down~astins into the sealed area.
The accident scene underlies an EGkom overhead power line.
As far as can be established no stray currents were
experienced from this power line.
A detailed examination was made of all electric cables and
machinery in the .belt road and section itself. Apart from a
flameproof light which was found open at the titueof the
explosion ne'lrthe waiting place all elec~rical apparatus
was found to b~ in order. H£i,d this light been the ignition
~ource then the bodies found in the b~lt road would have
reflected burns. tlNtlneof the bQdies evinced any burn marks.
The only person who suffered burn lIISrksto his face and
hands was a Polish electrician under training. He was
discovered near the waiting place with a side cutter in his
hand. The side cutters showed no signs of a short circuit
flach.
No &igns of spont eneous combuation'loYasevident in the area.
The most"likely cause of the ignition was frictional heat as a
r~sult of a fall of roof in tho "bad roofR area. This could
either have been quartzitic sL~d.toDe on sandstone or quartzitic
sandstone on roofbolt steel since the epicentre of the explosion
was in the s..aled-off area.
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2.6.3 Bosjesspruit CoUiery. 9th March 1.982. Ignition of
Methane at a Continuous Miner
Introduction
With the advent of thi~ greate-r use of continuous mining machines.
\~special1y in deeper and l'elatively more gassy seams. the
itlcidence of methane ignitions as a result of frictional heating
between steel picks and sands rene bands is inc.reasing. l'ht;~
perc~ntage deep mined coal won ill (!ontinuous miners it! 1988 was
32%.
The incident deals with 6 face workers who suffered burns to
their fac~s and hands as a result of a metha.ne explosion
resulting f.rom frictional heating betwpen continuous miner picks
and sandstoh~. The incident occurred in a eros,; cut from a
roa1"..,&ywhich•.had penHrated a dyke. The situation described is
a recur=ing th~me throughout this project dealing with methane
and coaL dust e~~plosions; rcadvays which nave penetrated dykes
are l:ikdy to eti"it high quanl1!ities of methane and be poorly
ventilated. Methane build-up~ occur which. for some or other
reason , remain undeeecced - and an ignition I~ource. in this case
frictional heating is all that is required to ignit~ the
explosive mixture.
The Incident
The No.4 Beam lies at a d~pth of approximately 180 metres alld
the e::r.:ploaion scene is d~picted on the plan Figure 22. The
section. worked on the bord and pillar $ystem. had intersected a
6 metr"! wide\ dyke which had burnt the coal on either side fox:
approximately 15 metres. Both t~e main and the left hand
companion had penetrated the dyke and the split off the main
"poulage was being advanced 11 a westtzrly directive to hole with
t:he left hand companion. The face was 37 metr.es from the last
through road which recorded a velocity of intake air of 1.1
metres per second. well above the leSkl standard of 0.25 metres
per second. The seam height in the sectiou \ias IF; '.vximstely
3 metres.
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It f I 17 SECTION NORTH ON 09103182
,. AT .A DEPl'll BELOW9URFACE OF :tI1Om
;.) MDt fa ~
'U:E. kntilation of the split off the: main haulage inbye of t he
dyke was by means of an exhaust fan and ventilation tubing which
extended into the face, F;:olr.thE> measured velocity of air. at the
continuous min~r it is calculated that the air quantity at the
h· <, 37 3.mac ane was J;.. m I sec. very lit1:1e. if any. of which was
reachang the face. Figut~ 23 shows the face details and the
Shortcomings resulting from the sole use of an exhaust
ventilating system. the duct ing being 9 m~tres back hom the
face. It is unlikely under these circtrnstar..ces that any methane
emission from the burnt coal zone w,,:dd be removed or be
suffi:,~iently diluted to prevent a methane e.;'~lc,>ion. At best the
aLr il'l the face area. where the greatest 1'. ,tsk of frictional
heating exists. will be disturbed by the revclvil.Z cutter drum of
the continuous miner and the operation of the dtl:'.': extraction
system on the machine.
Conditions in the sec t Ion are desczLbed by ::he Section Manager
who stated tha.t:
"Upon my arrival I found that the ventilatit"n curtain. as
indicated on Figure 22. was lying on the ground together with
parts of the exhaust pipe. I tuted £",r '\~a~~Qn monoxide and
carbon dioxide (\8 WE'.11 as mihhane. but the!'e wait'no indication of
~'.ny of the aforeml ...tior,ed gaS{ "
\
The test was car~iied out
retutued to norma~.
after the ventilation conditions had
-_)
I measured the volume of air and found that
the plan Figure 22. namely 2.37 m3/sec
it waf! &R shown on
\)
in the are~ of the
ignitiQn. that is, over the ccn\.i.nuoullminer. The incoming fresh
air velocity above the continuous miner was 0.15 m3tsec. At the
tA::" of the accic:htnt the continuous miner had just cOllDlenced a
new cut in the fice.
~
I revisited the acene of~~;the .ccid~pt accompanied b:v the
~FO
Inspector of Mi..IQS during hiB in-situ iniiptlction of the scene;
i "'.,
6 ..
.
PLAN
,
1 ...10 ..... ~ -'/ ),1FlOw of v.tIotIM .:-;• face
swne of igRDflcn ....
*/ . If_..-------- "
........ ...-.........
~ =E~-~EaIIaMt ~:=::
,
"'.._ ........ .._..._. -...........
_.... CoIIZ ..
.....,
"'...... '"._ ...... ,'j--......
F 3kIur! 2
FACE VENTLA noN USWG
EXHAUST SYSTEM OM..Y " ,J
...............
127
Once again we tested for methan~ gas in the dyke area as
ir.:'.;icated on P1.gn No. 22. as well as the posit ion where the fire
exist,·d. The tests were .::.11nega t i.ve,
The available ventilation was sufficient for healthy working
cQnditions and in accordance with legal and mining standard
specifications.
After visit long the scene of the accident I concluded that the
c'ot1't:inuous miner must have cut through a methane pocket which
caused the ignition. The ign~,ti<m occurred in a dyke area where
the existence of methane ga.s is J.ikely.
M"y cone Ius Lon was that an ignition could have been caused by the
picks of the co~~i~uous miner cutting into a piece of quartz. I
noticed that qu~rtz a~~ sandstone were present in the area
,_)
between the coal. This area has no history of the ,':Iresenee of
methage. even when p.netrating a dolerite dyke where methane gas
is ~ot prevalent.
If it ,ill foul1d that methane exists in !lny area. all electrical
appautulil except fens are switched (Jff and Personnel withdre.wn
from the area to a saf.1y ventilated area.
The presence of methane gas was not reported to me pr i.o r to the
accident. "
Ston.dusting in thin area was cl(.\e~ ..' to the hc'!! than the
.tand.rd re:{uirements. namely past ,the last through veL1tilat ion.
The atonedu8t ",a. in no way affected by the fire. There were
s~fficient f~~me safety laMp. suppli8d to this section. all of
..hich rei in order.
No further questions."
The evidence of the Teu Leader who "a. operatina the continuous
miner i. ~. follows:
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"I am a Te<,l.mLeader.
On the day of the accident I was the Operator o f the continuous
miner busy cutting coal when a loud thud occurred. I tried to
£lee but I realised I had heen burnt. I noticed that the flame
had started at the cutting head which was moving backwards.
Originally the fJame started in the rcof and spread evel:ywhere.
It felt to me 8s though the flame burned for a long while but in
actual fact it was over in secor.is. I never saw whether anybody
extinguished the flame but it just stepped burning.
:r3y Court:
The water sprays 6rt the cutting head worked efficientC). I
':2!c;:tuall~ saw r.p~rks on the cutting head. Pat~hes of stone wpre
" >-:,..:_"\
prtirCl,'ltin the c6al. I had already cut approximately 10 metres
bHoTe ·he ignition occurred. I ki'w several sparks fo:,,:a while
b&fo~e tne accident Qc~urred.
I had .'flame safety lamp with me on the continuous miner.
I~~diately prior to the accident there was no indication of.
•• thane. I tested for met~~ne prior co the accident. The test
was n~&..tiv ... I tio not have a certificat,e but my Miner taught me
to test for gas. I would have recognifed it ::.f there had been
, '
methane gaa present.
The ventil.ti~n pipe was in order but I could not 8ctually feel
the Mil' circulating.
I htlve heen employed in Rast I aheft for fuul.: yeat's And this is
the iirst tiae such an accident has occurred.
/}
~ have been taught to watch £(';1: •• thane g... - we an afraid of
it.
Whilst I was cutting nothing abnot1llBl was observed rega rddng
dust; it was abso rbed as n':>rlIl&l."
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The evidence of the Section Engineer who examined both the
ccnt Inuous miner and. the shut t Lecar after the exp LosLon ,
indicated that both machines fl;E!rein order. He could find no
fault with the flameproofing (If the units. The cables were also
in order.
A pn·tinent point in the evidence of the Hine Overseer. who
visited the section 4 days before the explosion. was that ne did
not test for gas in the main haulage road which was already 15
me.tre£ through the dyke. He ac~epted the assurances of the Hiner
that "the tests were negative". If!. addition his evidence that
"the exhaust fan c.lucting was up to date" went unchallenged in the
Inquiry. What is meant by the term "up to date"1
i.i ,No standard procedure. for ventilation and gas testing were
c.lled for or tabled. and "no referet'.c:e is made in the Inquiry
d.,cWll.entato the use of ebctronic methanometere ml)unte~ on the
c.ontinuous miner which would provide a warning of methal'l'=' build
up. at toM cutting head. The operator was provided with a flame
•• fety lamp for a~8testing.
The Sbiftbo.. in evidence
t~ .tner'. b¢x when the
stated that 'the Miner and I were at
operator (of the continuous miner)
reported that he had intersected stone with the cutting dr\1m.·· We
went to the face to inspect it and noted that the ~oadway had
inter.ected burnt co6.1 on the left band side of the face. We
exaain.d the face for methane u.ing ~ flame safety lamp and found
DO &a8. As I was leavina the section (1 was 150 metr~. outbye of
the wait ina place) I heard an explosion and returned to the main
"drive where 1 encountered injurec 'WOrke:;s'. The')author quotes
the Shiftbo •• t• evid~nce since it i3 important. Tests were made
for methane. they proved negative and a .~thane explosion occurs
albeit two hours afteL the inspection. It va. the miner's first
shift at this,. colliery. The espIo.ion did not tievelop into a
coal idu.t 6xplosior.; ..ince the section wa. adequately stonedusted.
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Nomethane readings were reco:::ded either before Or after the
incident which makes ana l.ysLs of the accident difficult.
Twocimilar incidents -;;0 the one above occurred at Springf:i_eld
ColLiery in May 1982 and. August 1983.
Figut'e 24 shows a locality plan of the first incident and
Figure 25 deta.ils of the face when the ignit iO.1 occurred. In
this incident the Operator of the continuous miner was burnt w:.,.:n
frictional heat from picks str.iking a sandstone root ignited
methane issuing from a blower adjacent to a dolerite &jke. Both
the forcing and exhaust m~thods were used to ventilate this face,
a method which the author endorses when faces are being worked in
burnt coal.
Figure 26 and Figure 27 shows a locality plan and face plan
respectively of the second ignition. The continuous miner was
advanoing in burnt coal. when the picks struck a sandstone band;
in the',.upper right hand face. igniting methane. The Operator was
burnt. In this instance the fao~ yas ventilated by a force fan
only alld the 450 1:lII1 diameter ducting was 9.5 metres from the
(·iace. Table 4 shows the methane readings in the face 1 hour
after the ignition when the v.ntilation ducting "... extended to
witbin 6 metres of the face.
Table 4 Methane R.adines after Ignition
POll it ion in Face Floor Roof
1 1,0% 0.5%
2 1.0: 2.0%
3 0,5% 1~9%
4
II 1.2% l!_,S%'.', '::c'
5 0.5% 1.8%
6 0.2% 0.2%
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In every instance the percentage methane was well below the
ignit ion range.
It is COh,:'on practice in Aust ...-· ...a to use line brat t Lce to
ventilate ]:'''adings b..ing worked with continuous miners. a
practice whici;, has not found favour in South Africa.
2.6.4 The Durban Navigation Collieries. 21st Sep.ember 1963.
Ignition of ,:<!:ethanewhile Coal Cutting
A non-c.asue Ldty acc Lderrt o...ccur red en the 21st September 1968 when
firedamp was ignited in
ope rat Lens •
an undercut during COdj, cutting
Figure 28 is ~ locality plan of the section showing che layout of
.r t
the aUXiliar1( ventilation far.G, ducting anti water pipes in the
section. F~i'Jre 29 depicts a seam aee tLcn showing the position
of the under~\j~.
/7·'/
The Section Manager. in hi;;: evidence" at at ed that:
"At about 09hOa on the 21st Sepumber 1968. the IH.le Overseer on
duty'reported to me that he had received a telephone call from
se(:tioJ~27 that an Lgni.tLon of inflammable gas had occuc red in
\
the face"":lf the ,belt 'toad and that the gas was burning in two
undercuts. The Miner reported to tht'! Mine Overseer that be had
contacted his Shift boss and that they werE! attempting to
extinguish the fire by us i.ng fire e:xtinguillihers. stoll£:do,st and
water.
1: il'ltllediu:.ely telephon~d the Mine M&'C''::~r ~ho in turn alerted a
proto tea.1U and not li ied t he Mines Department.
On being notified of the fire. ! proceeded to No. 6 shaft but en
route. at about 09h15. the Mine Overseer contacted me by
telp.phone and told me that the fire had been extinguiahed.
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At about 10h15 r accompanied the Mine Manager, the RE!sident
EngLneer and the Inspector of :t<1ine<:1 to Section '1.7 and upon
arrival I Eound that th3 ent rance to the oelt ro.ad hc.\d been
fenced off.
I w:.pected the scene and found a coaLcut t i.ng nklC'''!~i.w near the
face en the left hand sidl~ o,r; the road. I saw that the machine
had a Imos t (~o)Jlplett'd unde rcut t ing the face. I a l.so saw that a
cut had be€ completed on :~he advancing face of the heading. I
had a plan 0 the section and a section of the coal face tlraT..m up
(Figure 30).
The be Lt r oad was ventilated by means 02 a force filn deHve ring
3.36 m3/s€c.ond through a 550 mmduct which was withi.n 5.'+ meres
from the fa.ce. The c roas sectional dimensi()tIs of the roadway
were 3.35 metres high by 4,6 metres wide - there was a strong
flow of air over the face.
'rhe watet' reticulatior' servi~e was within 15 metres of the face
of the heading and the pressure in the 50 mill pipe acco rd ing to a
preuure gauge was 1400 KPa. The 'II'ate>::hos~ which was normally
attached to the coal cutting machine was lying on the fLoor (is it
had been UUG to extingUish the fire. Normally th-e waUr hose is
attached to the coal cuttinB machine and the water is sprayed
onto the jib and the pick chain t.ak.ee the water i.nto the
undercut. It w.. not possible to 8:I.y if water had or had not
been used during the undercutting of the face. All the coa I w~s
very wet.
By Court:
From fAy investigations in,to the ignition it .appeared that whiht
the ~oalcutt.t operator was undercutting the face as shown in
Figure 30 there was the sound of an ianition of inflallUll8ble gu
II
and flames appeared out of the undercut and spread to the
adjacent undercut. These flames butut to the heiaht of about two
metres. The coa Lcur r er Driver switched off the power to the
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machine and called the Miner who went to the rile"'. The Miner
attempted to extinguish the fire by h1eans of water, stonedust and
a fire extinguisher. He also sent for his Shiftboss and had iii
duty Mine Overseer
Shiftboss managed to
ext in8uishf~r and also
notified by telephone. The Miner and
extinguish the f Lames by means of a fire
by throttling the ventilation th,=:ccb~r
redl~c:i.I/,g the fanrdng
suffered ill effects
effect of the air current. The
from the fumes liberated by
Sh:1.ftooss
t he fire
ext :ingu:.sher.
I examined the coal face hut did not find any coking of coal.
During the in:::.:pectionin loco I te{;t:~dfor :inflammable gas with
an Oldham met hanomet e r and found 0.15% in the general body of the
air with the force fan deUvering tts iull quantity. I detected
1,2% in the undercut and by using a probe I detecteli 1.5% in the
back of the undercut. r switched clff the: force Ean and
immediately layering (If the methane took place; within five
minutes there was a 450 nun layer cont%.lining +5%me.::h&ne against
the roof.
I restored the ventilation and aftej~ the gas had been cleared I
had the coal cuttin!; machine started and hsd the undercut
completed. Water was applied in the normal ".y and during the
cuttina I teaUd cenr inually for inflammable gas but I did not
detect any comios out of the undercut which wa. 1,,8 •• trea deep -
noru:Lly • cut 0 f .2.42 met reJJ i. taken.
! <tid not find aflY sockets 01:' misfires on the facl~. ThE. cut h<1d
be40 tU,.n in clean coal - no .tone or pyrit •• "."re vidb!'~. 1
did not fin4~la blower of methane in the hf!adin&.
II
The only J!OOllfl geological dr~turbanc. in the vicinlty of Sacticn
\.
27 i•• 3.6 metre thiek' dyke runnin& parallel to the riaht hand
aide of thf: section and is abClut 110 lIletre. away from where the
ignition '~'()ok place. It is know that inflatdl.eble gas i.
occluded in the coal but gas hu not been detected in the lilection
for some considerable t iIle.
\~
)1
:1
1 examined the picks of the coal cutting machine and fOU1.1d that
two were missing and the tungsten carbide inserts of' cwo were
slightly chipped - the remainder were in excellent condition.
After the undercut had been completed I felt the pick~ and found
that they had not heated up to any CQll.::~.derable cxt ent ,
In my opinion the ignition was probably cause-d by a spark created
during the cutting of the coal and igniting the methane liberated
In the cut normally about 3 .o;:~ methane is found in the
unuercutl;: in a gassy section such as Section 21. The possibility
of dry cutting cannot be overlooked.
There were no casualties as a result of the ignition. ThF.fre was
a loss of some 400 tons (of production) due to the (:,,)0.1 cutting
machine having to remain
completed and t)he cost
determined#
idle until the
to the mil"!f:!
inspection in loco was
has not as yet heen
The coal cutter Operator had 6 years ell:perience on the colliery.
According to the Miner the ~~fety lamp was burning before and
after the igrtit ion.
An invt'c8tigationby t:he fuel ReS'.earch Institute is in hand to
deter.ine wh.ether or not there is some substance in the coal that
could have caused the ignition.
No further questions."
The coal cutter Operator in the sectior, stated that:
"During the shift of the 21st September 1968 I undercut the face
of the belt road with Illy u(:hine. The cut wali taken about 450 IIlIIl
(u,dicated) above tha floor .i.vetion. Whilst I was cutting the
coal .Y belper was spraying watur on to thct moving pick chain.
r
The h"8e was actually ~(.~la.ped to the machine lIn.d tb~ waul' was
.p~ayina on to the pic~ ••
After I had compLeted this cut I moved the machine back a short
distance, swung the jib over and started cutting the left hand
ribs ide • Again the cut was taken in coal and about 450 rom above
the floor elevation. My safety lamp was burning all the tim~ and
I did not (',etect any ir..flanunable gal: whilst I was cutting. 1 had
a lracst completed the second cut when light green flames came out
of the cut. Th(!se flames spread to the first cut and burnt about
1.8 net res up the face.
t immediately switched off the power at the machine and sent :n:r
assistant to switch off the power at the main switch.
I told him to call the Miner whilst I stood guard at the entrance
to the roadway.
The Miner arrived soon after my helper left and !;.,old me t( fl!tch
\\_
'Ia fire extinguisher at his box. I left the p);}tce and when I
returned with the fire extinguisher the Miner was trying to
extin&uish th~ flames with water. I handed him. the extinguiilhe~
and he played the contents on the flames. Soon afterwards o~~
Shiftbosa arrived and the flam.es were extinguished.
By Court:
I :it.m ab.olutely cltrtain that water was being played on tbe pick
chain whilst r was cutting the f.ace.
The rick chl.:i.ndid not stop from the time I started the second
chainI euained the /pick.cut until tlhe ignition occurred ..
'..
before "I sta(:rtedcutting. Two piekE wrofi raiuit:ll b~t
nothing vronl~with t,he reuinder. After the i,nli.t~kn I
that two pi(;I~S were chipped. /'
!i 1/.1 II.. !I '
The ventila1hon W~8 v.~ good and wa" on all lih.
I'
cutting in i:the belt road.
there war.:'
'I
noti~ed
till. I was
I t...~.d for I cut the
first face. and r tested lJgain beto);e I atarted '''" the aec ond cut.
No furth"lr que.tions •."
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What i5 of t echni.ca I interest is the fact tha.t the tungsten
insert on two of the picks bad brQkenr~ff. and that dry cutting
ceul d possibly have been taking place. Eoth these aspec t s a re
not uncomaon practices where supervision is either lacking or
weak or ,.hen the water supply to the section has been jisrupted.
The rapid buUri up of methat'1e in the roadway when the auxilia.:cy
fan was stopped indicates tha.t methane wa.s being given o f f freely
in the undercuts.
In a similar methane ignition incident at Springfield Galliel y in
November 1983. ventilation readings were taken imlnedia,tely after
the ignition in every face of the section. Figure 31 shows the
locality of the wecti~n and the details of auxiliary fan
"'ppsitions. diameter of duct Ing , diatance of ducting frOID faces.
ventiJ.ation velocities and quantities. The ilnition occurred in
the second ,141ft hand companion back-over which wa. being advanced
:in burnt co.:t't<~~nd the face det.it. aT'f: abo_ in Fi,un 32. The
lI.cti~'\ wa. worked' uSin, trnckl.!!.:: IMCbeni.ed equipMtlt (load.ers( . .
and .huttle~;ar8). The ventilation au.ndaro. .. i-r. the .ection wre
ad..quata •• will be a.en by referrin& to Fi&'lre :::1•
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2.7 SUMMARY OF.THE MAIN POINTS ARISING FROM THE INCIDENTS
'rhe 450 goaf line worked in;, stooping section t.o control
the cavin~ makes efficient ilation of such a section
, ,
difficult especially whl;;nthe :,Ultake .'.it' enters the section
at the lower end of the goat as ,~l,?wn in Figure 33. '!lk
ventilation at point A has the t;/,i;a)~h<:y to travel across the
sect Lcn to the return ...irway at point ft {th~ shortest route)
and not to point C where adequate ventilation is Iequired to
remove the fumes of ~lasting and also methane accufilulatiotls.
1,1 IAnydeficien(.;y in the brattice8 alorsg the line A-C as
i.n Figul,"e 33 will short circuit ait to point
possibility of an igniti.on at point C due
VE!rtt ilation.
, , Penons exposed to dIe £laAle of an explosion tsuffer seve re
body ~!Jrn••
The" p08itionin",) of auxi1iar~ dfans in pillar extraction
I (
sections (... Clulpter 5 C4l~,jian Colliery) is iaportant.
Fane' po.itioned in ••CtitU1S with ~o thought &nGremoved from
the .. et:\ol1 withou1: the p.raiJI.ion of .enior Ofticiala ~..au.e
• daftl.roull build up of .. thane in and alopa the loaf line.
(I
all that i. ~.quired to initiate an
(I
Au ililit~QIl
.plodoD.
Insufficient ventilation supplieo to the pillar. extraction
3aectiol1.~ 20 Il / •• c would app.ar to be ill.uftici~nt.
In.d.quat •• uperVision over the 8iting of fans. ND br4'ltticf'
cloth curtain. were erected in the •• ction (Springfield) to
.-::::.)
courslt the veadlation alofta the 450 s.oaf line.
(?
C :L)
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Officials and Minets (includ:"cng machine Oper.ators) always
claim. after.' an explosion. that tests fv!' methane gas h,.ti
proved negative ptior to the inc:idi?nt.
MCll:ked changes in the quantity and velocity of vent:i.1at:ion
entering d rection are not always disce~:nible by tbose
persons working in the section. The author ha s , <.11. many
Lnsr.ances entered sec t Lons to find little mo'.ement of air
in the section - yet operations p ~it;eed at the normal
An exanip Le of thi;e: is quoted beLow (frc·m a recent safety
ov~rview at a gassy pit);
1. Clock on bank out of order.
2. Grass untidy in the entrance area.,
11
(I 3. Section transformer door closure ir,adequate. Doors can
be opened suf;ficiently to a11o'" hatH} access.
4. A new sign required to denote electricity not skl..lll and
c rossbon.es.
5. Roads not 1ved from G7DDs.
'\.i~
6. ~roduction tat'iet: 25 2~~ t1)nntlS
J
trendbg~ 28 aaS t cnne s,
7.
\\
II
\~
Bratticea not llealUig ~. open on I\;idu causing leBkag~\ I
\\
II
A:j.r velocity (,.4 m/siac in No.. 1 rop..dway- f~r below th;\
lIll\.ne standard of 1 metr> ~1' liI~cond.
8.
9. 1\ . r] 3F..4:\\turnvelocity 1.6 m/tr.ec - 20 m Ieee; 'this should
',I, j
h~,re bee,n 40 In /sec as it was recorded two d3yS ago.
(~
.ii
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10. The t:i~p attendant did not stop ent ry to the tip area.
11. Reading at ventilation column di.scbarge 9.9 m/sec.
Ventilation
1... , AirvoluIlle only 20. 3 3,1+ m /SE!c. At le,ast 30 m I sec is
required for 3 aux i l.i.any fans.
2. Bratt ice stoppings not ';LPto date.
3. Venti1at~on ducting within 5.. t m cf the face and
g~neral1y in good condition.
4. Size 'Of vent tubing not correct; should be 760 Il1JI)
prior to the split instead of 600 m.tn.
)
~ ends being venr.:Hat~d off 1 fan. exanpLe
8i,:, flow 1.2 m/s
1.1 mIt?
2.1 miG
1/
1.0 m/s
.la..!..14!e
7,8 mI.
6. One fan w:!.th joint box Joon and nqt bolted.
illUllediately for rectifica;Hon. Fan "as also lC'lose on
trolley. (]
7. No 'methane detec(tjd in the ,eneral body again.t the
roof but 1.2% found in drill hole of llplit.
It traM.pired later that t 1010 large wo>ntHation doors had
been inadve r ten t 1y 1eft open. 1'1
"It i.s of pa ramount; i.mportilnce to line lIU1pagelnent thar any
fault in the operation 1.)£ ma.i;t fans be 4t!ifected i!xunedi4tely
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and be rectified. If the main fans stop for an, reason.
senior: management should be notified without delay.
The quartz content of sandstones which overlay coal seams
"Jher'~secondary extraction is likely to take pi.ace shr..'uld be
asce rua ined , High quartz content in sandstones is a cause
of fricti.onal heat during goaf:i.ng.
The goaf area. of pil:l.at' exr rac t i.on sections can become a
reservoir of methane.
Evidence of wi'Cnesses who were involvec.d in methane/coal dust
explosions can prove to be valuable and should not be
diswisged with impunity. This is highlighted in the
Springfield C~).liery exp Ios Loa where witneG:.>es stated 'cha.t
the flame of the explosion was yel1ow~ blue and green in
colour. A similar description of ..an explosion is given by
witnesses in the Hlobane co..l dust explosion in 1952.
l,}'pworkedcoal,'seslI'ls which exist above the seam be i.ng " worked
hav& baen known to contain methane under pressure and which
can find its way into the seam below.
\\
S•• l~l. off an area. known to contain methane can result in a
"':<:\)'?
build up of methane aaa to within (lltplosive limits.
Precaut:i.ol'lary method~ to prevent methane
generally ignored '..,hen •• alinl off old areas.
explosions are
The possible
" i,nition sources are alao not alway. c:onsidf!t'chi.
The decision to aul off old areaE i8 8ometim•• taken at 8
low 811j)t"rvisorylevel (ShiftboS8 or Mine Overseer).
No provision is made to install sampling pipes into seals
'--_l
when sealing off abandoned areas.
The force of an explosion df!l:ltrc.-ys s:~ructu'res in such a way
that it is possible I \ determine the epi,~entte of the blast
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(see Chapter 4 TIle Durban Navigation Colliery No. 2
explosion in October 1926).
Explosions destroy aircrossings nnd ventilation appliances.
Carbon monoxide pOisoning (Ermelo Mines Limited) can be a
major cause of death in methane explosions. This is
substantiated by the results of the ventilation samples
taken in a sec.tion after the explosivh.
Old areas which a:r.'i! sealed off are rarely examin. before
oealing takes place so as to deter-mine the state of the
togases in the area. Cavities in the roof are liable
contain dangerous accumulations of methane. Tongues
methane can extend from such cuvitiE:S and layer against
roof in d&.ngerou8 perc ...otages.
of
the
FlaJlleproof el.ectric lights within i:he 2(:)0metre limit from
the faces can be opened by electrician!! with t"'lepower still
on.
ROR.dway8\~tich';penetrate $eologic~il disturbances such as
dyku invarikbly encounter excel!l"iv.~ lIlethaneemission in t<;,l,\~:~J
,~~=- - ((
fora of blowers. and generally. veu1:ilation of these ends is 'It
inadequate .~d poorly planned. Methane build up in th~8e
fece. often iOe. undetect.d. Ignition sources are varied
in this ca .. frictional heat.
Vantil.tinS headinga (especially these advancing through
dyku) by Ialilan. of exha.ulat fan syst.as alone is inadequate
to ensure the removal/diluti~n of methane in the face.
'lJentilationduc t drig .should be as cLose to th~ face as is
pn.ctic'11 - ducting which terminates 9 m.etrer. froJll the face
will not ensure that methane is. adequately di1utl!l!d.
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On-board ventilation. dust extraction and methane detection
systems on continuous mining machines are often
non-operational and insufficient attention is paid to the
mainte:':Hlnc:eof these appliances.
Sandstone measures in the Karoo system contain between 30%
and 70% quartz.
Mining personnel sometimes blandly accept that vent LLatLon
standards ar.eadequate when in :factupon closer examinat:i.o')n~
they ar~ not adequate.
Pockets of metllane under p ressur'e are likely to occur and be
encount ered in areas of: burnt coal and d/kes (see Chapter 8
- Methane Outbursts).
Quart.dtic aands eone bands in the roof of the mineabl(!
horizon of the coal seam
frictional heat when cut
mining IIUlchir.u.
will cause incendive sparking and
by coal cutters and continuous
Flame safety lamps supplied to machine operato~s are not a
raliable fIIeans of detecting methane ellliuione during
ope~.ti~ns. since they alp. difficult to read d~ring
operations especially if they are set much higher than eye
lev~,l.
'No methane ga~ was detected prior ~o the e~plosion', a
r.cur:d.ng theme during this ulveatigation. 1o'(\u%:'..days before
the accident. the Kine Ovar.eer. in evidence. stated that he
visited the section And the lIlSin drive, hut did not test for
methane. He accepted ~he assurances of the Miner that no
methane was present.
Lack of standard proceduua in the section. For f!xa::U[lle.
the ShHtboss stated that "the ventilation ducting. loIas
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found to be up to date!!. Against ~lhat s+anda rds are these
'-'!';tiervations measured?
The continuous n.Lne r was not equipped 'with an automatic
met hane \,ete(~tor.
Inexperienc,ed Miners are placed it. charge of sect Lens - in
the case of the Bossjespruit. explosion it was the Miner.' s
first shift at the colliery.
Lack of det a i.Led methane and ca rbon monoxide :eadings after
r'
the explosion this ~~kes it <!ifficult to a.nalyse the
conditions in the section after. the explosion.
(I
The use af forcing and exhaust ventila~ion ~ystema in
headings worked by ccnt dnuou's mining machines would indicate
that such fa~es e.t'e better ventila,r.ed; this system is
howevu' no ~uarantee that explosions will be 'prevented but
the force of the explosion is diminished.
'l'he colour (If the flames which were visihle in the cut a~ter
\
the iinition were described lIS green which correlates ~\ith
eyewitneases in exploail)nc in other collierie~,.
Tun&sten carbide ~ip. were lliaai!'.g from two .,icks on a -:0011
cutter (;h~'4l when a methane i,nition cceurred ,
It is possible thAt all.S a result of weak 8uf'erviaion. water
was not being used onp tb. cutting chain during cutting
operat ion8.
In gQtuly pits methane can build U!~ rapidly in roadways l"hen
the ventilation current is disrupted. ·,7.,
Ci
rJ
il
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2.8 PRECAU'l ONARY MEASURES
2.8.1 God and Goa~ 'Cine Ventilation
The ventilation of the god 0, ,rte has been dealt 'Nith in Chapt er
5. Roe.d ....ay brat t ice 't.urtains can only be l!laitltained in rod
working order by sot11 ~upervision and training of milling
Officials • ~ith referenc.E: to Figure 33 it would be mor~
advisable te) make the right hand barrier road on the intake
airway rAther than the return and ensure that ai.r Urstly reached
iii>int C.
Photo No. 1 abon a 1 auxiliary fan instdla~ion with a
br'attice curt.in to Pt~" -he recirculation of air over the fan
motor. Fana recircu1.ati.na Alethane
have cauaed ••thane .;iplo.ious.
laden air over faulty 1II0.t.!irB
['
HelM:. brattice curtains Olil the
(.J "
inbye sid. of fans should be standard mine ventilating practice.
The Shiftbo .. ea loS book should make proviaion fe)r ,the le)gging 0\\
al~ autiliary fan inatallationa. whicb entries should be
counur.ian~ by the Mine eveu •• r who will tb~reby indic.t. hi.
awar.~.Ga of all fan installation ••
C:_:
\\
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The quantities of air reco!l1lnendeo.tot: ventilating stooping
sections are given in Chapter 5. as is the position of brattice
cur tains in a typical section to ensuze adequate ventilation to
all faces.
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2.8.2 Gas Testing
Unless senior Mining Engineers insist,. and set an (.xa.mple.en the
testing for methane in evel;Y face during underground inspections.
junior Officials and Miners will nor ear ry out t hes e t s t s
thoroughly. The author ha.s, over many years. been r.ighly
r;ritica.l. of Officials who fail to test for methane in all working
faces en a routine basis. Evidence at inquiries. time after
time. followin~ an explosion. is that tests showed no methane was
present Ln the faces - yet the question must be asked as to how a
methane explosion could have occur red if no methane was present?
It is highly probable that in ~ost cases no tests were conducted
for methane priQr to the explosion.
2.8.3 Ventilation Quantities to Sections
V-:t";'J.lationquantities in sections may deteriorate substantially
!
b:flt uot .becone discernible to those persons workin~ in the
sp.~1iop &8 proved previously in this Chapter. These reductions
are generally due to:
Stoppa8~ of one or more of tne main surface fans.
ralls ofoX'o.of in intake and return air,,,.ys.
,i
, h\
Officjal. sealics off r.tu~. inadvert~~tlY. The author has
experienced this aspect <m several II occasiona. In one
instaLC. (at Springfield Colliery itl. 'il955) a night shift
Shittboss actually bricked off a .ein return airwe.y having
misu:lderstood instructions to erttCt a seal in another area.
Thi. incident typifies the sed.ous lack of knowledge and
training of mine Officials particularly with regard to
ventilation.
Figure 34 i8 a plan of a section. For almost 25 years this
plan has been used ~o test prc~pective Miner's knowledge of
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ventilation in the Blasting Certificate examinations.
Miners learn to vent i.Lat e the plan "par!..\Jt fashion".
It is these miners who are eventually promot ed to Shiftboss
level (and who brick off main rt.turn ai.:.:way15 by mistake) •
Major "entilation doors between intakes and :rettn:'ns are
c,f:tenleft open thus causing serious shortcircuiting of air.
Interlockitlg devices should be it:stalled to ensure that both
doors cannot be simultaneously opened.
Water plugs developing in wet upcast shafts and thereby
causing temporary restrictions.
In gassy pits velocity recording instruments should be installed
in each ventilating district and connected to the central control
to give audible arJ visual displays of any changes in air
velocity to the sections.
In addition all main fan installations on surface should have a
back-up alarm systelJtin the fan sub static!' so a8 to record and
Sive a warning th(.;:tthe main fan hal,' tripped espl!cially if the
m..,tor has tripped out due to overheat'lina" The circ.uitry for this
.ystell U .hown in J!'i&u:e3 , The daB lfyau. c.annot be solely
operated fro. i~he pJwer supply whi.:h feeda the fan motors since
when tha pove~ supply tripa to the aotors there i8 no supply tG
r.ed the alarm .Y8te••
/)
The procedure. to be fo11o~ed in the event of. poWer trip are
set out below:
Ponr lailure
Main Fan 'ailure
a. The ?et.on who d~8coveX'.that the main fana have 3topped
(::,
mu.t notify th. mowt,.enior Pfficial at the shaft (Assistant
'-:
Manager. Mine Overseer. Engineer. etc.)
<) "
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h. This Official must Hut;'{ou~ what the reason for the stoppage
is and when it can he restal'ted.
c. In cas~ the fans cannot be restarted itrunediately. the
Official must notify all undeeground sections.
d. The underground ?OW£~:r: in t he urea se rved by a main fan
installat ion will be automat:hf;al1y tripped if two or mere
fans stand for longet than 45 minutes.
Tot6~, Power Fa1iure
\',a. The person in))charge (Miner. Artisan. Te,£;\t1lL~ader. .etc.)
\, if
tIlHS1:', l.lMIediate:lywithdraw all the people under his
supe:t\~\SiOn to the waiting place in productiort aec t Lcns , or
to a ~afe area ,,,here there :i.s nonually through ventilation.
b. ,N.,Q,tHy the f'~f.al);efit (1ffit~i(' > who must find "lit what·, the
J/ ' "probleom is alld\,J,~ti!y the Assistant Mana8:2r/Mine Overseer o'S?
d
Er.gineer. /\
) t
j('
«
In all th~ aV.()vGcit.cWIlGtbnces ti1e:"unior Official on the shaH
/(Asai.tant Irn.gar or lhne Ov.rliif~~,\r)together wit;b tp. ~n&in•• t'
(Sect!on En~jD••r or G.E.S.) ~.tdecide hQ. serious the
(_;
•.ituai i!'1t :i.. and to what extent p.o:~l.'have to b. with4raW1 fros.!
"'\under,roul:ld~ He au.;; alao notify t~ Mine Kauler ana Chi.f
:/,r~
The followin, aCjitJn m~~be taken.
fro ... hill Kanal~/ .. nior Official.
!
dependant on the
TheKiner ,.hall:
a. En.ur~ that .11 peuOIllJ inc:1u4ina EUlineeri:rj,6 and I.otr,er
iJ Pe'Uonnel are withdrawn t~ t''he "aitina place. :_)
, \
I' I
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b. Ensure that the power is immediately switched off in his
sectiorls.
c. After power has been r es t ored , re-examine his ~ction/s and
test for inflalllmable gas at the following pos Lti ons ;
Inside 'lll advancing headings (dead ends) at the faces.
Electrical equipment such as sub at at Lons ,
Flamedeen Bank
Auxiliary fans
Only after all the above places have been found to be fl:ee:
of in·fllJlllDaUle gas aay the auxiliary fans in the sections be
started.
In the event of methane heing found at any place in l·eI»
seetion. the accU.&u le:tad !!lothane must be diluted by
di:o:-ectiJ'l1 ventilation fro. the intllte entrance to tbtl
o
.ffecte4 au.. The purpQ1Ie U to have no IIOre than 1.0% .ot'
Mtbatae in tbfl l•• t throuah road or in the nturtl airway.
d. Make out .. Fireman I.. report and forward it to the Shift;
Overseer as aoon •• poa.ible.
After ~)ftr bill'! be.n re"tortad to the .. il". Wrf.f!(I fan. followia.a
.. etop,qe of -.ore tbarl a;l hour ;)
a. The .. in 8urfnc:. fane ahall be re.tarteclby the Suriace
Blectricis.n.
b. Underl~~uncl power to b8 .witched on afeer all checks for
inf1.... ble iall has b.e" c.rried out and the affected areas
have been decl"red free of flatamable Sas.
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c. All Miners will car ry out examinat i.one as per initial
examination at the heginning of each shH
d. Fireman's report to be made out by Miner and forwarded to
the Shift Overseer.
IiPower rest()red after fan fai1..tredur.;ng weekends
a. A Miner who is a holder of a f~~. Testing Certificate and an
:\Electrician shall proceed underg\roll.ndand restore the power
to all the sections and in all the areas including
v
substations. flamedeen$. auxiliary fans and workshops.
b. On coapletion of the inspection. the Miner shall fill in a
fireun's repid.t and forward it to the Official on dutj.
2.6.4
/)
While there is little that can be done regarding th!ihiab quart:r.
content of sandstone layers above stooping and lon,~_ll section••
it is ,of adv_nta.e to Minin, Balin.ere to b. aware of the quart.
conteDt~ if only to .occur.,. thea to taka all po••ible
praca1iXtioneto pre'ftut Ii build up of .ethan. in and around the
Soaf. . 'l'hu .ppli •• also to ...nel.tone banda in develop.ent ends.
2.8.S '!'be uoaf Area
II_adar road• .ad .. thane drain_aa throu~b borehola. to surface
.bould b. the .t8114a~ci proeeclu1:'ein .. xiaua extract. ion ..thode of
workina (... Chapur .5).
2.8.6
There are many example. of lara. quantities of methane being
emitted from unworked coal seams lying above the exi8ting
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workings (GlencoE' Colliery, Durban Navigation Colliery. Cambri;an
Colliery. Sp7ingfield Colliery. Indumeni Colliery to quote but a-
few).
Methane drainage by boreholes £1.'om the lower. sesm to the upper
seallls ~see Chatl' ~'r 8) and by bor-eho.Les to surface (Chapter 5)
have. proved effective in safely removing
the former method Ls" a+ways fraught with
layering in the lower workings.
this threat. .although
the danger of methane
2.8.7 S.alin, off of Old Are••
~ ••elina off of old worked out aree. is not in itself a
difficult task and in £.ct takes place in .11 collieries at
xGtUlax interv.lI and .enerally without incideht.
4fart fro. major roof c:ollap.efJ or .ubaidencea which may destroy
.t~pp~ due to the air blaat. the two .ost danlerous conditions
(;-'
"'~ .at:ue vheu •• alibl off are the build up of explosive_,_./aif: .iztures and aft ianiti9n source. in this instance.f~~.".l. ..tirl.. .d"~a from the c:ollap.. of quartdti.c:
·~"'l'oof.
tc Ltt oftec. in the ca •• of fric:tional ~.t rellultina ho. fall.
ot roof. difficult to prev.nt auch an incioent and the Kinin,
-.U"1: has ttm..: to 4eal with the p-ceveDtion of an e~~lo.iv'!
lnaUd up of"Mtlum. and air i,"\ the ppel.
&MUnl off fire. by _.'i8 of ... ling wall. is thll .. thad ao.t
... :rally u•• d to b:rina fir •• unde\.·control on South African coal.in.... The ~.f,.01l. for this _, perhAps b. foun4 in the
fol1owinS=
a. It i•• relatively IlIlfe .. thod of controlling a fire.
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b. It is relatively cheap compared to other methods.
c. It can usually be done quite quicklY$ espe~ially if the
panels are laid out correctly.
d. Coal Miners are in the normal course of activities well
prepared to do undel!round building; material and trained
manpower are therefore always readily available to construct:
sealing walls.
e. It offers a relatively permanent solution to the problem.
particululy where panels
produc t :L\onpu.rposea; •
are no longer needed for
HOW8ver. there are a few serious proble.s that may occur when £
fire area is sealed off and t;hese should be kept in mind. natlely:
A~ost no sealing wall ca~ be regarded as absolutely airti$ht.
aainly because of the .fact that the 8t'tata surrounding the seal
i8 not eirtilht because of natural fracture planes:in the coal
and aleo because of c.:t:ack:,s that ..re induced by the mining
process.
Leak.ae baeo••• a real problem in aulti-en~ranee panel. that are
subjected to high pressure differentials acros. the sealing
"alb.
L.~ak.al. ste_ing from 81!..i:h pre.ou:. differentillb may t:atlse Ii
fit'\l!\ to,~eaain reas')nebly a<..tive for. very lon& period because
or the ~\ofitinuou. adding of oX1gen to the fir~ (in old sealed eft
panel. such l&.xage conditions "1 even be the cau•• of n..v fires
within the area sealed off - the bi,sen firil 4'l a South African
coal mine in 't'.~ent yeat;; started in exactly this 1Il&nnerwithin a
sealed off area).
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Various techniques such as sho tc retring and grour Ing may be used
to reduce leakage. certain circumstances, pressure
equalisation chamber s may also be used t(,. ;:educe leakage but , in
the op-inIon of the author. this technique has thus far not beet)
applied in South Africa because of the practical pr\)blems .:hat it
entails {example" a sophist icated pressure regulatirlf, system has
to be used. addit ional walls have to be buil: . cc nt' nucus
supervis.ion is requir ed , and so on.)
Explos(j,_ons
The danger ~~S explusio06 within a fire area or 8 sealed area
is the most; general danger usu,lly related to the use of panels
d
to seal otf fifes» particularly when open flam" or glowing coal
is prellent. This danger stema frolll a combination -of two factoul.
namely:
The .c~WIlUlation of flcllllUble gaa&es such a.
hydrogen and carbon monoxide within the panel.
methane.
b. The diainiahed. or interru:>ted 8~ppiy of air that may dilute
fl ..... bl. &aS88 or cariy<t,!te... away and tbu.'1 belp keep the
ceo.ce'Qtra~.ion of the IIlUttura balow explolilive levels.
TIl. pre.ence of fllllUl&bl. ..... may be .ttributlltd ttl the
follow~~g source.;
.4 Natural rel •• ae or •• tban~ in p.rticul.r (but al.o hydro&,en.
u well as other hycSt·oc.ri)on.) fro. \:he 8urr;ounding 8tIt..tta.
which ... y be accelera't.ed by the beat of the fire.
b. '!'be reaction of steu with uti hot co.l vithb)1 t~,e fir:e
sre•• with the consequent rele.s. of hydro,en ana carbon
1I\0noxid.. (the 80 called -water a•• " reaction) '.
c. The oxidation or buminl of coal. which leads to the release
of carbon 1Il.:'l~: xido.
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The sampling procp.dures and che interpretation of gas sample
results from sealed off areas arc a very real p:::oblem encountered
after sealing off.
When the gas mixture within thp. fire area ':lel'omesel{plo3iv~. it
is advisable to ~ithdraw all workers frow the undergr~und working
sites if ex?losion resistant seals are not. used. The fact: thal:'
the gas mixture is within explosion limits does not mea;) that it
is,nec:essa,r:ilygoing to explode. but it does mean that it is
potentially explo$ive and that in the right set of circumstances
it will indeed explode.
c;
After lellb have been completed. every effort should he made to
rn:l.nilllise leak"le. This may be dQne by means of 'vermiculite
pr~&surearouting and
Wf'enexplosive-x'esiatant wan .. are nc(f utled2 it i8 possible for
the w&lls. in the riaht set of circt/.kstances. to be dest::~oyed by
1/
the area. and;! for such an eXl,loaion to be
H G
a. a coal ~~8t t!%pl08ion with dangerQU/~
ffean.equeaces. In 0~4.r to pr.~~t the propagation of such an
explosion, it i. e••ential to t ~e effective precautions against
"
such an _vet. The precautio ta uy be in the form of the
lIl1)readinlof atOll. dust in the oar"a of the .eals (it is proposed
!
that • radiu. of at l.~st 25D. around the seals be sprinkled
Iwith atODe dust) or it .. y be!in the font of atone dust bardeu
\..))~ ,')
ereeted in ateateaie poaitiqiu. It is" ..180 advisable to 1,\8e
I
nOll.,hl.t fil1ina b.t ....en tn,'1 doubltt valla of the seal.
an QSploaion, within
further propagat&d
The ... lin, valu &!ihould :t;asQ4iately be equ)~ppt:d with the
.ecusary fittinS. which uy iAc.lude th. fol1owina::
o
(i)
(i:i.)
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gas sampling pipl;;!(s):
water' sprinkler pipes to prevent the fire from
jump:i.t:',gthe seals (if required);
A drainage pipe. with a valve to drain away water from
behind the w",115 (if required);
(iv) a pipe to maintain ventilation and esta;:>1.ish the
(iii)
final seal.
The pod.tion of the sealing walls must be determinE~d on the basis
of the !Ifollowing considerations.
(i) minimumrisk to workers involved in conat ruc t Lou of the
seal (example bad roof i and so on);
(ii) i
( ••• , /i,11.1.1 J :
i
J'
Ii
Ii
Ii
(iV>!i
I
.
it
Ii
I
II
(Vir
() I:
esse of transporting materials;
condition of surrounding stratli in terms of
fragmentation. presence of S~~8 faults. magmatic
passages. and 80 on;
the possibility of ventilating walls witbvut using
mecha.nical devices with a view to later inspection
and saapling.
lUillilllWll nwaber of walls that have to be built -
everyo ad.ditional wall in(.:::e".... costs, tilDe and
1ealc..I&e.
If poa.ible. concrete "alb Bh(luld be reinfored (example~ by
means of wire me.h) particularl,v where explosion-re.istant wallE
are built. In addition. the side walls should be hitched and old
dril1in~ 8teel should be drilled in radially and flied to the
reinforcement in order to obtain • better bond at the
concfete/coal interface.
If the intention ill to make the .ealin, walla epplo.ion
rasiat8nt. the walla should ,lbe of such t.:onstruction "that the
II
maxfilum l1reaasure that can be expected within thra .. aled-off area
dUrl.llg an explosion can be resisted. 'l'he following formula may
be used f01: calculation purposf!a:
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Po.Am = 2 (w T h).l.f (5-35)
Where:
FO : maximum expl~sion pressure (MPa)
p~ = surface area of sealirg wall (m3)
~ _. width of sealing 'Wall (m)
h = height of sealing 'Wall (m)
1 - thIcknes s of sealing wall (mj
f - shear strength of concrete Q.r c{;:)'., ;'. cheve r is the
lowest (MFa)
. 'The thickness of the concrete wall that is required can therefore
easily be deduced by means of equation (5-35):
1 = {po.Am} I 2 (w + h) f (5-36)
Civil engin,ers Ilsual.ly make use of a d~~signshear .trength of
;';ti~rete \~hich is a function of the specified uni-axia.7 crushing
/r" -:
strength (core strength) of the concretej example. for concrete
with" cbr<e strength .0£ 25 MPaa design shear strength of 0.78
MPa is used, while concrete with a core strength of 15 MPahas a
des ian shear str~ngth in the order of 0.5 MPa. Coal on the other
band h4. a shear atreosth of approximately 5 MFa ~nd if 8 design
strength with a .&fe~1 factor 'f 10 is used to allb" fot"
eliff~rent IS..... frapentation during blasting. anel 80 on. the
design stX"enath is in the order of 0.5 MPa.
In the Er..lo explosion of November 1982 8~veral eleficiencie. are
found with regard to the soaling of the "bad around" area.
\
': \
'I~).ato~pings were not plastered to prevent air' l.akina illtQ
the sealed area.
c
No sampling pipes weu installed in the stoppings and hence
no samples of the air muture behind the seals 'Were t aken to
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provide Officials with a guide as to the state of the
atmosphere in the '3.•
The dE!cision to seal the area was taken at junior Offic.ial
level: in :fact. the area was not entirely sealed since one
roadway into the return to:asleft open and no reason was
given as to why this was done.
Areas ,are sealed off from the current workings for sevetal
reasons:
a. The coal seam has been worked out and the area is no
longer required for ventilation or travelling purposes.
b. If still used s.a3 ventilation distri~t th~re is danger
of spontaneous
occurring.
fireal and roof falls
c. It is not required for vantil~tion intakes or returns.
d. It is necel'l8ary to £nsure that the oxygen content of
the air in the area is reduced to a \evel which will
not support combustion.
e. To reduc~ the areas underar\)unu requl.X'l ..ng superviaioi!
to th$ minimUlU" thereby effectively inc rea.sing
8upervi.ion elsewhere. It isolates the min.. into
manageable compartments.
In the case of the E~melo Mines e~pl0.ion the rea80n for sea~ing
off the area would have been to isolate the "bac .,round" area
froll the working sections and poaaibly to use the ventiladon
circulating into the "bad ground" area in the working faces on
the left hand side which we're in good ground cond:i.tic~ns.
Standard procedut't~s for seilling off old workings will auist; in
minimising the risk.
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Stopping a wo:r;kingplace pgrmanently
a. The Environmental Officer or other appoil1ted person !."lustbe
informed when mining operations cease in a panel. heading or
area permanently_ Adequate ventilation c.onditions must be
maintained during reclamation activities until the walls
sealing tht working ~na.ve been completed.
h. Until the walls are installed. tests for methane and airflow
must be made on a weekly basis by the Shift Overseer and be
re~orded in his log book.
c. Prior to final sealing an boreholes and shafts shall have
cables removed and, in the case of boreholes. the casings
removed and they should be plugged or otherwise sealed.
Prospect boreholes to be ~ealed after completion. Where
possible the caSing must be removed_ If this is not
possible. the top 1 m should be removed and concreted over.
d. Under normal cLrcuaa:". ')ces" the stoppings should consist of
brick walls or the equivalent ..situated 1 m back from the
inbye corner of the pillara farming the pan~l entry.
e. A heavy gauge non-metallic sample pipe. of not more than 6
3m'diameter. should be built into the upper portion of the
st0t-pin, to enable the atm<..sphere within the panel. to be
8lU1tpled. The pipe must extend t o beyond the first split in
the panels and should be ~hspended against the roof.
r. Where panels or sections have had Ii hititory of emissions of
methane and 1oIhe:rre. in the opinion of the Manager. a
dangerous condition IGaydevelop. the panel shall be sealed
off by means of explosion-proof stoppings.
An explosion-proof stopping shall consist of two brick walls
or th2 equivalent situated a distance apart equal to half
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the perimeter of the roadw9.Y. well anchored into the roof.
floor and sides. The space between them shall be tightly
packed ·".ith sand. rubble or fly ash. (Under no
circumstances should carbonaceous material be used).
The position and dJ.m.ensions of all explosion"proof stoppings
shall be recorded on the pLan of the underground workings.
g. The Manag~r. or his duly author.ised representativ~. shall
test the atmosphere behind the stoppings and again~t the
roof at the stopping for methane. at quarterly intervals ..
and log the results on a methane record card kept at the
el:!.trance (wall) to the area. and also logging the results in
a book provided for the purpose. example, Methane Register -
permanent stopped workings. l'he record card is kept in a
I;!te.elor plastic folder.
Once conditions have stabilised in th~ sealed area.. the
M6nt.ger may dccLde to dispense with sampling of area.
The Environmental Official must teat for methane at
quarterly intervals. countersign tl.e methane record card and
log the results.
Temporary Stopped Uorkin,s
The wntilation arrangements and air volumes required in
temporary stopped areas dud.tJ.g the non+produc tLve period must be
detailed in a layout prepared by the Environmental Officer or
other appointed person.
Permanent atoppings/bt'attices I\Ust be built up to the second last
through road - no temporary brattices should be used.
All entran~e8 IUUst be barricade;J \0££ an...."NO ENTRY" signs must be
displayed on the barricades.
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Such temporary stopped workings must be checked on 3. w~ekly basis
by the Shift Overseer for methane and.in the Shift Overseer's log
book.
The Environmental Officer or other appointed person must visit
the temporary stopped area at monthly intervals and submit a
report on the ventilation conditions.
Where old or abandoned workings ate adjacent to a section which
is being worked and the area is known to be giving off methane
freely. it is ~dvisahle to withdraw ~orkers from the operating
section until all seals are properly ftstliblish~dand air samples .~
taken frolXlthe sealed area reVEal ..,hat an explosive znixture docs
not exist .hehind the seals.
2.B.8 Self lteseuen
The Correct use of self rescue apparatus will ~_ve l:lves in th"':
event of an explosion sillee many deat.hs after an ex.plosion are
caused by carbou monoxide poisQPc,ing •
.., ." ~
2.8.9 Ventil.&'tion of h.ac>in,8 which have 'penet\'tated
.\
aeoloaical disturbance. 'i
\\
\\
'\
I
vent ilat,~on( -\methods37. 38 and 39 theFigui:-e836,
sug$~u'ted for
',,1
both high and
headinas being advanced l'ly
\
continuou$;. miners in
low _~,e~. cO'Pditions. The basic aira is ~'9 1e live r
lJ ~
the uximum q~:anf;ity of ventilation into the roadway :~o ai!l to
dilute any Ille~;hanewhich may be present in the face~ 37\,«W fans
delivering lO'~13 ._3/second tlnrougb 75~ .. diameter ducting should
be used. Duq'ting should be extended to t1ithin 5 met'tes ¢f the
face.
Evidence given at inquiries indicates that mine Officials do not
take seriously the standards of ventilation. liuantity of air and
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II
"Boast not thyself ~f tomorrow: for thou knowe8t not what 8 day
"1 brinJ forth".
Ax. iou. relatives and friend. .ather' at the pith.ad at
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methods of dust suppression used on continuous miners and
coalcutters. In fact there would appear to be a lack of standard
procedures on collieries since these are never called for nor
produced as evidence in the case of ignitions.
If mine procedures are to be used to hold Officials responsible
for adequate fa~e and section ventilation. then these Officials
should be equipped with instruments to measure and calculate air
ve.Locitiea ar.d quantities. Honzech type velometers should be
standard issues to Hiners and Shiftbosses for determining
quantities of air in ductiuc into each face.
2.8.10 Continuous Miners
All continuous min~rs should be equipped with continuous
recording methanometers. the heads of which are mounted in the
cutting head not more tbsn 1.5 metreD from the cutting drum. The
mathanomet ai- i.s mounted in the Operator' a cab as shown in the
photograph below.
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Th~ digital read ouu is cle&rly obse rvab Ie by the Qpero.tcr at all
times. Flame sa.fety lamps are difficult to read and are not
recommended for ,Lse on llll"bile machines. Tablc! 5 b~low shows the
normaI sE'ttings on the aut cmat.ac firedamp tlf:tector at: which the.
machine will cut out. together with dete.ils which indicate the
state of the Automatic firedawp Recorder.
Table 5 Machine MQunt~.d Methatll.)meter MKII!
Indicati.:>n8
00 or Numeric ;:: % CH4 present
F AC supply fault
F1 Display l,lternal fault
F2 Power supply to head fault
F 3 Incorrect OUt},Illt froll1 head
'4 Battuy completely discharged
L Low battery
o Over 3% C~4 present
P Pilot tripped (above pre-aet value)
A i..larll(between pre......t alar. and pilot)
Push recall button:
P Pre-.et pilot If'vel
A Pre-set alana level
1-9 Memory recall max CH4 lev.'.•
net.etor ~.ld to b. c:alibraud approximately every 350 working
bDurB.
2.8.11
Every mine should have a series of standa~d procedures which
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should be updated. every six months. More importantly the
Tl.''iill i:'g Department should havE' copies which should be used to
train a.11 employees at the mine.
2..8.12 Mininl; E¥perience
~1ine Management who ;>).ace new employees iu positions of
responsibility before ensu"'ing that they are adequateLy trained
to the taskE. to be performed do themselves. the colliery. and the
'employeelS a grave injustice - particularly when their work
entail. dealing with gas~;' conditions which may be present in
conjunction with an ignitilbn source.
Thi. pr.. iee i. supported
C~lli.ry ignition ~ which
by the evidence of
it walS the Min.~'.
the Bosjespruit
\\
first day at the
.eclliery. No ."id.o<: •• xiau .bovina tKat this Dew employe. had
anderaoae a period of trainina •
2.8.13 ..errt 0. tbe _tate of the envir011a4lPlt.fter an
..1,10. ion
'ollo~1 the frictional ianition in the 80af a~ Springfield
CJ
Colli.r,y (1981) detailed g.. _-.plea and air quantitied were
r,acord.d. 'fhe Millin, '!nain.er i. thus '.ble to catle:!yse these
-v r
r.aults Ad ard.,," at conclu8ion. a. to the ad.quaey of the
vonti~tion versus aine Or indu.t~r 5tand.rds and not. the lStat.
I;of the atllO(IIpberc in the section. lor inn.nee. the air
qu.uatiti ...... "red in the return airway were c:.on.idarably lower
than the 8tAdar:d.. Add.itioul· ~i~ wall cireulated into the
aac:tion by open in" a rag\\lato7:. SubseflUetltly. i,t ... a.tabU.hed
that on. of the _:ill curtac. fus had tripped cut.
'fh4t iaportance of •&lIP lin & and t.stinS for the
conditions ia hi&hli~hted:
followin,
/(
!i
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Intake~ face and return ai.r quanti.ties.
Veloc:it:::'esof air in fan ducting and then quantities in the
ducting (high velocities will ensure the air sweeps the face
clear of dangerous percentages of methan~).
Distance of ducting from tue faces.
Position of auxiliary fans •
. --\
State of atmosphei-~"-'>with respect to percentage o:r:y&er,.
methane. carbon di~lide and carbon monoxide in all parts ,;If
the section.
Detail. ()n ·.Tentilation appliances.
Condition of oic.ks on coalcutters. continuous miners and
i,1 •
shealZers.
3tate of all automatic
production machine ••
firedamp recorders on mob:iltl
WbeP the ventilation i8 disrupted in a &a••y section methane will
build up rapidly.
2.8.14 CU.ttlAl Toola
The pr.aenc.eof quartzitic sandstone in the roof and floor or in
lenf.!lu in the coal seam itself calls for a hi8~ deane of
8up.rvi2ion. not only in respect of v.ntilatio~ and dust
suppression. but especially the conditions of ~uttinl picks.
Where piek. exist with the tuns.tee carbide either wor~ or b Aen
off these should b. replaced iMmediately with new picks thereby
le•••nina the possibility of frictional heatina as an ignition
scurce ,
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Recent data obtained with a single chisel bit cu..:titJginto
sandstone is shown in the ,:lccomJ_:.anyinggraph (Figure 40). The
drulIlspeed was 47 revolutions per minute with a. corresponding bit
speed of 3.33 metres per minute. The depth of cut was adjusted
to 5 mil1j~eters.
The graph shows the numbel' of tltlikes. averaged over a number of
trials, that were required to produce ignition as a function of
bit wear. It can be seen that the number of strikes decreases
sharply where bit wear correaponda closely with the first
oxposure of the steel shank to the cutting action. This suggests
that modification iri bit design to prevent early exposure of the
shank uterial would modente the tendency for cutting bit action
to cause ianitio'Os. Thi. p08sibilit;'i:~'i beinA explored using th~
two b~~ deaigns for reducing shank expd~ure by enlarging cutr.ing
tips ~f chi.el bits a~d pluab-~ob .bits which are .hOWDin the
a1;.!cOlltp*'lyinadrawing (Figure 41). In the draWl.ni_ chis.l bit
(a.) and plumb-bob bit (c.) are stan~.rd deaiS%ls. Chis.l bit
(b.) and pluab-bob (d.) are the never d•• igns.
The _in feature of both of
(j 0
type 1M • IROdificati.onin tip ••oatry to preVl&nt early ex.poaure
of tbe 8101_ during the cuttina cycl.. The plwab~bob design bas
the d•• ilns pictur,ed for ekch bit
recently ~an evaluated in laboratory .tudi •• u.inS the modified
biu IIOU1:ed on the Joy .bearer drJsa. Both the conventional
pluab-boD bit and a modified -mu.hrooa- pluab-bob d••ian were
lIOUute4 OIl the drum at dia •• trically opposed poinu and tested
4iain.t a sandstone block.
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2.9 CONCLUSIC, '.Ijl,
, ' \
Frictional heat and sparking has been t.L:? cause of serious
methane ignitions and explosions on South African collieries. It
is dif.ficultto eliminate this ignition source in the goal in
pillar extraction and longwall workings. However. the practice
of bleeding ventilation over the goat and using bO"I'eholesdrilled
from surface into the goat to drab off methane will assist in
ensurtng that dangerous methane/air mixtures do not develop ir.
tht!SE;areas .. Th~re is a need to be aware of the-quartz content
«
of the overlying s~rata whE'!rl!second mining methods are
practiced, Gince this aspect has a direct bt!aring on the degree
of' frictional heat developeti when the goaf caves.
Ventilation plays a majoI. role in prevtffiting the f~r.mation of
explosive methane/air mixtures. In pi1l6r extraction ventilating
.:-;_.
air IIhould"beclirected along the goaf line using auxili~ry fans
and ventila';ion <brattice us",~ur.tains. The of both
exhaust/fo ''Z:f.~g fans ,...,. the development ends 1'!ined by' continuous
• 1 I,
l'4inina t.UlChin~8 a ree ,.J!rlended.Fan ducting should terminate no
face in order to ~nsure that the
ventilat~~ current
firedaap detectors
sweep. aCr~!S8the hce. The use of autoutic.
lIlo~itorand velomttters environmentalto
standards on site is important.
Sup~rvi8ion and tr~ining is often neglected but iDeans of
improving this aspect of the operations b~ the introduction of
fonr.al courses are well dOCUll~,nted. Unles.s supervisors set an
exaJnpl. and test for lIIethanf~regUbrlY,. explofol1.·onswill continue\ I
to occur. \ '
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Cutting picks which are tipped with tungsten carbide. 'Jhich
revoLve during cutting and which are ....'ater-cooled with the Wtiter
spraydng behind the pick to cool. the hot smear will reduce the
possibility of ignitions.
More p Lanning and thought needs to be gi.ven to the $t;!,; .Lng off of
old worked-·ol.lt areas.
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3.1 INTRODUCTION
Li.ght ni.ng-r r e La t ed incidents in s ha I Iov coal mines have led to
several methane explosions and to l,)",s of life. Lightning can
give rise to high potentials betw<;.en points ne a r to one ano t he r
unde rg round in shallow collieries. Over the years both premature
ignition of explosives in cba rged faces and ignitions: of methane
air mixtures have occurred due to lightning in mines.
The mechanisms which link lightnulg diatu~bances (and a drop in
barometric pressure) .nd stray cu~rents to methane explosions are
~x.min.d with particular reference to underground conditions
prevailing at the time of the lightning surg@s.
The known incidents an listed and several case studies have been
analysed.
The chapter concludes with a discus.ion of the m.asurea which
should b. taken to prevent the ignition of methane by lightning
sur,....
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3.2 THE PHENOMENON OF LICHTt-."ING-RELATED INCIDEkrrS
3.2.1 Historical Background
In recent years. the South African Coal Mining Industry has
experienced a Qonsiderable number: of underground ii)cidents or
disturbances. '~bich were frequently related to the passage of
lightnL~g storms on the surface. Thebe incidents included
electrical shocks or visible sparking hom underground equipment.
premature detonation of explQsives and methane explosions. These
incidents were particularly pre'lale~,\ in shallow collieries and
"were of ,consid'erable concern to the vax'ious mining groups
concerned. A number of wide-ranging investigations were
initiated by certain of these companies and the~e culminated in
1978 in the formation of a co-operative sub-committee of the
Bxplo&ions Ha£ard. Advisory Committee of the South African Coal
Kinina Rese.reb Controllins Council - with a view to c&rrying out
an in-depth study of the problem and to formul~ting appropriate
safety measures.
II
In the ensuina yean, thi. Sub-c:olIJIiitt1:'einitia.ted a number of
act ionlll a inc lud:i.na:
1. The impl.ulltation of cOlllprehenlJiveprocedurell for repoIlting
and inve8tisating specific incidents.
2. A laboratory Btudy of the susceptibility of\\ electric
detonators to iinition by lightning-type surges.
------~-~-----~~-~-~------------ __ ~~~_-_J
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3. A series of underground measurements in collieries with a
vi.::wto investigating the nature and magn.itude of lightning
surges in such situations - including detonator circuits.
Arising out of these studies. sevet'al measures have been
implemented as a means of improvi.ng aa fe t y , These Lnc Iude the
prepa~ation of a "Code of Practice for the Avoidance of Hazards
Underground due to Lightning" which has been issued from the
office of the Cove rnmerrt Hining Engineer to all. c~11i€r:i.es. aa
well as the development of a more effecl;'ive lightning warning
unit. The latter has proved to be very effective itl several
collieries and has prevented injuries to miners.
The earliest known methane ignition as a result of lightning
initiation was at the Schoongezicht Colliery on the 2nd December
1960.
During tunnelling operations in the Swiss Alps. Berger (1977)
demonstrated that lightning strikes on the surface could cause
currents to p~netrate to sufficient depths to initiate the firing
of detonators. The incidents mentioned below illustrate that a
similar situation could prevail in the shallow coal mines of the
Eastern Transvaal.
3.2.2 Regional Ground Flash Penaity
Plate 1 depict... the coalfields of South Africa whilst !Plate :£
shows the lightning density Ilttp for South Africa derived by the
Lightning and Stray Curre!lt Sub-Committee of tb<? E:xploaion
Hazards Advisory Committee of South Africa.
This extensive reeeatch yielded invaluable data based on th~
number of lightning flashes per ii<l,uarekllometre per ann~F. This
highlighted the ~!lnerable ar~as s~ch as:
195
Piet Retief 13
Carolina and Utrecht 10
Ermelo 9
Betha.L, Middelb1.H:g and Witbank 8
The Ughtnir:g density map allowed for a lightning 'lIlarning syst en
to be implemer.ted at t ho se mines which became an area of concern.
An examination of the recorded incidents reveals that mo st of the
Ii
collieries are situated in the hign density areas of lightning
strikes and lie at shallow depths.
The pracr ice of ventilat Lng old workings with just sufficient
ventila.tion to "keep the pan~J,'frel3h" can lead to the build-up of
explosive quantities of met.hane in the panel. Sparks as a result
of stray currents arising from. lightning strikes could cause a
methane explosion.
3.2.3 Lightning av an Initiator of Methane Explodions
Methane explosions are believed to be initiated anderground when
li&htnin~ causes electric spat'ks 'with safficient energy in
prbxi.slity to pockets of methane. to. iluite ID.t:!tha.ne/airmixtures
of the appropriate proportion.
Lightning-related sparking underground is thought to arise Ln a
variety of ways. For exampi~. transiettt voltage surles on a
metal structure underground can create sparks where small
discontinuit.i.e8 occur in the metal structure. such as along a
conveyor sys!l;elllor between a strain£r wire and. roofbolt. ,.Sparks
could also occur at the extremities of ~uch structures. In other
instances. tbe high potential gradients developed dudug the
dissipation of lightning cutrents in the rock strata could cause
sufficiently energet i.csparks to ignite critical methane mixtures
in gas pockets *
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A. lightning discharge is a discharge of electricity through a gas
at atmos,!=,hE'!"icpressure and can take three forms:
<3.. A di.scha rge between a part of the atmosphere having a volume
charge of electric~ty. generally a cloud. and the ground.
b. A discharge between two ?arts of the atmosphere. each part
having a def:'nite volume charge of electricity, but of
opposite signs.
c. A discharge f r cm a part of the atmosphere hfl,ving\) vo Iume
charge into a part of the atmosphere in which no initial
volume charge is present.
In the fir.st case, the ground forms
latter cases. the discnar6e does not
an el"',ctrode but in the
~ass between electrodes.'\
two
\-_.'
The theory of lightning is expressed as follows:
Figure 1 is oil diagramm41~ieal rep't'uentatiotl of the field of force
about a region of the atmosphere. ,'". containing a volume charge
of electricity, say the cloud of • thunderstorm. For simplicity
the volume is represented aa a sph.r~ placed som~ distance above
the (.-round. the latter bfting perftlctl)f 1e'1lel and smooth.
The region IIOf, greatest el~ctrical intel'lsity·· is obviously at B.
the lowest ~o:!nt f the cloud. There the air will "break-down"
first and ionisation occuxs , As soon as this happens the lines
o! fcrce move towards the conducting ~egion and in consequ~nce
..he field there illcreases. especially at the upper and lower
parts of the Cend\lct~.ng region. This is shown diagrammatically
in Figure lb.
The increase of force causes further ionisation and the
conducting region extends along the lin(:8 or" force. both upwards
Ii
iuto the cLoud and jownwards towards the eitlft:h. as showr. ii in
Figure Ie. (Larmor ~nd Larmor 1914).
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Methane explosions are believed to be :lxlitiated when lightning
causes eLec t r ic !)spar.ks with sufficient energy j.n proximity to
pockets of methane/air mixtures with the approp rLat e propo r t i.ons
i.e. 5 - 15% CH4• The minimumignl.~,l.on energy tor methane ?;IS
thought to be about: 0.25 :1.1. having OJ. 540°C ignition temperature
(Lighi!1V-ng and Stray Currents Sub+CctamLt t ee Report. 1986).
The high potential gradients developed during the dissipation 6f
lightni['lg currents in the rock strata could lead to sparking.
This problem will naturally be worse;.:).f. during the lighl'b.ing
storm. power to the !)line ie interrupted (as was the situation in
the Mrst case studk discussed) and the ventilation fans stop
allowing for an acctUt\ul~'~.~O~ of methane. It is also more likely
to occur in abandoced workints, where the ventilation is. often
poor.
C:.)
o Ii 3.2.4 The Penetration of Lightning Disturbances into an
U:ld~rirOund Mine
Fi&~~e 2 illustrates several l.mportant features of li typi.cal
colliery mining situation and depicts sev2ral pbssible lightnin~
('\
disturb:ln~" '•• chani.sms.
In the event of a lightning .trike on the surface closp to a
(":,
worlting area. li&btning currenta couId penetrate into this area
through direct conduction in the iutervening scil and rock media.
Any large conductivE' s;;ructures undergtound (such as c."mvez.?r
unite O~ power cables). as vell as !I the ~ine excavation.:. cause
~J
local distortion of a current distribution .Ln the underground
strata. cc1his leads to s;eep potentil.lv~ ~radients in c10s£
proximity to (Be&lii-earthed) structures.such unde rg t ound
Inve.tigations into a number of light nids-re laud., i14cidents I have'
highlighted th~ l>os.ibility· that "his IHchaniSDl ccu Id have been
involved.
'OqJ.. _ <
---,-----------'"---
~T~~f. !Q STR'JC~
i,f 1AAFT £~T~ANCE
STRI<E ABOVE
DISTANCE TO Tt£ ORDER WORKNG AREA
OF 100m TO SEVERAl kms
(.;
Fl!H! ~
A COI..lERY SM'l.FEO SIluA lION - OEPICTIfG
H()W UGHTNIfG SlRGES MAY ENTER COLLERES
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The circumstances of h number of such inc idE.mt s Lave also
indica~ed the possibility that local perturbations of the terrain
- such as boreholes. dykes and geological faults - CQuld eitner
increaae the penetration depth of lightning current or locally
modi r y their distribution. A furtber variation of this mechanism
could include the temporary redistribution of an electrical
charge Lmmedi.at e Ly after .", nearby lightning s t r ik.e , during the
subsequent co l lap se and redevelopment of the t.hunde rc loud and
liil:'btninR electric fields. Thi.s agam leads to surge currents on
".
uride rgr ound c onduc t i.ve s t ruc t u r e s ,
A Beco~d mechanism whereby lightning Burges could enter a mine is
t hrough direct s t r i.ke s to the st ruc tu re s ar a shaf t entr.ance or
at vent iLar i.cn shafts.
This sudden rise in potential W:lu1<i propagaf e as a travelling
wave (voltage stirg..,) doWl.. into the minoa via shaft structures such
&8 pow~~r c.a~le armouring, water pipes and conveyor .systems.
A thid possible mechanism of a lightning distu.cbance could
entail direct electromagnetic induction in,!=.o detonator/exploder
'/?-~~\:. ~\
circuit:;;, Very high electroDl&gnetic fieldi u'assoCi.ated 1oI'~th
the di:acharge of the lightning channel. '
In the event of direct strikes in close proxil4ity to suscepti'ble
circuits. the surrounding soil .ediu~ would be ~illuminated" by
such fieldE:. These fields could lead to the possibility of su~:ge
current induction into the detonator/exploder circuits.
The study of rock strtita. of ~outh A.frican coal mine,I3, hOlL the
surfa.:e to the coal E.eam and below (exploration borehole logs)
has .-eve.lad a typical p.ttern of hot'izon'Cal layered sandetone
and shale with minJ2_.f coal sta!lH1S above the No. 2 seMI, which is
(r/
the most frequ4!:ritly WQrked. The resistivity pattern i.s
accordingly complex.
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C'>€ophysical repo rt s of Arnot Colliery "uu Bank Colliery. teco::d.ed
by the Li.ghtm i.ng and Stray Cu rcenr Sub"",CQmmittee. ~ec'ol'ds va r Lcua
resistivity and a few permittivity values for coa Jnd the other
strata encountered in the Eastern Transvaal coalfields. The very
high re s Ls c i.vi.t i.e.s given f(JI c oa L (pa rt icu Lar Ly ...hen dry and
measured pe rpend Lcu l.a r to t he beddirig planes) a ze remarkable WhHI
compared with trw va Iue.s for the overlying and underlying strata.
Con~ ieration of these figures makes clear the possibility that
unde; some circumstances the coal seam {whether partially removed
by mining or not) may have large lightning-sourced po t ent iaL
impressed across it from roof to floor. ac t Ing like the
dielectric in a capacitor.
These geophysical reports record the following:
i/ Arhot Colliery
Surface sandstc"1es 1000 to 10 000 Ohni-m; lllai:l l:l,:tndsl;:one sha Le
sequence 00-400 ohm-m to t!epths of "sev6!ral tens of metres".
H) Bank Colliery
Ecca l'Jequenc.t! 400-1000 Ohin-I'. Dry soil layer (10 000 ohm-sn) on
surfac.e. Clay-less than 51) ohm-m. Intercalation. of shales.
siltstones and fine grain';ld sandstones with appreciable silt
content: 400 ohm-me ]1)0-900-1200 ohm-m: coarse (grained
well-lJorted sandstone; 200-2400 ohm-m: grit or coarse
(;sand8tone.
No. 2 seu cool: 15 000 to 30 000 ohm-me Mirie floor resistivity
400-600 Ohm-Ill dry ~ 100 .Ilhlll-m wet. s: Basement rocks a re of
comparable resi.sti'lity to that of coal.
The geological layout of 8 typical coal ,l'IIine in the Witbank area
is shown in Figure 3.
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The penetration depth of Li.ghtni.ng cur-rent is propo r t i.ona l to the
resistivity of the rock (Berger. 1977). that is. the higher the
resistivity the greater the depth of penetration. If one
examines Figure 3,. a soil-sandstone-shale-ccal-;.;;andstone-shale
coal pattern is observed. The resistivities of the ground layers
ar~ considerably lower than that of the coal seams; 0.300 to 1.0
k m in r~l.ation to 15 to 1000 km of the coa l (Geldenhuys e t a1.
198')) This explains the penetration depth of lightning above
the coal.j in other words. the .:t'iterion of a sha l.Iow (;081 mine.
Certain "aiding fact,les" such as dykes. vhi.ch have a high
resistivity of approximately 50 k m and borebo Les may influenc.e
the depth of penfltration.
Di!"ect lightning strikes t(,) earth in the vicinity of shallow
ulld~rirouud collieries have over th.! last fifteen years b~Em the
cauae of a number of prelD&tl:1teigni1;;.on8 of charged ahochoLes and
also of methane explosions; in. moe~:cases the incidents have not
h"en of ujor severity but h.,ve nevertheless occasioned serious
concern.
The result of .uch lightning strik.~s is that high voltages may
appur transiently Itt plsces withi1:J.the wcrkings of a coLl.Lery
Cl
and cause the firing of detonators or sp,nks which may ignite
.ethAne-air mixtur~£ when these are present.
The detailed •• ehanisms involved in creating these two g~neric
;~,
effec.te :i:l unciersround mines are 1i.ttle by little coming to light
a. a result of study and research"
o
For the present the theories remain in ieneral that high
potenti(als and r<uH11ting sptu:ks or other current flow effects
o
a. direct flow of liall!:nina !;:urrent through the rock formations
surroundini a workiu, coal face (and in th~ face itself) due
to a st.rike close by; and/or
. \),
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b , the trar:.sfer of a high potential by metalwork in the mine
from a more or less remote point (for exaaip Le, an above
ground conveyor gantry) to the workil18 face. following a
direct J.ightning strike to the above ground steelwork.
A voltage of about SOkV has been measured between a. coal .f;~ce
and ea~jrhed metalwork in a colliery )i;,~t: to lightning •
._,j
On var i.ous occasions men have received eLect rLc shocks from
roofbolts or machines during lightning $torms.
Deto"~tors (sometimes a r.umber of detonators connected in .i:eries)
have been fired simultaneously by lightning currents.
The:notes which follow have been compiled with tho Witbank
('ftansvaal) coalfhld a.rea specifically in mind.
Measured t<lrth
depending on soil
resistivities on surface vary very widely
types and depthcpf soil. the nature of the
underlying rock strata;,>and moisture content. Resistivity of
surface layers tends to be higher i.n thti H.5.ghveldwinter period
than in the wetter summers.
Therefort.! to establish low resistance earthing electrodes (for
lightnring or penr ay.nelll earthing purp.>sea) on surface. it is
desirable to get them deep en.ough in the ground to avoid drying
out during the dry season. The depth below surface of the ground
strata which ~r. of importance from a resi~tivity point of view
in determininl the electrode t s ret<,istance to the mass of earth is
then largely dependent ott the vertical and horizontal dimensions
of the electrode syst3m concerned. This is likely to be of the
order of metres or tens of metre. for electrode ayatelllS desi~n'!d
to have reasonable earth re"istances for average local conditions
so th.,t .',en for electrical system And lightning protection
earthing systems 6n surface. the resistivity of the ea.rth to a
depth of 10-50 metres may be of importance.
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Representative resif;tivities are of the following orde ra s
100 to 1000 ohm-m
Under 50 ohm-l:\Clay (occasional)
Coarse grained sandstones 700 to 100 chm-ra
F.in'!:! gzained. sandstones
Sha:es and mudstones
400 to 1200 ohm-ta
200 to 1-f00 ohm-m
Bituminous coal
Igneous basal rocks
Dolerite {dykes}
In situ: 5000 t c 100 000 ohm-m
105 ,,.6 hmto.l.V 0 -0
50 000 ohm-om
As can be seen. the resistivity of dry coal tends to be
relatively high.
The net effeG't may be that a. coal seam may 9.Ct a little like the
dielectric in e capacitor. and may have .~.major effect on the
"
pattern of lightning current flow from sut.face to depth. If its
resistivity is high .relative to thalli: of the formations above it.
this could result in high potential arising across it at the ti~e
of nearby lightning strikes.
One coal sample from Acnot Colliery tested in a laboratory gave
the following figures: /!
Parall.1 with bedding Normal to bedding
All r~eived 120 ono ohm-m 108 + or.m.-m
After 40 min in tap water 60 000 ohm-m app 107 ohm-a
A~ter 16 hours in tap "ater 6 000 ohm-m app 106 ohm-II!.
It is clear that moisture content is of c.rucial imporct:ince and
.,that the nature of any ciissolved substances in the
!:
absort.'ea
moisture is aJ.'iilO'likely to be crucial. in determining effecl;lve
resistivitj of coal in situ. In parti\:!ular it fi:hould be rbted
that the layered nature of coaL d<!positB me:aus that horizontal
and vertical resistivity measured values are extr.aordinarily
diffennt in' caClples tested in the laboratory. In practice it L~
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not known to what extent vertical fractures in a coal seam m::;y
:reduceor nullity tt cffc::t 01: the horizontal layering.
!t ahou Ld hf~ currents have st rongnoted that lightning
hi.gh+f requeric y components and that resistivity of 50i1. is
f re quency dependent. reducing with ancrease in f r equencv
Permittivity effects may also be of importance in relation to
lightning currents.
3.2.5 Hazards Associated with Abandoned Work.ings
The study of accident reports indicates that ligh:pi~g related
lIlethaneexpiosions had occurred on several ocean Ions :"0 abandoned
workings. Once sealed off. such :-..ining areas often develop
non-critical met hene-e Lr ~::.xtures. although this may take a
considerable perio:::J of time. \fluorder to minimise the hazards of
methane dxplosions. precautionarytherefore. a numbe:r: of
~rinciples should be applied.
3.2.6 The Effect of a Drop in Barometric Pre.aure
II
In 1.948. Charles Moleter in the U.S.A., and Jea1'l BessejJloulin in
France. pointed out the strikins 81'181011b.tweep the variations
in pressure fte:nperature and fireda.mpexplosions. (jut of 41 c.ases
of explosion. ~tudied. Helater observed that. with one singl,o
exception .• they wer'! all preceded by a sudden drop in atmospheric
pressure.
The opinion 0.£ Bessemoulin litesthat the same phenomenolt \'as at
.~he origin of the disasters of Courrieres in April 1948 and of
,r:entralia. U.S.A. in March 1947. which o~curred during the
passing of a cold storm front.
The hypothesis was expressed that this ';'rop in atmospheric\\
\
'\~pressure on the earth's Hurface. caused an expansion of gases
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underground. especially of the firedamp deposits in old workings.
After that. the electric field of the atmcsphe re , modified by
s tormy weathet'. could easily create the spa-rk initiating an
explosion. On December 27 1974 at approximately 05h3C, a
Iiredamp explosion occurred at a depth of 710 m in the
Six-SillclUs seam at 1ievin. killing 42 J::l,iners. At the same time
the barometer ..eadings in the meteorological stations at 1:1.11e.
Abbeva l Le and Saint 4'Uentin had reco rded a sudden drop in
?tmospheric pressure in the Lens coalfield. (Refer to figure 4).
Lievin is marked in a triangJ.,'. the three po~r.t:s of whiCh are the
towns of Li11e. Abbt.!ville and Saint Quentin.
Meteor lcgical measureaent s taken by means of a ballc,,(,n probe
were detecting sufficient humidity to produce an unstable cloud
mass above ~he Lens coalfield.
Fauconnier (1981) quotes the changes in pressure over seals in
old workings as a result of changes in barometric pressure.
Table 3.1 Example of the change in pressure over walls with
change
in barometric preuure (Data: Springfield Colliery)
Barometric Preuure (kPa)
Time Surface Underground In Panel
Pre.sure Differen~e
over walls (Pa)
06hOO 85.079 85.488 85,428 - 60
06h20 85.132 8S.533 85,453 - 80
06h40 85.159 B5.S/,j 85.463 -110
1)7hOO 85.078 85.526 85.466 - 60
07h20 85.131 85.:540 85.480 - 60
07h40 85 r 144' 85.560 3:).480 - 80
08hOO 85.172 8$,,586 85~491 - 95
08h20 85~187 85.605 85.485 -,120
\~~)
08h40 85.219 85.640 ~5 ..525 -115
09hOO 85.239 85,660 85.535 -125
Q9h20 85.242 85,686 85.576 '-110
C9h40 85.235 85.653 85.568 - 85
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Time
10hOO
lOh20
lOMa
IlhOO
l1h2.0
11h40
12hOO
12h20
12h40
13hOO
13h20
13h40
14hOO
14h20
14h40
15hOO
15h20
15h40
16hOO
16h20
16h40
17hOO
17h20
17h40
18bOO
-: j
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Surface
Barometric Pressure (kP~)
In Panel over walls (Pa)
85.226
85.211
85,198
85,164
85.132
85.106
85.080
tiS.OS1
85.010
84.972
84.944
34,916
84.895
84.864
84.863
84.839
84.839
84.851
84.892
84.923
84,920
84.926
84,596
84.998
'?5.038
Underground
85.537
85.620
85.609
85.578
85.556
85,5i16
85.50t
85.446
85,422,
a5.3e:t.,
85,344
85.313
85,280
85.246
85.232
85.260
85.220
85.233
85,286
85.328
85.328
85.333
85.3'.6
85.392
85.43Z
~~essure Difference
85.567
85.570
85.574
85.583
8::.586
85,626
85.622
- 70
- 50
- 35
+ 10
+ 30
+ 80
+120
85.596
85.582
8:; .562
85.544
85.533
R'l,5QO
85.486
85.452
85.450
85.400
+150
+160
+180
+220
+220
+240
+220
+t90
+:;'00
8~.383 +150
85.366
85.388
85.383
85,368
85.346
85.352
85.352
. ,.",or U\.I
.;.60
+ 55
+ 35
o
-40
- 80
The importliltlceof these fig1~ni$ i8 tbat methane which bas
accumulated behind the seals i..,. "'}.f! old workings could find its
way into ~~rkin8s outside the seals durina peLiods of low
pressure (by leaking through the ile.b). Spllrks result.i..ngy:::from
Hgbtning may ignite this metbene causing an .~xplo.ion.
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3.2.7 Earthing Properties of Roofbolts and Mine Floors
The roofbolts which ar« in use in Eastern Transvaal Go1.lierie:::
ar.e of various types and lengths. The notes "Ihien follow ref'e r
to commonor typical prac t Lce but do 'not cover, all cases.
~pansion Shell Type Roofbo~ \,
,I
This type of roo fbc Lt is fixe.d af t e r insertion inr.o tho;- '~vlE:
drilled into the roof by tighten~~"~; a nut on its t hre aded lower
/ __ J
end. This has the e.ffect of 1/ causing the corri.ca l wedge steel
assembly at its upper end to expand and grip the s i.des or the
hl)le tightly. e~lab1ing the plate which is clamped age Lnst the
roof by the tightl:!ning of the nut to provide a subc t ant i.a l,
Il RUPPO:cting force.
aesin-Grouted Rpo!bolts
In recent years
If, very co:wnon. In
~has been drilled
'I
by 16 111m
the use of reain-groute4
'\
'i\
roofbolts has become
whichthis case the hole (22 t.O 28 'lu,n diameter)
for rr .... =~~f'....V1L llftlich is typical1Y~~.5 III. long
~
di&llleter) .ha"c:'~.oneor more two-compartm~"t. r$..1%1:'ipsules
(Ipushed up into it. Th. rOQl~.1t
I I
caps'ures,rotated braa)u these
is then pushed hhome and wn~\
and lIIues t e t\.'O rp.$l.n\~\,
ingtedifdlU which then set quiu rapidly, after which th~ nut call
be tightened provi4ini the required" support to the roof.
II
~h.electrical r~si8tance t~ earth of toofbolts of both typ@e
have been •• a.urad underground at various t:iJll.esin vl.lt'iuus mines
and laborfttory reeiatlvity tests on resins have been parfClrmed at
the ACeo.l Re.earch and Development Department at Vandyksdrift.
Typical relili8tance fi.iure. for expansion shell type roofbolts
recorded have. rab&ed frOG 10 000 ohms t I') 40 000 ohms pe;r
roofbolt.
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Resin grouted r-oofboLt s have given an extremely wide: range of
earth:Jing resistance figures which are clearly dependent on d.
number of factors including th~) resistivity of the ua+e r i.aI in
which the roofbolt is fixed. ,·,f..ether the boLt is grout ed over its
whole length or merely near the cC!1 end (point ancho r ) and the
cha r ac t e r i.st Lcs of t he resin employed. The lowest in situ
~I
figures encountered have be~ of the or oe r of 300 ohms to 500
ohms. while f i.gur es in the range 1 000 o~.s to 5 000 ohms are
1\
common and some have been h i.ghe r , probab Ly when hoJ\~s have been
set in coal.
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Again the existence of a poorly ventilated area. is evidEmt.
together with a conductive ventilation pipe in the shaft coLl.a.r
seal.
Spii'rk;;r-,gpotential from the lightning strike caused one.Jr more
sparks b~'twCE::1 unbcnded conductors theJ:(~by inducing a methane
explosion in tbe pal:tly vent:ila,,:edshaft. Engineers on the mine
'Nere not ,m"are o f '~1,,(;; eartf.ii>::>g code fot headgears and dia nct
know the tietails of: t he eaTnhmat on suz face ,
3.5.2 Erlllt'lo M:lnes Ser'ITiCE!R (PtYJ Limited
Introduction
I ,--, ,.,, \
One pump at t endane died anli '.;cc'i;:Jkcond worker sustained ruptured
eardl"UlIls when a methane explosion occurred in an LncLane aha f t ,
The eX,,?losion w.;l,S initiated by stray currents from an eLec'tr i.caL
storlll O'n surface. The survivor "all th(~ flames asaitl.!!!'_",tht! roof a
few seCC,IOdb4!fore the €xplosion occurred.
An accWflUlation of methane in' the sha{'t resulted fror.~ tha fact
that the powE.r supply to 'the fan tripped out :Jeverul hO;lrlil pri(;r
to the accident.
1\
Th, two WQrker•• considering tb~ posaibility of flooding of the
.shaft <il1e to th~1 heavy rains. took a cdculated' ..:a(' "·W ent~ring
\ )
the unvetttilated shaft. They obviously did nc.r k. t../ that t here
wall a possii;,ility of a gn!\ 'l;)uild-up and thouiht tbat the
compressed a:lr supplied toct:he pwaps woul'd suffice.
This i. a typical case of 108s of life due to inadequate
training.
The coa.l seau.s at this colliery ar.e notoriously gassy.
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3 •J THE PHENOMENON OF I GNITIONS DUE TO STRAY CUR...1lliNTSOTHER
THAN THOSE DUE TO 11 GHTNING
3.3.1 Stray Currents
Fen ',hately. the risks "posed by ()th".~~: forms 0:: s tray cur r en c
which originate from Cduses outside the mine have not. BO fal as
is known. yet been the cause of any exp Los i.cn in a Soc.th Af r i.c an
collier.y.
I;
Such curren~B may however pose risks. partiGularly in rela~ion to
methane ignition in mines; as electric 1'(li1 traction activities
by The South African Transport Services (SATS) expand (both fI.C.
and single-phase A.C.) and locomotive power j'Jer train (and hence
t,.5,action supply cur rent s) increase and <:.he F.lectricity S'Jpply
Commission (~SKOM) transmission lines rClt,ifer3t'e (leading to' an
-:/
increase in the chances of dat1&erous striy A.C. inducf'd currents
occur;flr,g) stray cur rent probleu underground IIlsy be expected
increase also.
to
C \~
Large aJn0untJil of n: n ,D.C. trac:C?ion curr~'tlt leak Il:),ay f~oll1 the
., t' J
rails and hud their w~'l back to Jtr8cksid~ suppJ.y subst!lt :."'n8
;;." ,-,
through tne ground. I t is such cv;innts which may be tt'oubl~IFome
1/ ') \\
iL~ uUd1!rground co l Li.e r Lea ; itl c(!lllieries in Britain and ~th&
1J, S.A. and in a !tunn!l in So~):h Afril"a. th,ere have be('!o aCCiJe~~1
1f: whi.ch detonatorE::in ~:huged holes have been fired by D. t r
stray currents. Some of r heae accidents are show in((~~able 3.2 •. ,\
u')
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Table 3.2
( .,
" .1., 1958 Broughton
'runnel
Blasting
Accident
Natal
(ii) 1978
DCTractic.'.
Cur rerrt (;,AR)
suspected
Coa: Estate's potential
South African High DC Rail DC traction return
current
(i~ Possible Sources
Rail<way traction circuits:
a. D.C. current through the ground (and also possible
induction due to short-circHit current transients).
b. ~ Single phase A.C. (Induction from
.J wires and ccuduct Lcn through" ground).
Elec ~rOlllaguet ic influct ion
overhead t rac t Lcn
by unbalanced component of
11 • \'alt.mat llli currept \in overhead power lines (norlllal and
fault current).
A.;:. earth, fau.!t curren~,\(by conducr Lcn , fro: overhead power
\\
lin;.). \
'"\.
Radio signals.
o
Indu~c I-ve flU.ets within the mine' power diatribution system
(such I•• longitudina? yotential. induced in earth couductors
of 88ynmetrical trailing cabl •• l.
(ii) Danler. po&.d by .uch eourcea
~\
\"Po.. ible ri.kll 'aridl1& fro. Stray Cunenu
Premature igllition of txpl(\,8Jves
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Ignition of methane
Electric shock to human beings
Corrosion Qf buried structures and structures in contBcc
with the ground
I'1terzyrene€ ',dth proper operation of electrical equip: -nt ,
Jackson (1987) states there is a network of electrified railways
in the Eastern part of the Tran~va.:.tl.I..in~s in the Witbank area
are supplied at 3 000 V d.c. by an overhead feed with track
return to the traction substations. which are spaced ten to
f~fteen kilometres apart. Despite the provision of insu13tiob
between rails and the concrfllte sleepersoand the install.ation of
heavy return cur-rent conductors in parallel with the return rail.
appreciable voltages above earth arise on raila snd a substantial
proportion of t~~ current orawr" by locomotives returns to the
traction s\.\pply .oubstations via leakage to the geneksl body .'0...
earth and via other unintended paths. '
Thti result is that appreciable D.C. potentials can be me$sured
b'*tveen the bod:1jof earth and loca.lQ1et~lwork almost anywhere in
the area. including points unae:rgrcunii in collieries. The
higlleat local potentials occur c10ae to railway lines carrying
lon,~.,l1'ulti-loC6Dl'l)tive tninlil.
Rail potential. may exceed 50 volta durin, normal operation (such
as passage of a train hauled by five 6El l.ocomotives) •
Me••ur...nt, made at about 80 m depth in a colliery haulage
dirctetl)'balow the ra:Uway have liven peak roofbolt potentials to
c
,earth.d metal of about (_,8Vat the tiJae ,of panage of train~.
though av.ra~. leve18 in the same colliery were a fraction of g
volt.
It doe. Dot appear that potentials of this order are likely to
(~
provide much risk of direct incendive a?trkiDI_ However. a fatal
.bot-firiDg a<.:¢irlent.
piace in the Westoe
in very unusual circumstances. d i.d take
Collifery (U.K.) due to B1tr&y d;c, traction'-,
currents which .entereo :-hemine vilametallic. paths. (Given low
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resistance current paths. quite substant :Lal stray currents can
.flow in favour.able circumstances).
A different possible rLsk sLt.uat Lon may exist when t r ac.z Lon
supply shvrt-circuits take place. In this case. for a very short
periCJd. track vc1tage may theoretically be elevated to something
like one quarter to one half of the supply voltage. Dur i.ng this
brief instant. therefore. ve ry high leakage currents to ea r t l. may
occur, with possibly serious results. The r.apid rate of rise of
such fault cur-rent implies the possibilit:y;, of ';_nduction effects
also occurring.
There is no record in South Africa of any explosion in a colliery
being initiated by traction current.
source posing certain risks.
It is however. a cur rent,
Overh,uld power lines 1;8rrying alternating current are normally
cOlultructed vith three phase ccnduc tora as closely spaced as'
po••ible and carry moderate levels of three-phase current which
i. theoret~~ll).,ii.xactly balanc.ed. Li'Ctl. or no induced 'V:O:~~~~
on parallsl conductors therefore O~CUr8 in !post cases. ~_j_C;=~1
Ho".. ver. in prftctice there i. ,>!ten a 8.&11 Jear •• of inbalance
(C:.i, 1% to 2%or mon). nu: t.:ner. at very hilh voltag.' (220 kV
and bl.,her and quite often at lower volta.e.) the conductors are
ho:tizort'tally disposed so that for a paran.".l conductor (tiI.g. a
H,
fence, telephone line: or cable sheath) close to, but to one ..ide
of the l~ •• induction by the near •• t conductor is not exactly
cancelled. by that from the others, 80 that the res\;.lting
&\lolymmetryresults. on its own. in subatantial parallel indllcti\)n
occwr r Ing ,
The higo(llr the voltage tIlt:! "ider the phe.se siJ,'1.~bg and
consequently the greeter the probability af it~ductic,., croub Le
arisin$.
i'
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The unbalanced
return depth
portion of
through the
the line curr(:'nt h.;is a theoretical
earth dependent on the equ.ivaLent'
This depth is of the order ofresistivity of the curreat path.
hundreds of metres (or even kilometres) f;)r local
ccnductivities.
ground
3.3.2 Risk of Ignitions as a result of Stray Currents
il
\'\
)1
Further, a& in the case of the lightning hazards diBcusa.d
earlier* ,it is necessary to re..-:.e)!f and conceivably to do certain
---~-:;::,)~---
teat work ccnce rn Ing the energy levels required in sparks between
various materials to gnit. methane for the direct &nd
alternatil1a volta.e 8oi.trcea beUlI con.idtred, and likewise to
r.eview"the volt.,e. current and energy levels li~Clly to be. able
to let off detonators of various tYPfltS as "'.relult of 8tuy
Overall. the pre.ent known situation is that in the futl1r~ stray
railw.y tree tiott cunents My ~eacb levels tlhich could
eonceivably llO.. lIleHane ipition ri!lkr. in \1:: \rground
~o11i.T.ie.. Further theoretical acd practical study ~ee..
neceasary t~ define the risk. in cu.-rical teras. in particul.r
in relation to methane ianitiou.
()
n, ,
J'.
(,:'
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3 .4 NUMBER AND DATES OF INCIDENTS
The gt~ph depicts the incidents in relation to the months of the
year.
It ia of interest to nct.
winter monthe.
that no ~ncidents occurred during the
o
Table 3.3
Dat. Location
2nd Dechbet 1960 Schoongedc~t
Colliery
10t.h APTil 196,7 Indumeni
Coal Mine.
\\
28th ~\UauRt 1972 Usutu Cod
\'-
'14inea tiaited
Min6S Ljllite4 "
MUl .. ~i.ita<l
12th ct.bruary 198C Coalbroc.k
CelHni ••
o
lat.liti.. Description
Nil
Nil
6 injured
13 killed
~.~~jund
Nil
Nil
Nil
Methane explosion
in old working••
Methane «I,xplo.ion
,I
u • r~8U\\lt of
li"htnina cr
faulty electric
a,ht fittin,
Methane ~xplo.ion
In standbye
s.action
l'~thar,e a.plosion
II
in old, pan~l
Meth"ne ex~llosion
in old working.
Met ban. iln it ion
(between ahiftll)
in pr9ducin,
tSetba:le explosion
in ••aled
vertical shaft
Table 3.3 (Contd.)
Date
6th NoveQbe 1983 Ermelo Mines
Location
25th Oetober 1 0,4 Ermelo Mines
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Fatalities
1 killed
6 killed
Del>cription
Methane (,.sion
ionMethan(~
caused
lightning
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3.5 DETAILS OF INCIDENTS/PHENOtreNON
3.5.1 Coalbrook Collieries Limited
Introduction
At approximately 19hOO on the 12t~ '~~lbruary 1980 an explosion
occur red at the No.2 vet:tical shaft at the above colliery. The
1t,.thanE explosion destroyed the concrete seal at the top of the
shaft. damaged the steel headgear $,nd broke windows in
neighbo\lring build'lng.. A severe thund.lrstorm occurred in the
vicinity of the ahaft at the tim. of the explosion.
The mina wa. extremely ga.4Y and in 1961. a methane er.ploaion
1::-:
caused severe damage to an incli~e $hdt kHling 7 pet7sons who
were engaged in the cu"tmg of steel girders which were
o \oh.t rur.t' iU8 the removal of • feeder in the shaft.
Thi.s area of the 1Il1nein the vicbdty of the shaft had been
worked uut and had recently been .ealed. The shaft i~ vertical
and has a depth of about 2UOm. The .~aft 8eal was reportedly
complated on 9 !!'a~ruary 1980. and '(:olllprised a concrete plug
appro:d,utely 1 .tI1 thick. This hl'd been cast upon steel
il ,
shutterin& laid. previ'Qu(lly across the shaft. coUal'. A 100 JBIII
di.uetn .tlllel vent }1ipe bad been cut thrQugh this plug 311d.
durtni the pniod bfttWl~ell9 and. 12 lebruary. fresh air wa. beina
drawn into the shaft t.hrouah this pip. - via an (~haust fan
located at another shaft several kilometres away. This fan was
reportedly uhausting at a flow ute of: abcu 50 m3/af).c.
I)
2.20
The explosion occurred during a t rumders t orm in the area and, at
1.1:;.: time. lightnitlg was '::eportedly observed striking the stee L
headgear above the shaft. Tnt! shaft seal \<lCiS totally destroyed
in the explosion and the steel headgear was also ext er ivel.y
dar.taged.
The s t ee I plat form and related s t ruc t ura L elements at t he CDP of
the haadgee r were carefully inspected and all potent iaI strike
points pxamined for evidence of recent flash root termination.
No such evidence could be found.
A heavy gauge stranded aluminium earth cable was connected
betwe,en this air terminal unit and a buried eartn electrode at
"the base of the structure. The intervening connection clalllp~
were opened.• nd inspected for 0 evidence of the recent passage of
dischar,. current but a~ain. no such ~vidence was found. In
&ddition.~ in examining this earth cable in the courae of its
j)l~ •• "le up the steelwork of the headgear, no indications were
I ( "
,,'ioutld of .0" recent flashmadts 1'- 'UIInot'lllally would have been
neBel)'C had high impulsiv\l CI.1rretltfi paned thrOll&h tile structl.'.re.
\\
in thAt .beetle. of any positive evidence. it h concluded that
lightnina did not strilt~~,tb" bead, •• r - D.lternativdy. had such it
')\',
'li,(
\,
o
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flash taken place. the
·-exceptiona111 weak.
dischar.g~ cur-Tent must have been
Ohservet· evide!:;;~
The following poi.nt s were noted froUl '~he evidence:
a. All obse r ver s confirmed a thunderstorm in progress and heard
a vhunde rc Lap followed almost immediately by the
explosion. (Excluding allowance for methane ignition And
r.Jropagation times for the explosion. this probably put s: a
lit,lhtn:Lng £lash termination within a radius of about 300 m).
b. At least one obs~rver. apparently heard the leader approach -
which is consistent witb b~ing with'in a few hundred lIletres
of a discharge.
c. ~'? observer positively saw a flash strike the top of the
hf:adgear. In fact all observers were reportedly d\.zz.led by
\i
G the brightness of either a flash in the 'vicinity. or its
.reflection3. or the :explosion itself. One observer had .. the
impression of a flash to the b.~e of the headgear - ne~r,~he
vertical portal structure.
A Boilermaker's
lightning. The
followed by &
\,,-,
Helper gave evidence that he heard the crack of
sky lit up and a (!ust cloud 1)ose out of the shah:
du.l.l blue flame which ar08e with the flying
concrete. !bfore ht!heard the lightning bolt. he saw the flash
of liahtnins. It moved frog South tc~ard~ North and appeared to
strike the around between the two legs of the headgear on the
W.st side.
\\
Immediately after the explosion pieces of conc~etp. began to fall.
u lit! was ceruin that the flash of Ughtnina did not strike the top
of the headgear but that it struck the groun&.
2')".....
It is considered that: the above evidence .'$ cons i.st ent; with a
lightning flash in the immediate vidnity OF the shaft. just
prio;:' to the p.xplosiQn. The absence of discharge evidence on the
structure of the headgear. however, argues against such a flash
having been to the structure itself.;,
The possibility 'of an ob.l.iqu€ flash terminating at the base of
t nd.s st ruc t uce is conside:r.ed extremely itt.probaole. since 3
S;tucture of this height and shape would normally be expected to
E'..;;hibitan attractive effect within a radius of about 40 - 100 m,
It is concluded therefore that Ii ground flash terminated
somewhere in the immediate shaft vicinity - probably on one of
the nearby buildings. or associated structures. rather than t o
the headgear directly.
It is thought that l~.de! flash was sufficiently close. either to
induc'~! spar:king pot err .,")1 in the steel -ientilaticn pipe (which
was reportedly not directly bonded to the shaft structural steel
;\
work and thus was "floating~i.or to causp the flow of bround
currents in the S1:ee1 railwaY""'lines which led to the shaft lip
and a~.i. n were n~t directly bond~lt. and thus couLd have giver! rise
to local spark discharges.
It should emphasised that extremely low energy 8par~
cetJabJe of igniting critical methane/air mixtures
of 1 MJ .or leu). In the pgUntial pr~flence of
/j
such miEturea therefore. all conductive clements in the vicinity
di8chsrges
(of the order
should be galvanically t»"nded. in order to obviate ,Jny transient
difference. in potential or spark discharga ••
Cone lUM ion
This explosion occurred as a result of the lack of galvAnically
bonding betwe<enconduct ive itI&tl!rial in the vicini'~y of a shaft
and a connec t Lon to a wel\-e8cT,'thed commonelectrode at the shaft
top.
f:tJ:#tigraphy
lligure 5 depicts a typical st rar i.grapb i.c section of the coal
Sinking cpe ra t Lcns had been compLet ed prior to the acc ident in
this 420 m long incl:i.ne shaft of which th<-" bottom was
approx imat eLy 125 m below su r face , The shaft has an incHnaticn
of 17° to the l.1orizontal.
SI:H)'ij,cretingand equipping nf the chaf t commenced several days
prior to rhe accident.
The Incident
The incid~nt occl'red at the recently developed Tweefonte:In
inclined ~aft.
Figure 6 shows a locality plag. ,)£ th,~ workings in uJation to the
l'weef6ntein s~ r=.
AC.cording to witneG,s~s who were near the mint!. there '1118S ft,
thunde,rstorm in th~ vicinity of the shdt at the time of the
f:lccident.
No evidencf\ of a direct lightning strike CQuld })e found -,' burn
marJ.ts as a result of a high elt!ctri~ current or of noticeable
amounts of re.aining magnetism in steel ?ojects could not be
traced. This. however. does not mean that no bolt of lightning
occurred * Currents of a few lc.iloampe-:es fN"ld ha.ve flowed in the
sh&ft~8 pipes. as well as current8 of hundred3 of a!l).pel:ein the
steel lIlelth installed in the 1:od. with!~ut it l:!~ing evident ill che
investigation.
_IIYjen a lightning bolt strikes neal: the mouth of a ahaft. it is
(/
possible that a portion of the lightninr cur rent ~~allflow in the
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pipes. r.ail lines, electric cables and concrete reinforcemtmt of
the shaft.
The pipes. rail lines and electric cables are electrically
continuous and should not cause any sparks. €},cept at the points
where they end. However , the steel mesh reinforcement placed in
the roof may easily cause spa.rks where various pieces ot l'lesh are
joined. Lebora tory t'~stE>bave shown that reasonably Large sparks
develop at such a joi.nt; if abcur 100 ampere of lightning impulse
current s}rould flow through it.
Figure 7 shows a typical cross section through the incli~e shaft
looking North East.
The Mine Manag<:!r's evidence is quoted below:
"At the time of the accident which occurred at appro~imately
16h50 on 6 Nove~per 1983. the sinking of the shaft had been
completed and th~ shaft was in the process p,! being equipped.
One persvn had d~ed and one injured in the accident.
The deceased and the injured were Pu~p Attendants. They were
both employed by ,'the shaft sinking contractors.
The Mine Manager 'visited the scene (If the accident at Tw~ef()rt e In
i\
shaft and arrived. there at 1~h45. The shaft ccnt a Ined mot:e \\than
of thtt acene ....as \1 not5% of flammable gas and an inspection
yossible.
The shaft was tested for gas at 16~0 011 8 November 1983. and
less than 2 percent was mftasured after a 150 millimetre diam~ter
hole had be~n drilled fro~ surface to the bottom of the shaft.
The proto team started it1:o{talling 6. ventilation column and I went
into the shaft to inspect the scene of the accident in the
presence of the Insp~ctor of Mines and others. It was clear to
me at the time that a lIletbme explosion had occurred.
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Thp scene and the shaft were surveyed and a plan was draw-n. up
depicting the scene befcre and after the explosion. I submit
this plan as Figur€! 8. I submit the locality plan of the shaft
in relation to the rest of the mine wot"king~ as Figure 7.
At the top of the :.:hdt there were a number of badly damaged
galvanised due" ;l" pi.pc, , The fans had been moved frvm their
original pos i t+or )'j 1.,. torce of the explosion. The one fan
a n;,·tre: a..'~' the second was moved for app rcx imar eLy 45r
I!
"Ii
Ii
Ii
There were cl/~ar Lndlc at ions that hf!atinJ..~ took. place on the
cable~. The ihdications were that the seat of the explo~ion was
moved abcuc
metres.
200 to 230 me~lres below t he portal of the "shaft. In the vi.cinity
of the pump 81tation. a tin was found. wrapped around a drillstelll
ha\'\drail UPrif~ht in a manner indicating that the explosion had
taken place a/rove t hie point.
Plastic. seal~1had/ibcen used on the ventill'l.tion column and signs
of burnil;J.g II/wereI! observed right dow to below the C sel'UU
I I:
.;.ntersec;tionl~POSiH(:It'I. Methane was iQsuing from both the Band C
-if I (
,~eam interse! t iOO$. '~)proxim.tely sao 1I1e"":resfrom the portal of
th<t shaft. fi~attenin& of t.he v2r.tilation pipes was observecl and
I,
b4do,", thb ~~ry little damage 1"0 the pipes had taken place.
Ii
Ii
The deceasjid WI,S fou"lQ near the i>UIlP station which
.t>J:''roXimate~~3!)C, metres frou the ahaft portal as :Ludicated on
Figure S. 1\
II
In t;his anall there wr,~ also badly burn~ pieceE of plastic. hoses
and cables. \IA nWllbe:-of dUl8g~~ hard hats were found 'I in the
shaft in the \\,posit iQn5 .,etS inaicat~ on th .. plan. The bottom of
~ \~
the shaft wa~\ full of' water. ',\
~ ,
\', \
"II
Approximately ,300 t'letres ~r:omthe portal. pi$ces of the w()oden
\\
is
fraLle of the detonator box were found IIcattEored fr.om 300 to" 320
met:res from the portal as well <iF.! explosives cartridges.
A =:::: -;;..,'_*-_ ~ _~
,\ I
,Uii.TN------ ......;_L-SHO-::r__-CftE-TE-MA-IlM--. -.-. -'.- -._---------,
+~N'" ,_ --- B~ ===I~ ·i==L----;;:;::==x:i~_---__.-o!r----'.- ....._·~!""'------ -_-,;_)
METAl.1ft: fROM HTdlfn: 1MQ\t!IE IWM&[ mn- f'K
~: :~~:;~-;:T -=-;;;.' :;::t-=; B
VOOUOON Pft ClETONATOR BOX . {iAf NiP
C ~-~:::!::~7-:~E=t~ ..~~;;~.--~~~:li:r;;G=.J0
E.XPLOSM ebx WATER TANK HIW£R. \.FAN lOAO£R
, ,
ERMELO W£S SERVICES (PTY) LTO.
PLAN OF SHAfT REFORE
AND AFTER EXPLOSION
-----,---_ •._-- _j
231
The wire mesh. approximately 220 metres :rQID the portal. was
dpped away fr.om the roof an"] a piece was lying on the floor
app rox imat eLy luC metres from the porta L, This had fallen as a
result of the er ).1.Osion.
The surface borehQles to the shaft were examined and it was found
that they were all sealed by means of concrete.
The Mine Ventilat:b:m Officer had carried out a ventilation survey
L'l t he shaft on 3 r-:CkvelUber1983 and the rel~ort of his survey is
suclIlitted a 1;):> ,TabIe 3.4.
II 'l'able '3.4, Development Ventilation Report
Tveefontt:oin Date 3.11.83 Ref No. TS3/I
Dia4Uter
of
Coluau Area ·of V01~e Distance fro. face
in ... end2in ill • /s in •• Ovet:
Water lap
Tille Leak.,. Fore. Ezh. !'orce Exh. Force kh. Blast in.
09h40 l~:- 570 760 15.6 2.2 3.6 13.5 39.5 15.0 5.0
\:-.:"'<
two flaaepI'oof .shauat fans i.n aeries exhausted 9.9 cubic metres
of air per second and 8 force fan forcing 2.6 m3/sec vas used to
clear the toe the shaft (see Figure 8a).
\\,
\. The ventilation set up as it wall prior ti~ the accident 'lI1as
\-.•.tiafactory as there was no blasting being done in the shaft,
Mt'-thane had been encountered in the shaft bef'~)re.
\
Duritlg 1I1y inspection, no sians 01 \contr.llband 'llfere found in Lile
I \
shaft. The two cap lampe :\1.Redby tlle llow;:-deceal.ledand the other
injured person were E~xi>lIlined.and found to be flameproof.
The baro!)leter readi!lgli r~corGed on the mine during th)! week show
faidy high readings u.p to SMurday 5 Novemb(~r1983 and a hep
I
fig!!e Sa
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was recorded thereafter and the pressure remained constantly low
right through the day.
During my inspection in loco. the only two obvious pLaces where
methane was being made was at: the intersections of the t1~O coal
seams. Because of the presence of flammable gas in the sl~aft and
because of the destroyed ventilation column, the body of the
now-deceased could only be recovered on Tuesday 8 NovelI!b~~r1983
after ventilation had been restore~ at 20hOO.
;1
The explosive boxes fouJ,ld in the shaft were found to be 1Jeforllled
and it was thought trlilt detonation of explosives eQuid have
{' occurred inside the brixes. ExperilJlents t:ondueted on sudace in
the presence of the Chief Inspector of Mines. indicated t1~8t this
I!
was not 80. bec6use similar boxes had holes blasted throuj~h ..hen
5 doeton~tor. were set off in a box, 25 detonators caused I;he box
to dU,integrate and one stick of explosives. that is 200 grallUlltHI
of Ajax. eOllplet~ly demolishea the 'box."
The security at the top of the shaft and the status of tM~ power
supply to the alhaft on the day of the accident are descr:LbEtd by
the shaft Guard.
"All per.on. loina underground are ch9Cked by •• to .ee that they
do not take contraband into the workinas. I 4180 check I~he cap
lUlfs. When the shift k.nocked off at 14hOO! also left.. I "7as
not replaced by another luard a. there was no further shih After
the day .hitt a. it was a Sunday.
The PumpAttendant had not yet arrived. We had left \14hOO
I
becau .. it was raining heavily. The day 8h~!t was bUlly casting
eoner.til at the portal. and becau.e of the rain the work cl;>uld not;
proc.fld. Weall knfJCk.edoff a'C 14hOOinstead of 15hOOas we were
I'l\ppo.ed to •
.\ II \ ..l
WhenI knocked off. I closed the gate and secured it with A
chain. t could not Leek the ,.an a8 the &Il4nI had relie'lll!d had
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not left the lock. I closed the gate befor~ I left.
When I Lef t there were no pe raons underground. i aCl tertain
o
because I know the persons cn duty on that day and I knew where
they were w<Jrkins. The P,~miJ Attendants on my shift were on
su r f ace because the electricity was off when we a rr i.ved ate.' zhe
b'eginning of. the shift. The Engi.neer arrived:l and restored the
power. Th~ /rpower was off on t bree occasions but I cannot
(/
reme~ber th~ times. The engineer was around and restored the
power.
The el~tricity was off whoenwe left.
The ).~.iiilp snifl remain.d hehind when we left. They remained to
.. it for the other shift to relieve thea.-
C)
\
Evi.d.nce indicates that th.. ~over. supply to tll.e shaft tripped out
at 13hH alld that althoulh report£( had been lll6l.deof the potwel:"
failure. it had not t.~.n restored at the time of ·.tbe explosion.
,)
It. Fitter Helper g.v.e evidence as f.ollows
ntty von aa .. 1l'itter Helper entailed ay ha"l:h'1' to go unduiround
Q at i~ll.Bhaft.
"'T!
~ba !::;;i<:in.ity
)\t the time of· the "cploaion. 1. vas on surface in
of \ the sl1aft.. Before the ezplollion there vaB
l;L~~cini and rait,. ): -waa look ina at the aooft'. at the. time of
~he n:pl.::ai')n. I ~~ not know if there wa. 8 lil~~inl flub at
II
I "'~" the equipl.1ent and ~ebri. beingtbla tiae of the e:pl'08ion.
"blowa out of the sbaft.
The power at the shaft va. off. I eamwt ruaecbcr how 10lla it
had o..en off before the e%plo.ion.·
~ .. one Fuap Atf~nd.nt who survived the ..lplo.ion has t'rov.t.~.da
;,1',
.de~lcription (If what happened prior to the explosion.
, i' II
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"I can rememher r:h", acc i.dent which occur red on ') Nov...mber :983 at
the Tweefontd.,'1 daft.
I was workir.g Q3 3 Pump Attendant. There ve re two of us worklng
at the time.
-<,._,!
Th':He was no one present at the gate when we went down. The gate
was closed but wa~; not locked. I was a ..are that the pcwer was
off 8!\i t l.at t he fans were not werking. We ~ent undergtound
because another w()xlr.ercazae out of the shaft:. we are taught, that
we may not go undi.q~,round when the fans are standing. We went
,'\\
down to pump the ~'li::te.rat the bottom of t he shaft to prevent it
be:.ng flooJe,d. o
There was a diesel piant on ~uT.fac. vbil~jthe F~tter was to staxt
up.
My intention was to g'.) '..IOW1l8 switch OJ). the pumps and come out
"agam. w. :::ealr~.;l~i::1bt the fans wre n(>:_tworking. but' that the
\
compressor ....ould 8~~r.~·~lysome fl1~sh air at the PUlltfS.
When we went do~~. we ~witched on the first pump which is a big
I. i:
pqlnp!~ '.(1lenOW"'d~ceased SU.y.l.td at: tbis pump and I went do'M'tl to
tb~ botto:ll o~ the shaft to st.rt ~APthe otb~r pumps. I switched
ibn tLe one pump and as I W&$ s,riiFchi!<8 op the sull submersible
pump. I ~eltOa blast of air from up the sh8ft~ I ran away and
't~d ....ext to the sidewall.,~>... After the co~cu.sion subsided, r
looit'4d up the shaft and 8aw flf:m.s ag1linst the ro~)f. I then
MfJLrda loud .ax.plosion. The rlaaes di.lappeared and.r ther, !law
~~ke in the air. The air blaat threw Ill. to the ground. The
explosion followed less th&19five second.s after I saw the flame ••
I .ltoke ~,_';)t did not have any Itatch •• or cig&T£:ttea with IIEl. They
( I
we):. in 'li,> jacket on surface. I was tauBht .hat I should never
take matches ox ciganttes with me undergropnd.
2.36
The now-deceased did sllloke bct I have no idea whether h€: had
:igarett~~ and matches w1th him. I did not see hili'. smoke
unde rg r cund , I do 'lot know what set off the explosion. I cannot
identify any of the h,,:rd hats s honn to me in this court."
An impor':ant aspect of the evidmce Wi'.S sinking
contractors ~dmitted that tbeir Pump Attendants were not taught
to take .flame .safety lamps into the shaft to test for gas.
Furthermore. no documE!nted proof existed that Contractor WOl'kers
revi&wed any safp.ty or training instructions; for ezamp Le, that
workers are not, to proceed into workings when th~ fans were on
stop.
A drop ~ barometric pressure was recorded during the day prior
to the (/accident and this low pre138Ure was maintai,xied until after
the explosion. This fact. in itself. ~uld have envisaged the
release of methane from the shaft bottom which had intersected
the coa~" seams.
niscu .. ion ~f .vi.dence
TIlQ tampro~~Attendantf. statement that he had h.ard no thunuer
nor saw any lightning prior 0 the £ccident and that it did not
\,rainuntil after 15hOO. is refu.t~d by all the other witnessl!s who
were in the vicinity of thrcshaft f'n the day of the accident.
Th~ twc Atteudnnts "''lter.d ao unve~~i1ated shaft and proceeded
be~'ond a contraband c1i::tcit"'loint where ther4! was no guard as
rO<luired by Regulat ion 15.ll.L
1,1
The ahaft was completely without electricity 5t the time of the
a('cident. The explo~~on could therefore p,ot have been caused by
deli!ctive electrical lequi~.nt.
~ 0
((
The only other sources of electricity in the shaft were an
.,
approved compressed-air operated dynAlllo-light and the; two cep
~- -------------""'__.....,---,~~..--
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lamps worn by the two worken~ Examination of these und.t s proved
that .hey were all in a flameproof condition a Er e r the acc ident ,
The only alternatives are that the spark which <:ausvl the
explosion came from contraband. Qf \.;hich tIO signs i~ere found
either en the now-deceased or in the shaft. or was caused by
stray currents from lightning.
The latter possibility was investigated by the Electrical
Tl'ansience and Lightning Division of the Electrical Power
Department. National Electrical Engineering Rese.srch Inst itute of
the; GSIR. Although no positive evidence of a dhe'~t lig.htning
strike ,,,ae detected. the· report concludes that the possibility of
a flow of electricity from such an occurrence causing a spark.
cannot be ruled out.
(j
Circl'JUtant ial evidence showed beyMld any doubt. that the
atMosphere was heavily charged with electricity during" that
period before the acoident occur red and» by process of
l!liminat ion. t'his appears t< ave b~E!nthe only source of a spark
which could have caused the explosion.
The warped explosives boxes iiientioned.iudicated the possibility
that explosives therein may have detonated.
'.'hia theory was tested on Burface. The total destructi<m caused
by :~5detonators or one stick of explosives proved this theory to
be I__fallacy. Even 5,detonators. explo.!etl inside a similar box.
caused undeniable damage. the equi"alent of which" was not
noticeable. in ..the two boxes found underlrcund.
An exsmination of the shaft (Figure 8) reveals :hat the following
lilted equipment had been installed during sinkint.~
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Rails
1.50 llUi1 diameter waste water pipe.
150 mm compressed air pipe, 50 l1lJll clean water pipe and the
force far: cable all suspended flora the loof on the east side
of the sha Et ,
760 llllll di~lD.eter galvanised v~ntilation pipe and cables
suspenci~d c;:'rolXl the roof on the west side of the shaft.
The roof of the shuft had been supported with re in rerc ed
mesh.
Since no si&n of arcing was' f,._ ••,; neaI the' seat of the explosion.
it i. only possible to postulate the cause of th~ ignition based
on curr~nt Knowledg~ of lightning problems in shallo~ mines.
Firstly. the interruption of pO'loler lrJ. to an accumulation of
m.the.ne in t~e shaft: bottom area above' the two ceal &aam levels.
Secondly. the depth from surface was approximately 120 wetres.
\0
Thi'~dly. Z<llh (l987) statu that the location of conductive
,)
structures underground play - prominent role in the probability
\t ,.an ign~.tion occur r sng,
"I( 0
Fou'rthly. the shaft was wet which could influence t:1e amount of
energy which could couple into an earthillg bond (Zeh. 19S7J.
The most likely cause of the e,rlosion was a lightning strike. at
th~, shaft entrance,. tl) the rails Or water pipes. The voltage
sur~t!s travelling down the shaft conductive st:tUctur~s (rails"
-"lIter pipes. vent Hat ion ducting or cables) C'ould create sparks
where (!.i.continuities occur. This would lik~ly be at joints or
the shaft bottom extr(J.tnities of such structures parti<~ularly
rails. Jackscn (1987) state,. that a vo Lt age of 50 kV has been
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measured bet'"een the e oa L f'ac e and earthed metal work during
lig~tning storhlS.
Conclusi<.-u
Several elect~ical tri9s. the ttird of long duration. resulted in
a fan ste'ppage in the new incline shaft which had bet.'n developed.
to the coal measures. Methane was be ing given off freely from
the two cca l seaas and. as a resulc , ':rtethane built up in the 1.20
metre long shaft.
Two Pump Attendants entered the unguarded shaft to puwp cut water
wbile about to start t~e sec/pnd of two pumps a methane
c!xl,ilosionoccur red distance 1/ 250 from the shdtat a (lof metres
pot·tal.
-
There was a severe lightning storlllon surface at the time.
An examinat ion of the SCene of the (·xplosion pointed to stray
currents from lightning as the only in~ciator of the explosion.
3.5.3 "Usutu Col1i6ries LimitBd
Introduction
A violent metha~e explosion occurred in a section where work had
ceased some 6 months prior to "the oexploe1on.
The min~ wrkings are uh.t iv'ely sh,;l.llow ~nc! the seam is regarded
as gassy. The details of the incident are dillcu88ed with
particul~u' reierence to t hc equipment and electrical cablina:
which had not been removed from the pan~l and tha reduction in
ventilatin& air which circulated through the work.ed our area.
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Stratigraphy
Figure 9 shows the depth of the coal measures and the typ'!: of
overbu rden encounte red in the area of the mine. Of notfl:it the
absence of doLe.rLte sills overlaying the coal seam. which sills
have been shown to have a high resistivity.
The Incident
Figure 10 shows the underground wor.kings at the collie:ry. the
shaft bot tota ar ea , together w,ith the upcast shaft. the Main North
haulage torz-ors) , the mair. return airways (011-03) and the panel
0.2.0 where the explosion o!:iginated,~);
The seat of the explosion was traced to Panel 0.2.0 which had
bJ:~-)opped 9 Months prior to the explosion ()O the 28th August
'---'/
1972. FrGm"evidence the conveyor belt had become too long and
rather than install a tandem drive. the section was m<')\7ed~
The sectioq conveyor had not been removed from Panel 0.2.0.
n~ither had the lightning cable am! bell wires. The ~ituation of
all electrical gear in the affected s,Ftion is shown in the linf!
duwing, Figure 11. which has been redionstt"Ucted from evidence at
.the (:'fficial EnquLry ,
All pipes to the section h3d been rewoved.
'iThe $ituation on surf2C~ at 16h55 is described in evidence by a
Shift Overseer.
"At that stage there was terrible thunder and lightning. I
looked in the dit"ection c:;,f the fan and the next m0ll!:~nt1 saw a
bolt of :dghtning strike the £al1. After four or five seconds I
heard a tremendous shock and tl:emor. I looked in the (Hrection
of the shaft opening and sa" dUllt pouring out of it. r
immediately suspected that it h:id been a methane gQS explosion.
It was 4.55 pm when I noticed the smoke coming frotl! the shaft."
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The main fan covers had be~n blown off and t"'·ere was considerable
damage unde rground , StQPpings at Q. x and y and air crossings at
x and y had been blown out. Regulators for Panel 0.2.0 had ;;>11"0
been damaged and the panel was laden with carbon monoxide. The
conveyor structure in the panel ....as badly damaged alsQ.1!
In April 1972. 'Tfmtila.tion to the Pane L 0.2.0 t otaIted
37.6 m /second and tests for methane in the area by Shift
Overseers on normal fire patrols y:'re negative.
/ \
However. in August 1972. the Mine Su~veyor reported to the acting
3Mine Overseer that 47 m Isecond of air was somehow leaking
through Panel 0.2.0.
stated:
The acting Mine Overseer in evidence
"I ..sked the Shift Oversee r to carry out Ii survey and he reported
to me that 34 m3/second was passing through s~ction 0.2.0 I then
told him to reduce the quant ity to plus minus 18 m3/ second. He
reported back to me that he had changed it to 17 m3/secor.d. I
did not deem it necessary to check his readings.
I did not wish to reduce the ventilation drastically since I did
not know what the effect would be. I knew that. in the past.
there was 7.? /second in the section.. I did not have any
misgivings in this regard.
I cannot think of any reason why more air was suddenly passing
through this section. To my knowledge no change had been made
since I had taken over from the othru Mine Overseer.1t
The ShHt Overseer took air readings which totalled 334 m /second
leaking into Panel 0.2.0. He then states in evidence that nthese
figures were reported to the Mine Supervisor. He then instructed
me to ensure that about 18 m3/second went in. The following day
I constructed walls there. The intersection at Y was completely
walled in and at X an opening of 1.1 metres x 0.7 metres was
left. I then took measurements again at this spot~ The .reading
(r
(with anemometer) now was 2.29 metres/second which I tn(;:l1
calculated to be 17 n?/second but ..hieh I now calculate t;,:;, be
" 3:_.76m' /second. I d i.d not take any further readings and I also
did not see whether the regulators at P and Q were open."
There was an f..'artLl~_:ngmat in the surface substation at the East
n:.ine to which all earthing systems were ccnnected. This
substation had a lightning conductor on the first power mast to
the substation - the fan had no lightning conductor.
Conclusion
For aome unacceptable reason the
had increased from 7.55 m3/second
air l'eakaif": into a spare panel
3
to between 34 - 47 III /se1cond.
The Act\\l'l&Mine OVerseet: iave a i:ihift Overseer instructions to
!'educe the quantity to ..19 m3/second which he duly did by closing
regulators into the section. However, his calculations were
incorrect and were not checked or followed up by the Acting Mine
I,
Overseet.'. The Shift Overseer calculated that he had recuced the
quamtitY,to 17 m3/second w~}ereas the actual quantity was only
1.7 1I13/second. Methane. bleeding from fissure8* accueu Lated in
the spare panel and was not detect4td. Tw week.s lat4l:!r a severe
lightning storm on surface resulted in lightning striking the f.an
or. it. vi~inity. It is> concluded that the voltage suq~e ca\~sed a
spark in the spare panel ignitin, the explosive m~tbre.
\),
<:::_
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3.6 SUMMARYOF PRACTICK- REVIEWED
1. ATP s had'been ?drt~~lly sealed off and just sufficient 81r
was allowed into the area to create an exp Iosi.ve lllixtu!:e as
a result of methane bleeding into the partially sealed panel
t hr.ough f i.sau res and faults.
2. In the case of 1 above. conduc t oeajsuch as steel p Lpe s ,
voreholes cased or not cased but wet or full of water.
cables and conveyor s t ruc tu res have been leJ:t in the area.
The$~ proviae ideal conductors.
3. oSteel headgears and builtiings in the vicinity of "'hafts are
ideal lightning conductors.
4. Adequate earthing mats were not provided on surface and high
"voltage surges dre conducted into methane filled areas
through ccnduc.co en rather than to earth. Mining Engineers
are not aware of the need to provide adequate earth mats
adjacent to surf.ace structures such as steel headgears. In
this regard it u often the problem that iIlajorsafety issues
are not conveyed to &11 em~loyees on
therefore unaware Qf inherent dangers.
'\
the minI!!.
', 'j
who are
5. Methan<o accu!'!I'll.\tic,nsin shafts and sections which rang-e
from 5% to 29% (within the inflUlmabl. and explosive ranges)
occur as a result of power··failures causing~' stoppage to
main or secondary ventilatiog fans.
6. Senior Mine Manaae18ent are not fully aware that lightning
related problems underground in certain areas are very real
ones. Not !I1ucn research had been done on the relative
resistivitie~ of overburden ~nd coal seam measures.
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J
t: L\\~CeSs ':0 $~:'aftG are not adequately fenced off or g,'arded
thereby allow!ng unau~horised persons to enter
JangerQUS conditions exist:
stopping the main verrt i.Lat b,g fans.
8. Senior Officials entered 'l.n incline shaft after a methane
expl(i)'sion u s Lng a compressed 'ii;: hoseIi,ipe tl3·.ptovide oxygen
\\
for breathing without the suppo r t of Pr-ot o Teams a
foolhardy act.
9 Senior Mine Hanagement ere not a~ar.~1 of illegal wDrk. being
performed on Sundays.
(I
)/
I.j v!D. SeniQr Mine Management will alWij,ys b~ faced. with the
perennial problem of conflict41g _"idence. In t he Ermel.o
Mines (1983) explosion. the fo11ow1.;n& evi.dence suppo r t s this
st3teaent.
"T\~~!L8.l.uproom Attendant's stateme:nt the:1: he had hei'cd no
thunder nor saw any lightning pri<:,rto th~ accLdent; and that
it did not rRi.u until after 15h<>O. is refutfld by all the
other nitr.,es,,,,,s who,were in the ~icinity of the shaft on the
day of the accident.w
I
\
l.
11. Inat.dequate tnining of mine worke-rs will result in
II
accidents~' ao .u~ported by th~~8tatement:
"The two woI'ken. condderina tho posailibility of flooding of
the shaft due to the be.vy rains. took a calculated ri~k by
\V
"entering the unve'~tila:-:ed shaft. Th~y obviously did
know that there was a po••ibility of g.. build-up
"
',ot
aud
thought t~t the co.pre.sed air supplied to the pumps
/,\
would
suffice."
12. The use of t
'
on-f1&J1leproof lights in ~ dnkiD& ahaft where
I~.·
methane i8 being given off fr .....;fi). could lead to a methane
explosion. Theilmeth&ne being diluted has to flow back j.IP
the shaft over non-flameproof lights as shown in Figure 12.
~ .ii.- .__ .__ •__ • _
I'Ii,I
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13. In the Albion Colliery explosion. three ?rospecting
boreholes from surface to an abandoned panel (the s~at of
the exp Losion) were not :o.how on the mine p Lan s and hence
not sealed on surface. One cf these boreholes was cased
~ith a st~el pipe. See Figure 13.
It is a common occurrence underground thar boreholes are
inadvertl':!ntlyholed by workir~!'I. These boreholes are not
show on ,.~ine plans and they invariably contain water.
14. A lack of lightning arrestora at the top 0: sha.{ts is a
commonfeatun in this ~in:vuti~lation. Lightning win
have a tendency to st~ikJI the most prominent fetii:ur:e
is not likely not be eartn bonded.
thue
wbich
15. Fiaures 14. IS an~ 16 have been ~eve lopec!l from evidence
taken at the Schoonge.zicht Colliery explosion on the 2nd
December 1960." The I!liil~ wall .extremely gassy "tl~~ the
explosion in the old working. was caused by a li~htning
II
strute to the top of the bQrehqle followed by a .~rse in
voltl~;:e down tM borehole which led finally to a spark an
the ~~ld vox-kinas "hi~h were filled by an uplosive mixture
II
of lIlitthane/air.
Detail. of this Schoonlezieht Colliery explosion on the 2nd
,.
Decftmber 1960 are giv«n bel~wl
r:Laure 14 depict'S the .c.ene before the flxplosion. Section 4
"'~I worked u:> until Sely 1960 and reports indicated tha·..:
QlatMne was bein, giv&n off fre6l1y. The power cable f-rODl
.t.lrfaee va. usftd to, jupplv power to Section 4 and the two
C:')re cable wa .. connected to .. telephone in Section 4.
J)lJrifllthe third quarter of 1960. Section 4 was litopped and
the cable!: were disconnected. Piaul'. is "huvs the poaition
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at the time of the explosion (14h50 on the 2nd December
1960). The borehole was closed with a concrete plug as
shown in Figure 15.
The Electric ian f s evidence is quoted bel.ow:
"I disconnected the cable from the telephone. Then I cut
the open ends off with side cutters. at the end of the
cable. I then taped b~th ends up with insulation tape.
Then I remcWed the telephone. 'l'heend of the l:elephone
cable I jus-" left against the wall..
Thl!managE;: indicated that the power had gone off. as
reflected by hi. electric clock. at 14h50.
""",-"'~i
We tben came out of the mine and proceeded to the site of
the borehole on surface. At this boreh,")le I observed tbat
then was no transformer and.the low tension cable WIlS lyi.ng
on lIurfaco on the around with ,_ connection box on its erid ,
There was a pair of telephone Hnes mounted under the pOller
line on the poles~ attacbed tQ, a two core PVC cable at tb9
1e.t pole. which cable went down the bor.hol~.
(\
By court: All far as r .. concerned I think all the norlllal
precaution. were taken with regard to protection. I cotaLd
not .ay if an inclined current could travel dow '~he
telephone cable and ignite an acculIWlation of fixedamp below
it. I did not see the .et up underground at the borehole.
I certainly think. all the neceasary precautions were talten
underaround reS.edina the dicconncaetion of the telephone
cable. "
An inspection of the section after the explosion revelled
that sOlie disturbance and h.at va. fOUDei at the end of the
telephone cable. Figure 16 shows the detail of the end of
this cable itl the .ection.
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The Electrician's evidence is as follows:
"We found the end of the te l.ephone cabIe lying as shown in
Figure 16 on the ground not in the wa.ter. The cuter PVC
cover Lng vJas cut off, about 250 romback f rctn the ends.
Th(j, inner common PVC cover wac cut off about 200!Illl1 back
;1
from the ends and the two ends were lying about 150 IllJn
apart.
The red PVC wire wa£ still i.nsulated at it.:. tnd. the back
wire showed a distortion of itB insulation about 120 romback
from its end. The wire was uninsulated for about 175 !ll.lIl.
T~~8.in my opinion. was due t~ some form of distortion due
t,,> the e:r.plosion or durinr. the explosion.
The end showed signs of having been insulated before the
explosion; there was still a small piece of insulaticn
~ticking to the PVC co"er~ng and one could distinctly locate
the i:ot1ller position of lithe insulation tape before the
II
explosion due to the fact that th~ PVC. uncovered by the
inaullltion tape. showed clear aigns of b..ing heatell up and
d~torted. That which had been covered was not distorted.
A careful investig.tion for the iinition sources point~d
only to a discharge of atmoapheric electricity during a
liahtnine"storm frem conductors passing through B.R. 225 to
surface."
Several questions in this evidence relll8inunapswr,r.cr!. Was
the borehole cased? If 80, to what depth? weJ.:et~H: cables
armouredl l(t. the date of thb inc~d.nt. thliMinbg Indlfstry
tended to U8~ paper insulated lead covered wi~e armoured
cable. Was the armouring earthed at either end of th~
cable? 'l'hedepth of the No. 2 CL)81 Geam from surface was 65
metres as shown in Figure 17.
If
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The serious situation which may arise in collieries. i~
highlighted by the contents of a letter sent by the Area.
Inspector;: of Mines to t.he Manager in October 1956 fol1owirlg
a methane explosion which killed 12 persons. The COI!CE!!'n of
I1ining Engineers regarding the quaritity of section
ventilation and the environmental state in abandoned
workings is highlighted.
"Last week after the explosion in the South Developoent:
ends , I instructed you to reduce the number of producing
sections to 5 sections in view of
ventilation conditions in your mine.
On 10th October 1956. I also instructed you that only
approved flameproof equipment should be used in your
producing ae~tions.
I requi:ce that:
1. The number of producing ~ection.~ in your mine Fhall not
exceed the qu.otient of your total downcast air supply
in ra3/second divided by 19 m3/second.
2. You JJhall have delivel'ed to me personally within 48
hours of the receit't of this not-ics. a certificate to
the effect that the electricity supplied to all the
abblu,t'onedsections and other abaadoned" areas oE your
mine have been disconnected at the nearest practicable
point to the shaft;, bottom. 'l'~':..certificate shall be
signed ~Y yourself and the retop0ol$ible Engineers.
Ij
3. Within 96 hours of receiving this notic~~ you shdl
have delivered to Illeperiilonally a cll't'tificate from a
r&coanis.d ventilation expert indicating whether the
ventilation arrangements in your coal mine are such
that:
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a. The best use ::.s being made of the available
downc.as t ui,x ,
h. A,lequate protecti.on is being afforded the areas of
the mine in use aga.inst invasion of firedamp from
abandoned or t :mporarily abandoned s.reas with or
without the maIn fans in ope rac ion ,
/!
c. In the event of the answer to (b) above being in
thl"::nega ci.ve all Labour , except such -l.abour as may
be requireo. to recti.fy matter.s. s~,~1..1be withdrawn
fro~ the workin'vs of your mine un~_~.,(such time as
the necessary precautions have been completed.'
d. Entry to abandoned areas i~ to be prevented by the
pointsconstru¢tion of permanent stoppi~gs at all
where such entry can be gained. You are
to furnish lIIe wi't·hweekly reporte on the
required ,)
progr~S$
of this wcrk. the weeks startin~ from today. until
L\the wo1~ has been completed.
1,/
Please sign. date and return th~ Cl;)pyo~ this letter to me.n
()
Signed - Chief Area Inspector of Mines.
t> many insta1.l~~:: it is necessary for Mining Engineer.s to
realise that only "tough and IJttc.olllprollll.sing attitudes" as
shown above !ill gain the required Bafety objectives.
16. Lack of bleeder roads in pillar extraction sections can
result in a build-up of methane in the goat. When ~he goaf
is ~onnected to surface via a borehule. it is possible to
have a spark develop" in the goaf as a result of ~ lishtnj.ng
;/ "
8tcik"l at the top of the borehOles.r I'
,~
::t
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Lightning is known to have caused a met!1.arl€explosion in the
goaf are:;;.of a s'tonping section at: El:'oeloMines Services
(Ft:y) Limited.
Six workers out of a total of ~4 employed on pillar
extraction. died as a result of carbon raonoxi.de poisoning
when t..'...o mat hane exp Los Ions occurred in rhe goar , at an
estimated 200 In from where they were working and at a depth
of 120 lJ1. Nobody suffered any burns nor did ,my of th~ eye
witnesses see any flames at the time of th~ explo:3ions.
The exac.t cause of the explosion could not be d~termined a.s
thf\-::9uspectedexplosion area was Lnacceas ibLe ,
Thi~ area. however. contained an open 220 rom diameter
3borehole downcasting 0.22 m Ise.r; cf fresh air. into the sea£.
At the time of the accident severe lightning occurred in tr..e
vicinity of the borehole. It is conc Luded that the
lightning current penetrated the body of the earth abo'lp. the
goaf. probably via the wet borehole which acted as a
" when lightning st"L.uc.:k the ground inconductor. the a re a ,, .
This resulted in the occurrence of spad~.s und~t:grot1nd which
ignited t,ht:'critical met hanft/air mature in the vicinity of
the bo reho Le ,
,'.)
'Had this borehole been filleti andlor sealed" d~i:.l accident
might not have occur red ,
\\I;
':\
Figure 18 shows the locality plan of the stoopL~g se~tion
toge t he r with the borehole which was caged w.ith a steel pipe
for 2 ~tres ')nly at the surface. Mana~,ement were unaware
of the existence of this bo rebc.ie,
17. Not all borehtlle~ are recorded ')n mine plans. Hence the
section working plans do not display boreholes and mine
Off~ials are not aware therefor.e of these possible
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conductors. In many instances the top of these holes are
cased with steel pj~es which are themselves excellent
c')ndu<:tots.
18. w'hen !UP'In venc i Lat i.ng fans are stopped Eo r extended pe r Lcds
(longer than 2 hou rs) danp'i'l:ouSmeth;.HH;; accumu Lat i.cns r:;:}y
occur. Notwithstanding that underground power supply may be
isolB~ed~ dn electric storm on surface may cause a ~ethane
exp Io s i.cn . (lHN/NG 374/67 Lndun.eni, Coal. Hines Lirnit
19. In sections whe;~e work has vent iLat ing
r,/ quant it ies are
3m /second to 7
o f t en substantially reduced (f rom
m3/second) while mate::ial and equipment i.s
being reclaimed. Ventilat ion changes a re aLso f r e querrt ly
maee by br e ak i.ng dowr. stoppings in ne Lghhcu r i.ng se a Ie d
sect ion.s and temporarily rep lac Lng t he seal with 8 bra tt i.c e
curtain. If this curtain. is dLstu rbed , ventilation will
short circuit the section where re~lamation is ill progress
thus al10wlllg a d~ngerouB build up of methane~ A lightning
storm on surface could re~ult in a strik~ to surface and a
resultant voltage surge into the gas-filled area with
sparking as an in,itiator of a I"uetbanee:xplosioll.-.
J'.
\,)
20. In the case of the exploaion at UGutu Collieries EaDt Mine
on the 28th August 1972, veut ilat ion chaoies we:re carried
Qut by M Shift Overseer· who closed the regulators reducing
the air flow to the section considerably. His superiors
failed to check his ventilation calculations which proved to
be erroneous ond did no~ follow up by visiting tb~ area
after the changes had been ~ade.
...
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3.1 PRECAUTIONS ro BE ADOPTED
The preceeding; sections have prDvided details of seve ra l
documentated and researched incidents. Based on these. the
following conclusions a!~ observations can be listed.
1. The dan, rs whi·;h arise from on Iy partially s(~alinr. of f
worked-out sect ions in shallow mines are great.
Where sections are giving off metharie freely the section
should either:
be 'totally s eal.ed off using. at least. 225 mm brick
("J)opp'ingswhich are well hitched into thE!roof. floor
"Fand sides end then plastered with n cement mixtur.e on
the outside of the stopping;
or remain adequately ventilated 00 that dangerous
meth~ne accumulations do not build up in the secti~l.
In thill Cllse an f!xamination of the section at two
weekly intervals IiIhouldbe undertaken by an officia::'of
Shift Overseer status. The results of th~ examination
should be recortied in the Shift Overseer's logbook.
This second alternative is not always open to Hining
Engineer.s particularly where ventilation iEl required in
p:roducing sections. Furthermore. the erecti.)t1 of expensive
explosion pr(,of .toppings to Sf>B1 off old cPanels is
generally D(.It i'l:scticeble both ecilonomic.lly and hoUl a tiD)e
constraint point of vi~w.
In a situation sllcbas that at No.3 shaft. Coalbrook. the
relative merits of sustaining low capacity ventilation in
the shaft Bfter sealing (i.e. thro~gh & vent pipe) shollldbe
critically examined. In this situation, a non-conductive
vent pipe would be advisable.
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2. It would be adv Lsah Ie that all prominent surface s t ruc tu re s ,
such as the shaft headgear" be removed prior to shaft
sealing. Where extensive surface conduc t Lve e Lements are
also in tLc· itr.n1ediate vicinity (such as railway lines).
th~se should be temovp.d.
All conductive material in close proximity to the shaft
should be galvanically bonded i.e. shaft col.Lar , s t ruct ur a I
steelwork in a shaft plug, allY pipework passing down the
shaft. AI1 sucb a';!lements should be well 4i'a~thf:d to a common
electrode - preferably the existing main eSlt:h ~le::,,;rode at
the shaft head.
3. Where p rac t i.c e L, be
scheduled out of the lightning season , in orf':~r to allow the
safe attainment of non-c r Lt Lce I mt:thaneillir mixtures.
o
4. Whenevet p rac t tc abke , ,~e'11.ing-('IHope r a+Lons it~_ \)11:1';ecti::ms
should be schedulpd. to take place out c f the J ::'~htr.ing
season to reduce the pcssibility of a build! ,~,,'I of critical
methane/air mixtures whilst then is a slgnificant lightring
hazard.
C;", When sections of workings are to be sealed ofl. it is
important thAl:~all elemc{flts of metalw<>rk and metal equipment
be nlloved from the world.nas. This applies particularly to
items such as conveyor structures. power and telephone
cable8~' pipes. rails and "ires. inclu4ling thoRe attached to
roofbolts. Furth4rll1ore. to pipe or cable entering thp. area
via 8 borebole or otherwi.. Iilhould btil i.ft in positioJ.) and
:I.t is d.,s:i.rable t.hat box.holl! cad.ltS,s itl holes frcill the
sv,rface, b'El",ithdr&wq wherE possible.
"\\ ;'~j \\ /'
The purpo,... olne these Uleaf:ures is ~,.)i'miniailJe the risks of
ulcendi.ry ~~~. occur::ing in • \' critical methane/air
,,~,
lIixtl.l.,re. Such sparks ma:f 4UIlanate from metal objects of
apl"rE!ciabb siz.e when theliu~ are subjected to high potential
gradients during a lightning storm overbead or to high
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levels of electromagnetic induction due to nearby lightning
strikes.
In addition. large surface structures. such as headgears.
should be removed from permanently sealed·-off shafts.
A cBsed borehole will provide an excellent conduc t xve path
into a mine.
5. ~JackRon (1987) deals with the need fer earthing on ~urface
and states that "it;, is desirable for the current Irorn a
direct lightning $trike to ~,,;.ll1inebeadgear or other
structure to hI! absorbed and dissipated by ito; earthing
arrangements so completely th~t there is virtually no rise
in potential of the connected metalwork extending down the
shaft. This may b. a counsel of perfection. but the
provision of a well-designed eerthing system 2bould allow
direct strokes to be safely withstood without consequent
danger underground. With the relatively high soil
resistivities etlcountel:ed in the highveld Ilrea (hundred to
thousands of o~~-.etres) the solution most usually found
practi~.l consists of a loop (.n ring) counterpoise
conductor buried r6und the perimeter of the structure being
'"pro~ec~ed and connected to it at various points. including
corners and cajo~, vertical IJteelwo1:kmeaben. Tho a.ddition
of radial counterpoises and/or vertical driven rod. will
f~rther reduce the earthing taped.nee. and the use of rode
will pouibly enable moister soil lay.n to be brouaht into
contact with tho earthin& .ystem, improving th., earth
('; resi.t.nc&.
ShMft headae.ra. far;: hoUSjpSs. and IlOro .~or in.taUnt ions
such ~.borehob accesa points to under&ro~nd mines
0 (contsinina pip.s of for .. toriala) all require st.dtable
earth electrode systems to .inai•• the chances of higb
voltag •• being introduced into. mine.
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It may be noted that the carrying out of surface soil
resistivity measurtments (necessary to a precusor in
If
if
if
designing an earthing system) is something of an art. A
series of measurements is desirable to give equivalent
resistivities to various d~pths (e.g. 1m. 2m. 4m. 10m. 20m.
40m. 80m). Precautions must b-e taken by using su f f i.c a.en.t Ly
long test ~pikes • and if neces sery wett.ing them with salt
,I) \'
water. tQ)\ ensure that the measu reme; ':/3 a:p= not oeing'-~_I
affected by high test spike resistance."
6. Mining Engineers should hold 6 monthly reviews of all.
slJrface ~md underground earthing standards ttl ensure that
responsible officials are fully aware of the requirements,.
7. The worked-out panel (No.2) in which the explosion occurred
at the Albion Colliery {3.1.1974) was described by the Mine
v
Manager •• dir,ty. dry and dusty_ No stone dust had been
applied to this panel (I.M. Wit A. 220/74). It is necessary
I'
to .!laure that "iIl11 wOl:ked-out pane18 are swept clean and
stonedusted to prevent the initiation of a coal dust
aplcaion follo'W!tng on hi)1II a lightning induced lIIethane
ianitl.cn. ' A. a Shift Overseer at Sprin~field Collieries in
the 1950's. the Author recalls that when rails were removed
froll the old .re.lS of a .action prior to • double track
_tend.oa. all coal ballan and 1008e c~;al wa••,.t•• tic.llyO loaded into .ine tubs bafor. the rails "re
lift"~ Thia Bou:o.d practice ia still applicabl.: ol.d
workin .. should be swept and claared o! all 100 •• coal.
8. After .. alin, off a panel. an ir1d.l~ndent i'll.paction (for
ezecilple by an Environmental Offic:.~r) should be atade to
ensure thAt all brick .eala are IliZl place. At Albiot1!,
Coll~ry (1974) a llrick .toppin, inlt thCl third "ntrance to
"he aftectltd panel had not bean buht and ventilating air
I:
was le.vina thi. panel throuah th:i.•ilentry. The result wae
tlul build-up of .n ex~lo.i," aeth.[(..nSi~ ai.xture.
\;, ii,
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The erection of such seals should be notified to the Mine
Surveyor in writing so tl'at they a re recorded on the mine
pLans ,
9. Employees should report. and Hining Engineers should
"-"',~, i~?:stigate. incidences
~~~_::::;.~PE! rLenc ed unde rg round ,
of eiectrical shocks being
Lightning has also frequently been the cause of electric
shocks experienced by men working underground. palticularly
!!then metalwork wnich is bonded to the mine's electrical
~qrth systems is touched. For example. when a shuttlecar is
touched by • per&on stand:i.ng on the floor. or when a
roofbolt i& touched by someone standing on a loader or other
machine. Although shocks pf this nature have not been the
cauMe of any known
on morale.
injury aa yet. they
In aine. wl'uere"
do have a negative
.ffect such \.,hock.s,(;r
uperi.nced dUrin, thunder8toru. it should beCregarded as
an indication that ther~ ia a .ubsdl.~\tial loul risk of
pr~tur.e detonation of explosives in charged holes. and
possibly also c! the ignition of critical methane
.ere
accwaulations. 4ue to ligMninS.
10. The Code of :?racti~e i'o%' the avoidance of hazards
un<:lerlround in C()llieries. due to liahtning. deals with the
lartbina of Meta~,worlt.in Hille. as followa:
'&artbina (if Hetahork, in Kill••
Ceneral
The "primary lAeaos of lIIin:Laizina th4! effects of stray
potentials and cutrents i. to ensure thet all extensive
metalwork (e.,. conveyor structure •• rail.. piping and cable
abaaths. etc.) is ~.. 'n ••;-tbed and bonded tq,.the1:' so that
'VI ,
.11 n:po.~d lIetal.W(lrk.i. kept as clo.e as possible N t:te
electrical potentid of the nrt~ at all t~u. Ok>nding is
the conn~in, to,ether ~f .eparate metal it... to~\ev.ut
II
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the occurrence of potential differ.ences between such items.
The risk of sparking between them!, or of an electric shock
being received by a person touching one~ or both such items.
is thereby eliminated).
Power Supply Equipment
o
The earthing and bonding clOrmally required in te rms of Mines
and Works R,egulation 21.6 for electric pmiler supplies
underground Ln a colliery is aimed ac ensuz Ing a secu 'e.
lov-resistance metallic circuit from every point on the high
and low voltage power distribution network in the mine back
to the eartbinl electrode of the incoming power supply
substation on the surface. Cables are screened and
protected by earthed she8ths. screens andlor armouring to
prevent the exposllre of
daaage to a cable; and
in thelive conductors event of
to provide, a ioed return path forI,)
fault current to supply-transformer neutrals when insulation
blf:Jtkdown.occur. thus ensuring that itarth ~ault pro~"fction
operatee:· correctly and cut. off the power. Earth I fault
I
curreut. are often intentionally lillited in lI\agnitu1~e to
"
.iIlildse the ri•• of the potential ot earthud metal <.uring
I
the very .bert periods for vhich earth fault curur!',s ii flow.
Ii
lor •• fat,. ~J .... on.. .l.ctr~.c.l aquipaent und.rlrouj~(l i•
•uclo.ad iu ea'Ctbed IUt:a1 houdna8 of fla.'!~)roo}l
AltboaAh all the aboy..antioued pree.udon. are u.ually
:!ken._ .::et:t .. in .~"Ut:~ona~ .... ur." which at ~ important to
ordin.try al..ctri'C:a1 a part inaaf.ty
lishtnin,
and play
prottc:tioft
t,f, '>t8~ are
tOllither of
,\.gainn\~
)'
oft:en n•• lect.td.
a<ijacent .etal'lJOrk
and other .tray currlmt
These .. includ1t the ~pndj>ng
Iisuch a. con'i1eyor I ddve
.ator frames and
i)
conveyor .t.. lwork - • omet bUH! inSulated
froa one ,another due to the use of non-condui~tive sh•.ft
~(\uplin8
'~I.l
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elements and the separate mounting of lllotors on concret€
pedestals. The head of each conveyor st ruct ure must also be
electrically bond.ed to the steel structure o f t he conveyor
onto which it discharges.
Note - Bolting of steel structure elements prd7ides a
sufficiently continuous bond for this pUl.'pof.e. It. the
absence of such bolted conr.ec t Lons, a su i.t abLe e Lect r Le al
bopd should be installed.
Cross-bonding of Electrical ..nd Gthe~ M{'\;~l'It'Crk
In p~iinciple. all continuous metallic ;:;t~rvic<:;eli?ments. such
. I
as cable, Ineatha and arlilouring~ ,,{pes. COl,V'?yor ~~trt.~tures
c
and rails which follow COIIUllon pan~ll~l rour es Zh("'lld be
cros,s/bonoed at r~gular intE!t"'.J81snot e~ceedins SOt,} l':"it~~S.
Ordinarily. such crosa-bo'llding will b)~don~ at high ::€!'lsb~~
cnble joint locations an(i tra.nsformJ~ installation points ...
and should alao include Ipw voluae si&~l1it ..Z and lightit,g
,\ '
CIUlle arlllOuring vh.Ie these are present.
Bondin. Conductor.
It ia recoamend.d that bondina co~ductor. should b.
.~trand.d copper or galvaniaed st •• l wire of 70
cro.a-.action or 1arser. to enaure that they nt-e att;ong
enouah uchanically to ensure reliability in service. Whe(',,"
croas-bondiDa probleas are experienced e.a. wher~ .iinal
cable a~uriD& foraa part of the connection. it is
~o_.nd.4''ithat suitable .arthina cable clamp. and lUI.
I~'
'.1 used in. a bo.ited conr....ctl:on.
II
:1
CODJlec:tion ot M8til,~rk ~io Underaround. Barth~1 Ilectrode.
" >i
Tran.~ent potantl,al f!iifl;er·ftncea can develop bt!t\i!Cten. for
'0
example•• cocv.yor stru<~ture or mobile electrically pO\1ered
C'\\ IUchiue. and the roof. foce and floor of thQ: working ••
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presenting the risk of electric shocks to people during
thunderstorms and also of di::;charges across charged faces to
nearby "earthed" metal obJects such as coal drills. which
may result in the premature detonation of explosives. Such
risks ar-i.se particularly in the case of ext ens i,vr wptkiTl~_;
where the electric~l substation earth on the surface may oe
tw<:,. to five kilometres away from a face area.
Th~ gene ra l, aim is to llll.nimise these transient differences
in potential. and this may be achieved by providing a local
electrical connection .'between the body of earth in the
worHng area and the nearby continuous metallic service
e J!ents.
Som~ success may be achieved in this regard by connecting
th~ face end of conveyor structures to nearby roofbolts.
tthicb should be connected together in groupe of at least
thr~~.. Thill should be repeated at intervals of not more
than 200 !l,\ as the working face advanc~s. Despite the high
i.ndividual ..J.~ctrical resistances of the roofbolts to earth.
conditions can bl?improved substantially by this means.
Th~ rcofbolta must be ot a type that has a good earth
connection with the surroundi~g strata.
Unless the fb..~procf .witchlear at the face is already a
cro.8-bcndin, pC8itionu ttis equipment should. in addition.
be bonded direcHy to the conwyor.
!arthin& Precautions asain.t .Lishtnina
A prillary protective lIleasure.,ainst li,htnina is to ensure
tb&'t all IIlCltal c:ouductor8 ente.rins an underground mine are
~~11 e~rthed at the surface. fhis r~quirea attention at the
c(~llar for verhc::al .h.ft. and to the points where inclined
"aharts and adits reach around level. In addition.
ccnneLtion~ with underground workings such as the armouring
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and/or shear hs of power and telephone cab f.es and p~-pes
passing through boreholes. a:::well as the steel casings of
the boreho",es themselves. should be well earthed at the
surface; and underground they D,;.llstbe bonded to any nearby
metalwork close to their points of entry to the workings.
For an effective design of an earthing system it ~"ould be
advisable to conduct a soil resistivity survey in the
vicinity of the mine workings. If the probability of direct
strikes iti high. then experts on protection should be
consulted ;:;inee earth geographic region and mine
instal1atlun may have its own particular constraints.
As a genetal principle ...1. the collar or po rt a.l of 8. shaft.
it is recopunended that a copper n.ng conductor be bud.ed
\\ .
round the ~~haft opening at I.i minilllum depth of 0.: m, and
that it be cvnnected at several points to the shaft
<·teelwork and headframe. inclined conveyor ar ruc tuze or fan
!lousing. whichever may be the caee. Where a shaft conveyor
deliverr. direct onto a stockpil.Q. it may be useful to have
the riD, conductor encircling the latt~r. In order to
obtain a satisfactorily low earth~g impedance. it may be
neceasary to ilIlprove tht'learthina ebctrode system by adding
radial bu=ied conductors and/or vertical uriven rods.
riiurea 19. ~I) and 21 illustrate typical earthing electrode
arrafta... nts and electrode re'18tance. achievable under
various 80il resistivity conditions.
At the entranca to the shaft or edit. all pipes. rails.
cables. conveyor st~uctul'es and handrails. ali well as all
other contin'4-puS lIletalwxk in the sb4ft. should be bonded
together and to earth.
Where applicable. the relevant provisioDl of ~ABS03 (The
Protection of Structnres against Lightn::.ng) 8S well as the
,\,
reco_endatiol_s contained in the ..ection of the Ch8lo.berQf
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